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Abstract 
When risk management considerations are integrated into the engineering systems 
design, both overall system performance and quality of the developed solutions improve. A 
central part of integrating risk management in engineering systems design is to ensure that the 
design process benefits from employing risk and uncertainty methods with different levels of 
sophistication. That is, namely through the application of risk analyses that model risk and 
uncertainty in different ways. Traditionally, especially in engineering fields, risk analyses have 
largely been expressed in a quantitative, probabilistic form. However, such quantitative 
information, either as customized input to decision making or as general-purpose statistics, is 
itself becoming increasingly problematic and afflicted by severe uncertainty. Both the precision 
in estimates and the quality of background knowledge, on which probabilities are based, have 
been challenged in practice and academia.  
This PhD thesis investigates advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods in 
the context of engineering systems to better address, reflect, and utilize available information 
and background knowledge in design. The investigation was guided by the four research 
questions focusing on: 1) challenges in current design risk management quantification, 2) 
advanced risk and uncertainty methods, introduced under the non-probabilistic framework: the 
first group of methods is based on imprecise probabilities, the second represents a group of 
semi-quantitative approaches and the third group of methods is based on exploratory modeling, 
3) prototypical applications of the non-probabilistic methods in different engineering systems 
design contexts, and 4) the transfer and integration of these methods and their results into 
overall risk management and associated processes. The results are presented in corresponding 
chapters from which four core findings are extracted: 1) currently widely used risk and 
uncertainty methods do not appropriately describe all uncertainty - especially uncertainty due 
to lack of knowledge, so called epistemic uncertainty – that remains a challenge, 2) advanced 
methods have been developed in other fields (i.e. outside of engineering design) to deal with 
similar issues and have provided valuable results in those fields, but have not yet been applied 
or tested in engineering design contexts, 3) for the engineering design situations and scenarios 
tested in this thesis, the non-probabilistic methods provided more credible representation of 
uncertainty, and 4) finding and employing a satisfactory quantification method from the 
available options is context dependent, and a broader process view needs to be considered when 
tailoring risk management to specific design situations. 
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This study contributes in four ways to the extension of our knowledge base on risk 
management in engineering systems design. First, the study synthesizes the challenges in 
current risk management from the literature and through empirical work regarding: modeling, 
quality of background knowledge and use and integration of results (research question 
1/contribution 1). Second, this study systematically collects and categorizes advanced methods 
from the literature in other domains, conceptually develops them for the design context and 
provides a unique platform for their application through the non-probabilistic framework 
(research question 2/contribution 2). Third, it transfers these methods into usable tools through 
examples in case study applications in the oil and gas industry, followed by their comparison 
with several traditional probability approaches in representative situations (research question 
3/contribution 3). Fourth, this study facilitates and enables a more adequate choice of a 
quantification method depending on the design context in question by developing a risk 
management tailoring approach (research question 4/contribution 4). The overall conclusion is 
that non-probabilistic methods have a high potential in engineering systems design, but their 
integration to the overall risk management and associated processes must be carefully and 
knowingly planned and carried out, to harness this potential and to achieve an actual design 
impact in practice. 
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Dansk Sammenfatning 
Denne afhandling udforsker forskellige måder, som skal forbedre det videnskabelige 
felt risikostyring. Mere specifikt er målet med denne afhandling, at give en praktisk rettesnor 
og et solidt videnskabeligt fundament til at adressere, reflektere over og udnytte den 
tilgængelige information/viden indenfor kvantificering af risiko og usikkerhed. Når 
risikostyring integreres i engineering systems design styrker det kvaliteten af både systemets 
performance og kvaliteten af de løsninger der udvikles. Et central aspekt i at integrere 
risikostyring i engineering systems design er at sikre at design processen drager fordel af at 
benytte metoder til håndtering af risiko og usikkerhed som har forskellig grad af detaljering og 
sofistikation. Fordelen handler ofte om at benytte metoder der arbejder med risiko og 
usikkerhed på forskellige måder. Risiko styring har oprindeligt været overvejende kvantitativ 
og benyttet sandsynligheder, specielt inden for ingeniørkunst. Kvantitativ information som 
benyttes som input til beslutninger eller statistik, er imidlertid blevet mere problematisk at 
benytte og påvirkes af voldsom usikkerhed. Brugen af sandsynligheder er blevet udfordret af 
akademika og i praksis med hensyn til præcision i estimater og kvaliteten af den 
baggrundsviden som brugen bygger på.  
Denne Ph.d. afhandling undersøger avancerede metoder til kvantificering af risiko og 
usikkerhed i relation til engineering systems, for bedre at kunne adressere, reflektere og benytte 
den information der er tilgængelig samt baggrundsviden inden for design. Afhandlingen blev 
guidet af fire forskningsspørgsmål som fokuserede på: 1) udfordringer ved nuværende 
kvantificering i risikostyring i design, 2) avancerede metoder til risiko og usikkerheds 
håndtering – som introduceres i forbindelse med ikke-kvantitative metoderamme i tre dele: 
Den første gruppe af metoder er baseret på upræcise sandsynligheder, den anden gruppe 
repræsentere en gruppe af semi-kvantitative tilgange og den tredje gruppe er baseret på 
eksplorative modeller, 3) prototypiske anvendelser af de ikke-probabilistiske metoder i 
forskellige engineering systems design kontekster, og 4) overførsel og integration af disse 
metoder og deres resultater til risikostyring og de tilknyttede processer. Resultatet præsenteres 
i tilsvarende kapitler hvorfra fire centrale resultater uddrages: 1) nuværende metoder til 
risikostyring og usikkerhed som bruges i vid udstrækning, beskriver ikke al usikkerhed på en 
passende måde – især vedrørende usikkerhed som skyldes manglende viden, såkaldt epistemisk 
usikkerhed, som forbliver en udfordring, 2) avancerede metoder er blevet udviklet inden for 
andre felter (uden for engineering design) for at adressere lignende udfordringer og har vist sig 
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at være værdifulde inden for disse felter, men er endnu ikke blevet anvendt eller testet i 
engineering design kontekster, 3) det var de ikke-probabilistiske metoder som gav mest 
pålidelige resultater i de engineering design kontekster som blev testet, 4) at identificere en 
tilfredsstillende metode afhænger af konteksten og et mere vidtrækkende syn på processen er 
nødvendigt for at kunne tilpasse eller ’skræddersy’ risikostyringsprocessen til specifikke 
design sammenhænge og situationer. 
Afhandlingen bidrager til forskningen og viden inden for risikostyring i engineering 
systems design på fire måder. For det første syntetiseres udfordringerne ved nuværende 
risikostyring fra litteraturen og gennem case studier vedrørende: modellering, kvalitet af 
baggrundsviden og brug af samt integration af resultaterne (forskningsspørgsmål 1/bidrag 1). 
For det andet samler afhandlingen systematisk avancerede metoder fra litteraturen inden for 
andre domæner og kategorisere dem, udvikler dem til brug i en design kontekst og bidrager 
med en unik platform til at benytte metoderne ved hjælp af det ikke-probabilistiske 
rammeværktøj (forskningsspørgsmål 2/bidrag 2). For det tredje overføres disse metoder til 
anvendelige værktøjer ved hjælp af eksempler fra case studierne indenfor olie og gas 
industrien. Metoderne sammenlignes med traditionelle tilgange som gør brug af sandsynlighed 
i repræsentative scenarier (forskningsspørgsmål 3/bidrag 3). For det fjerde facilitere 
afhandlingen valg af metode til kvantificering i relation til den konkrete design kontekst. Der 
udvikles en fremgangsmåde og rammeværktøj til tilpasning / skræddersyning af risikostyring 
(forskningsspørgsmål 4/bidrag 4). Den mest gennemgribende konklusion er at ikke-
probabilistiske metoder har stort potentiale inden engineering systems design, men deres 
integration i risikostyring og de tilknyttede processer bør planlægges nøje og udføres refleksivt 
for at kunne tøjle og udnytte potentialet, samt opnå en reel indflydelse i praksis. 
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1. Introduction: Re-thinking risk quantification in 
engineering systems design  
 
“Great Design sprouts when good research grows” 
- M. Cobanli -  
This first chapter introduces the PhD thesis, starting with the overall motivation for the 
research and problem framing (Section 1.1), as well as outlining the industrial context 
surrounding the study. Section 1.2 highlights the challenges of designing engineering systems, 
the current industrial needs and knowledge gaps regarding advanced risk quantification 
methods, and their integration into the overall risk management and design process. Thereafter, 
Section 1.3 lays out the research objectives and the main research questions, based on the need 
and knowledge gaps introduced in the previous section, and links them to the research 
methodology that is further described in Chapter 2. Finally, Section 1.4 provides a brief outline 
of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Motivation and problem framing: Risk and uncertainty quantification 
in engineering systems design need improvement 
 
This section highlights the following key messages: 1) Many engineering projects 
fail to deliver in terms of time, cost and/or performance; 2) This means that there is great 
incentive to find methods – risk management – that help us assess the risk of failing to 
deliver and of mitigating those risks; risk management is part of project management 
and most engineers’ training; 3) Such methods often need a quantitative estimate of the 
probabilities of adverse events and yet these are difficult to identify, especially in the early 
stages of engineering systems design; 4) This deficiency (lack of reliable quantitative 
probability estimates) is made especially difficult today by the trends toward “systems of 
systems” in engineering, as well as by megaprojects. Ironically, it is in megaprojects that 
the need for risk management is the greatest. For these reasons, this thesis investigates 
methods to improve risk and uncertainty quantification in current practices.  
 There is an ongoing and lively discussion in research communities on why engineering 
systems projects often face challenges to be on time, on budget, and on specifications. In 
particular, much focus is placed on those whose goal is a design of an engineering system (de 
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Weck, Roos, & Magee, 2011). According to de Weck, Roos, and Magee (2011) engineering 
systems are defined as: “A class of systems characterized by a high degree of technical 
complexity, social intricacy, and elaborate processes, aimed at fulfilling important functions 
in society.” The design, delivery and operation of engineering systems are normally executed 
through projects, including products in the systems – aircraft, computers, communications 
equipment etc.  
The issue raised in this thesis is of key relevance for industry. The Project Management 
Institute estimated that more than 40% of engineering projects fail to meet their goals. “We see 
US$122 million wasted for every US$1 billion invested due to poor project performance, a 12 
percent increase over last year.” (PMI, 2016). The main message of their reports is that the 
cost of low performance is high. Apart from this substantial economic factor, engineering 
systems that fail to meet design specifications could potentially have a tremendous effect on 
the quality of thousands or millions of people’s lives.  
Engineering systems play an important role in society, but are also extremely risky 
(Locatelli & Mancini, 2010). Causality with a weak (i.e. often sub-optimal) phase of project 
planning has been researched before, since it leads to underestimations of the costs, 
overestimation of short-term benefits, and strategic misrepresentations (Flyvbjerg, 2006b). 
Merrow (2013) shows that the vast majority of large-scale projects could be considered a failure 
when considering adherence to schedule and budget as well as benefits in operation (Locatelli, 
2018).  
On the other hand, globalization brought integration of multiple engineering systems 
accompanied by designed and integrated services. However, it also brought higher 
competitiveness in the market. This consequently leads to time pressures, tighter budgets and 
a greater need for higher accuracy in estimates at an early design stage. This is even more the 
case when system-ilities are taken into account – properties concerning wider system impacts 
with respect to time and stakeholders (e.g. resilience, flexibility, adaptivity) (Chalupnik, Wynn, 
& Clarkson, 2013). In the case of large-scale engineering systems, the complexities, numbers 
of people involved, long life-cycles and enormous societal effects are even more evident. 
Therefore, such engineering systems are inherently more difficult to describe, understand, 
design, manage, and operate (de Weck, Roos, & Magee, 2011). 
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For instance, one example of poor performance is certainly the Berlin Brandenburg 
Airport. A number of challenges and changes in the design, and a rather long list of identified 
shortcomings led to tripled costs, now estimated to be €5.4 billion (Hammer, 2015). The 
learnings from this example pose the question: What can we do to better support decision 
making in similar cases? There is no doubt that making decisions in engineering systems design 
is a challenging task, but can we do better than this, and how can we make sure that the overall 
quality improves? 
It has been suggested by both researchers and practitioners that the way we manage 
design solutions should keep pace with the complex and changing nature of engineering 
systems (Chang, Lee, & Chen, 2014). Risk management is an important tool to assess the 
environmental, financial, legal, technical and societal impacts of product, system and service 
designs to support achieving predefined goals. These changes lead to the increased importance 
of addressing uncertainty throughout the whole life cycle of a product, system or service. 
Uncertainty considerations are particularly relevant for the accuracy of planning models, and 
thus research, in that direction is of great significance for the field. 
During the last decades, the management of risk in engineering systems design and 
associated projects and services has drawn attention from researchers and practitioners in areas 
such as engineering design (Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2009), project management (Raz & 
Michael, 2001), and safety-related risk management (Paté-Cornell, 1996; Glendon, Clarke, & 
McKenna, 2016). The Project Management Institute represents the largest professional 
organization dedicated to the project management field, and identifies risk management as one 
of the ten main areas of project management (PMI, 2008). Furthermore, risk management 
courses are usually a part of most training programs for project managers. In accordance with 
the current view of project management as a life cycle process, project risk management is 
often perceived as a process that accompanies a project, from the initiation through the 
planning, execution, monitoring and control phases all the way to the completion and closure 
(Raz & Michael, 2001). Arguably, risk management has become an integral part of many 
formalized design processes for complex technical or socio-technical systems.  
Despite this formalization of risk management in organizations, Flyvbjerg (2007) 
observed that the main challenges of large projects, including the design of engineering 
systems, are incomplete, inadequate, unreliable or misleading information. Decisions made 
during the design process have a significant impact on the strategic value of the asset delivered, 
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and these decisions depend on the quality of the information on which they are based (Eweje, 
Turner, & Müller, 2012).  
Furthermore, it has been shown by empirical studies (Levi, 1990; Sahlin, 2012) that the 
amount and quality of information used to develop probability and utility functions is an 
important factor when making decisions. For example, people tend to make different decisions 
if they are aware of the amount and quality of the data on which probability and utility 
assessments are based. Given that uncertainty plays an important role in decision making, it is 
notable that its quality improves if uncertainty is carefully addressed (e.g. Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991; Riabacke, 2006). 
For the last few decades, the probability theory has gained popularity in many 
applications such as modeling and quantifying uncertainty in engineering systems. The 
development of probability as a measurement of uncertainty is based on an axiom that precise 
measurements of uncertainties can be made (Bernardo & Smith, 2009). However, the 
complexity of today’s engineering systems has been increased by various requirements, such 
as high performance, efficiency, and cost reduction. Since a probabilistic risk and uncertainty 
quantification analysis requires extensive information, both scientific and engineering 
communities have recently realized that there are limitations to using probabilistic frameworks 
in their systems, and the precision of estimates has been challenged. Therefore, there is a need 
for exploring advanced methods that could overcome these challenges.  
1.2. Identified need and knowledge gaps: The critical role of knowledge in 
uncertainty quantification 
 
This section highlights that risk management tries to identify what we know about 
the ways in which things could go wrong, and the likelihood of such occurring; this is 
crucially dependent on our knowledge of the project, the engineering, the people involved 
etc. In large-scale engineering systems design this knowledge is very distributed among 
the participants. Hence, this section introduces the reader to epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainty, and ambiguity. Probabilistic methods function well in relation to aleatory 
uncertainty, but to a lesser extent with the other two. Engineering systems design in 
particular needs methods to deal with a lack of knowledge, and I will thus examine non-
probabilistic methods that are nevertheless compatible with Bayesian/classic probability 
in this regard. The non-probabilistic methods have demonstrated reliable results in other 
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fields facing similar challenges, and are therefore worth exploring in the engineering 
systems design context. Methods that focus on ambiguity are outside the scope of the 
thesis. I will examine three different groups of non-probabilistic methods and test their 
application through case studies. This will show how they may be incorporated into 
usable design tools. 
Almost a century ago, Knight (1921) made a distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
Both concepts are described in detail in Chapter 3, where I introduce the definition underlying 
this research. Risk can be defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2009). 
Furthermore, two types of uncertainty can be distinguished: epistemic uncertainty and 
aleatory uncertainty (e.g. Helton & Burmaster, 1996). Epistemic uncertainty arises due to lack 
of knowledge and can be reduced by collecting and acquiring new knowledge. This is in 
contrast to aleatory uncertainty that is of stochastic nature, and therefore cannot be reduced. In 
addition to the types of uncertainty, there is the concept of ambiguity: it describes how factual 
statements may be interpreted differently by different individuals (Klinke & Renn, 2002). 
Arguably, one of the key challenges in design risk management today is that uncertainty 
quantification relies heavily on probabilistic models (Flage et al., 2014). While these are fully 
capable of describing aleatory uncertainty, they have been challenged when used to model 
epistemic uncertainty (Dubois, 2010) or ambiguity. If used this way, probabilistic approaches 
lead to violations of their initial assumptions and provide arguable precision in their results. 
This thesis examines the current state of the art in practice in six leading, large-scale companies 
in engineering systems design, and documents the existing challenges. That represents the basis 
for the first claim: current risk management practices need improvement, since we only use a 
subset of the quantification methods. 
Understanding current design risk management challenges is a key element to providing 
usable tools to best support industry needs. Thus, this thesis relies heavily on established 
collaborations with practitioners from various engineering systems design domains. The 
collaborations were essential for understanding their risk management process requirements. 
Based on this, better support for decision making in situations dominated by weak 
available information is documented and this is found to be a common issue for multiple 
engineering sectors. It is therefore essential to explore methods to better assess uncertainty 
caused by a lack of knowledge. This sets the basis for the second claim: literature could provide 
   21 
 
arguments to build theoretical reasoning, and bring formality to the choice of risk management 
methods and their application. 
For the reasons mentioned above, it is necessary to investigate other risk and 
uncertainty quantification methods to advance the support of decision making in situations 
dominated by lack of knowledge. After introducing the research methodology in Chapter 2, 
this thesis first investigates the current state-of-the-art in engineering systems design risk 
management (Chapter 3). Second, the thesis systematically collects and introduces three groups 
of “non-probabilistic” risk and uncertainty quantification methods that promise to better 
address epistemic uncertainty, and discusses their possible application in the context of 
engineering systems design risk management (Chapter 4). These theories are not in conflict 
with Bayesian or classical probability but rather provide tools that complement probabilistic 
methods for risk assessment of systems when data are scarce. However, advanced methods to 
better deal with ambiguity in uncertainty quantification are beyond the scope of the thesis.  
Third, the non-probabilistic methods represent three different angles of adding to the 
existing engineering systems design risk management thinking. These angles are presented 
below (each is introduced and analyzed through one representative approach): 
1. Imprecise probabilities through Coherent upper and lower probabilities (Walley, 1991): 
expand the possibilities of established probabilistic risk quantification to reason more 
reliably with limited information on actual probability distributions. The approach 
allows decision makers to review and discuss coherent and plausible ranges of 
probabilities. 
2. Semi-quantitative approaches through the NUSAP scheme (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1990): this can be seen as an extension of established probabilistic modeling of 
uncertainty. NUSAP adds qualitative information to the uncertainty and risk analysis in 
a structured manner, informing the modeling, analysis and decision making process by 
making issues such as data origin, quality and key assumptions transparent. 
3. A family of related approaches for dealing with uncertainty with their roots in 
exploratory modeling, here introduced through robust decision making (Lempert, 
Popper, & Bankes, 2003). The main principles of these methods are to explore a wide 
variety of relevant uncertainties, connect short-term targets to long-term goals, commit 
to short-term actions while keeping options open, continuously monitor the 
environment, and act if necessary. 
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Fourth, improving risk and uncertainty quantification is only one part toward achieving 
higher accuracy in estimates. The choice of risk quantification method and its integration into 
the overall risk management process play a crucial role and also need to be considered (Chapter 
8). 
1.3. Outline of research objective and research questions 
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background that will substantiate the choice of 
research questions in detail, complemented by empirically documented needs. The 
development of the research questions was an iterative process (see Chapter 2 for details), 
where the detailed research questions, particularly research questions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, were 
developed and refined during the exploration phase of this PhD project.  
The overall research objective is derived from three interconnected research areas and 
defined as better design and delivery of engineering systems utilizing advanced risk and 
uncertainty quantification (introduced in this thesis under the non-probabilistic framework). 
Chapter 2 and Table 1 describe in detail all steps and rationale behind each of them.  
1.4. Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis consists of ten chapters complemented by references and appendices. In the 
following, the thesis structure is described in relation to the current state-of-the-art and its 
limitations, methodology, data, and research questions. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
•  Chapter 2 describes the employed research methodology in reference to the Design 
Research Methodology and its stages, details the research questions and their rationale, 
and provides information about the empirical studies. 
 
• Chapter 3 addresses research question 1. It provides an overview of the main schools 
of thought in uncertainty quantification. Moreover, it provides an understanding of the 
limitations of the currently most widely employed methods, followed by a number of 
challenges in practice that are documented through case studies. The chapter explains 
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the motivation and sets the basis for investigating advanced methods for risk and 
uncertainty quantification. 
 
• Chapter 4 addresses research question 2. It introduces a number of advanced methods 
for risk and uncertainty quantification that promise to better cope with the challenges 
identified. These methods are introduced under the ‘non-probabilistic’ framework and 
are structured into three groups. The first group of methods is based on imprecise 
probabilities, the second represents a group of semi-quantitative approaches, and the 
third group of methods is based on exploratory modeling. 
 
• Chapter 5 addresses research question 3.1. It illustrates the problem of imprecision and 
how we can employ the first group of non-probabilistic methods (imprecise 
probabilities) to better support decision making. The chapter compares an imprecise 
probability method, i.e. a probability bound analysis, to several traditional subjective 
probability approaches for a case study in the oil and gas industry. 
 
• Chapter 6 addresses research question 3.2. It focuses on the representation of the 
background knowledge in risk and uncertainty assessment. Based on a case study, a set 
of methods from the second group of non-probabilistic approaches (semi-quantitative 
approaches) are applied to visualize uncertainty surrounding data and results. In 
addition, calculations are developed to quantify and correct biases in expert judgment 
in risk assessments, as well as qualitative approaches to inform decision makers’ levels 
of trust in risk quantifications.  
 
• Chapter 7 addresses research question 3.3. It further investigates the third group of 
methods (exploratory modeling) through one representative approach, robust decision 
making, for the challenges related to the life cycle aspects. The challenges of using the 
method in the engineering systems design context are documented, and conceptual 
suggestions to overcome them are proposed.  
 
• Chapter 8 addresses research question 4. It provides practical guidance for tailoring 
risk management. Different needs for risk and uncertainty quantification are discussed, 
and concrete suggestions are provided for designing a risk management process and 
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choosing a risk or uncertainty quantification method through a number of representative 
examples.  
 
• Chapter 9 deals with the broader discussion of the integration of this work with the 
current state-of-the-art. The chapter compares the presented methods with several other, 
widely used methods. This is followed by recommendations and overall research 
limitations.  
 
• Chapter 10 concludes and summarizes this thesis and includes a reflection on the 
theoretical and industrial contributions, research and managerial implications, and 
recommendations for future research.  
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2. Research methodology 
 
“Not everything that is faces can be changed, but nothing can be changed until is faced” 
- James Baldwin - 
  
This chapter describes the research methodology applied to this doctoral study. In 
addition to the system of methods employed to acquire, analyze, and interpret empirical data, 
this chapter introduces the logic behind the selected methods in connection to the theoretical 
research approach and its limitations (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). 
The following discusses the methodological approach and research design and provides 
a detailed description of each research stage. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 
provides a short review of theoretical and empirical considerations related to the methodology 
and frameworks. Section 2.2 further describes the research objectives and questions introduced 
in Chapter 1. Section 2.3 describes the overall stages of the applied Design Research 
Methodology (DRM), and Section 2.4 introduces the case studies and the strategies utilized for 
data gathering, analysis and interpretation. Section 2.5 provides a summary of the presented 
research methodology.  
2.1. Theoretical and empirical approach 
  
 Given that the main research paradigm is within design research, the thesis’s 
methodology is built on the Design Research Methodology (DRM). DRM is also highly 
suitable, as it supports both the literature-based (i.e. Chapters 3, 4, 8) and the empirically-based 
elements (i.e. Chapters 5, 6, 7) of this thesis. Also, the projects used in the empirical 
components of this thesis are either directly situated in a design context, or design new products 
and/or services in their respective contexts (for the overview of the empirical data sources and 
design challenges in question see Section 2.4). The methodology allows a systematic approach 
for conducting design research, with the overall aim “to make design more effective and 
efficient in order to enable design practice to develop more successful products…” (Blessing 
& Chakrabarti, 2009). Such design research/design science is aimed at improving, which is 
expressed as “the purpose of design science is to raise quality of designing and designs …” 
(Argyris & Schon, 1989). This is accomplished by a focus on both creating an understanding 
of the phenomenon in design, and the development and validation of support to improve design 
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practice. Therefore, the DRM framework allows researchers to generate insights into design 
practice, and by developing different support tools strive for a changed, further developed, and 
improved design (practice) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Design Research Methodology (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). 
 
Research design  
As Chapter 1 indicates, this study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. This 
research paradigm is known as a mixed-methods approach. The mixed-methods approach has 
its strength in getting the best from the two worlds (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Even 
though the research process seems like a linear sequence of steps, in practice it followed a 
series of iterative steps and customizations toward industry needs.  
The initial literature review on the various limitations in terms of current risk 
management practices sets the basis for collaboration with industry. In fact, during the project, 
interaction with six participating companies took place over the course of three years in 
multiple ways, at different levels, and with varying goals. The research project’s first 
explorative studies were accompanied by the use of semi-structured interviews. This generated 
insights from the industry and real-world practice, provided details on specific risk 
quantification analyses, and enabled the articulation of knowledge gaps and current risk 
methods limitations. These examples lead the interviews in directions of interest to both the 
interviewees and the interviewers. Hereafter, follow-up meetings, student projects, 
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conferences, forums, single-person interviews, and two synthetic case studies for the actual test 
of the developed support from this project increased the involvement with and verification from 
industry.  
A number of analysis methods were used throughout the research project, with iterative 
exploration as the backbone. The process included exploratory meetings with industry 
stakeholders, and an initial literature review in order to identify needs and knowledge gaps. 
Identification and organization of the main industry needs and knowledge gaps helped to align 
academic and industry needs and goals. Initial formulation of research objectives and research 
questions clarified the scope of the project. Exploratory case studies and a second more focused 
literature review were carried out to additionally enrich the non-probabilistic framework. 
Furthermore, the case studies were introduced in which the methods were applied. At the end, 
analysis of the results and evaluation of the framework’s ability to address industrial needs and 
knowledge gaps were documented and discussed with practitioners.  
2.2. Research objectives and research questions  
 
 Before implementing the research design and verifying whether the research questions 
could be answered within the scope of this project, the constructs used in the questions had to 
be developed, detailed and described. This was done mainly to investigate if the constructs can 
be measured, and even more so to establish which methods were suitable for the use in each of 
the DRM research stages (see Table 1).  
The identified needs and knowledge gaps acted as drivers for the thesis and were used 
to determine the goal of this study as well as concrete and feasible research objectives. The 
main unresolved issue for each of the four research objectives was phrased as a research 
question, which also defined the shape of the expected outcomes. Finally, the results/outcomes 
were evaluated based on academic and industrial success criteria.  
The overall research aim, derived from three interconnected research areas, is defined 
as better design and delivery of engineering systems utilizing advanced risk and 
uncertainty quantification. These research areas are first introduced in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 
and further detailed in Chapter 3. As explained in Chapter 1, in the research questions I refer 
to the methods as risk quantification in order to shorten/simplify the wording. In order to 
achieve the aim, four more specific aims were articulated: A) to understand and document the 
current state-of-the-art in current engineering systems design risk management; B) to collect 
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and conceptually develop the non-probabilistic framework; C) to provide prototypical 
applications of the introduced (non-probabilistic) methods, and D) to discuss and develop the 
integration of these methods into the overall risk management processes. 
Table 1 Research questions and respective research aims and objectives 
 
    
Thesis RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 RQ 4 
Research 
question 
What are the 
challenges 
with current 
engineering 
systems 
design risk 
management 
methods? 
What 
advanced risk 
quantification 
methods exist 
that have not 
been widely 
used in the 
engineering 
systems 
design 
context? 
How can advanced risk quantification 
methods be transferred into usable tools? 
 
 
 
During the thesis the question was refined into 
the following sub-questions (see Chapter 4):  
How can we 
effectively 
integrate 
advanced risk 
quantification 
methods into 
the overall 
risk 
management 
process? 
How to use 
(deploy) 
imprecise 
probabilities 
in expert 
judgment 
elicitation? 
How to use 
the NUSAP 
tool to treat 
and manage 
uncertain 
assumptions? 
What 
methods exist 
to support 
long-term 
decision-
making in 
early design 
when facing 
severe 
uncertainties 
and scarce 
information? 
 
Aim and 
objective 
An overview 
of the 
current 
state-of-the-
art in the 
field 
Collection of 
the methods 
and framing 
of the non-
probabilistic 
framework 
Prototypical 
application of 
an advance 
quantification 
method 
Representing 
background 
knowledge 
and 
information 
Exploring 
approaches 
for coping 
with deep 
uncertainty 
Tailoring risk 
management 
(based on the 
maturity of 
risk 
management) 
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A) An overview of the current state-of-the-art in engineering systems design risk 
management  
 The first research objective is to provide an overview of the current engineering systems 
design risk management, articulate the challenges in practice, and conceptually guide the 
remainder of the research. In terms of knowledge gaps, this objective stems from difficulties 
in quantifying and managing uncertainty (i.e. epistemic uncertainty) in design due to its nature, 
and a lack of information at the early stages of design projects. From an industrial point of 
view, the objective emerged from insufficient understanding of uncertainty types and 
respective quantification requirements of associated risks, as well as inability of the available 
methods to address all the challenges practitioners face.  
 The main problem was translated into research question 1: What are the challenges 
with current engineering systems design risk management methods? The answer to the 
first research question should articulate problems with current risk management processes and 
most employed risk quantification methods, document the challenges in practice, and clarify 
the main risk quantification theoretical concepts.  
B) Conceptual development of the non-probabilistic framework and collection of the 
methods 
 The second research objective was to collect advanced risk quantification methods 
developed in other fields that have a potential to address documented challenges in design, and 
to conceptually develop the non-probabilistic framework that provides a clear structure for 
gathering advanced methods. In terms of knowledge gaps, this objective was triggered by the 
latest advancements in other domains (such as mathematics, artificial intelligence, safety 
engineering, water management, etc.). From an industrial point of view, this objective emerged 
from the need to more thoroughly analyze the way we cope with epistemic uncertainty and to 
achieve that in a more systematic way.  
 The main problem was translated into research question 2: What advanced risk 
quantification methods exist that have not been widely used in the engineering systems 
design context? The answer to this question should provide the unique non-probabilistic 
framework that offers a clear structure and collection of the advanced methods.  
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C) Prototypical applications of the non-probabilistic methods 
 The third research objective was to provide means for the non-probabilistic approaches 
to be applicable in practice by transferring them into usable tools. These can be seen as a toolkit 
from which, depending on the design challenge or the risk quantification aspect we want to 
improve, the use of a specific method is recommended. In terms of knowledge gaps, case 
studies were conducted to demonstrate the potential of non-probabilistic approaches, as they 
need to be adjusted to the particular design needs. This objective emerged from an industrial 
point of view, as the more mathematically advanced methods need to be manageable for the 
practitioners; they can utilize the potential of the powerful computers now available in 
companies.  
 The main problem was translated into research question 3: How can advanced risk 
quantification methods be transferred into usable tools? During the thesis the question was 
refined into the following sub-questions, each corresponding to one group of methods from the 
non-probabilistic framework:  
Research question 3.1: How to use (deploy) imprecise probabilities in expert 
judgment elicitation? The answer to this question should introduce the imprecise method 
reasoning and provide an example of how a method from the first group of non-probabilistic 
methods can be applied in practice. 
Research question 3.2: How to use the NUSAP tool to treat and manage uncertain 
assumptions? The answer to this question should provide an example of where and how a 
method from the second group of non-probabilistic approaches can be used.  
Research question 3.3: What methods exist to support long-term decision-making 
in early design when facing severe uncertainties and scarce information? The answer to 
this question should raise awareness of the advancements in IT that now allow advanced 
simulations. A set of methods is introduced and one particular approach from the third group 
of non-probabilistic methods is discussed – robust decision making.  
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D) Tailoring risk management (based on the maturity of a risk management process) 
to specific quantification needs  
 The fourth research objective is to provide a wider process view of the integration of 
risk quantification methods into the overall risk management process. In terms of knowledge 
gaps, this objective emerges from a broad range of risk management processes as well as 
different practical design challenges. From an industrial point of view, companies can have 
different risk management maturity levels, which is why support is needed in planning process 
improvements.  
The main problem was translated into research question 4: How can we effectively 
integrate advanced risk quantification methods into the overall risk management 
process? The answer to this question should provide a tailoring approach that ties risk 
quantification methods to the overall risk management process (proposed in ISO 31000) as a 
basis for systematic improvement of risk management. What needs to be improved is not only 
the quantification itself, but also its communication and its integration into the overall process.  
 
2.3. Design Research Methodology stages  
 
The DRM consists of four stages that were followed to structure the thesis and guide 
the research process: research clarification (Chapters 1 and Section 3.1), descriptive study I 
(Section 3.2 and Chapter 4), prescriptive study, and relative initial stage of descriptive study II 
(Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8). While a descriptive study focuses on investigating and describing 
problems, a prescriptive study develops support that addresses those problems. The first three 
DRM stages were associated with at least one research question (Table 2). The last stage, 
descriptive study II, focuses on “the impact of the support and its ability to realize the desired 
situation” (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009), and therefore this stage evaluates whether the 
success criteria were met. For this reason, this stage is discussed as the final part of each of the 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
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Table 2 Research questions and research stages according to DRM 
Thesis 
Chapter 
Research Question RC DS 
I 
PS DS 
II 
Chapter 3 
RQ 1: What are the challenges with current 
engineering systems design risk 
management methods? 
● ●   
Chapter 4 
RQ 2: What advanced risk quantification 
methods exist that have not been widely 
used in the engineering systems design 
context? 
 ●   
Chapter 5 
RQ 3.1: How to use (deploy) imprecise 
probabilities in expert judgment elicitation? 
  ● ● 
Chapter 6 
RQ 3.2: How to use the NUSAP tool to 
treat and manage uncertain assumptions? 
  ● ● 
Chapter 7 
RQ 3.3: What methods exist to support 
long-term decision-making in early design 
when facing severe uncertainties and scarce 
information? 
  ● ● 
Chapter 8 
RQ4: How can we effectively integrate 
advanced risk quantification methods into 
the overall risk management process? 
●  ● ● 
 
The goals and the work carried out at each stage are summarized as follows: 
Research clarification (RC) 
The goal of this stage was to define the key research problems, research objectives, 
theoretical focus and research questions, as well as to identify potential models and methods to 
answer the research questions. The research clarification process was conducted iteratively, 
defining a set of research goals and questions and adjusting these after Descriptive study I. A 
preliminary literature study, based on state-of-the-art design risk management research 
combined with discussions with industry practitioners and researchers, supported the research 
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clarification process and the literature study through the entire research project (reported in 
Chapter 3).  
This stage included an inductive process of increasing the level of abstraction, where 
literature gaps and the discovered needs in practice are framed into approachable research 
questions and linked to the research methodology. The intention was to provide a holistic 
exploration of the problem space that could subsequently be transferred to a suitable model. 
The main results of this stage can be found primarily in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Descriptive study I (DS I) 
The goal of this stage was to develop, refine and propose the non-probabilistic 
framework. In order to do so, two exploratory in-depth case studies and interviews (Yin, 2013) 
were carried out in six companies, as well as a literature review (Webster & Watson, 2002). 
This particular stage was also vital in the sense that it was used to align research and industry 
goals, and to establish a sound platform to articulate the problems in a form that corresponds 
to the scope of the project. 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the industrial state-of-the-art in terms of 
design risk management, two in-depth case studies (Yin, 2013) were developed. As described 
in Section 3.2, the exploratory case studies look into two different, but currently well used risk 
management tools (Primavera and RamRisk). The studies document some of the limitations in 
their application as well as the challenges regarding the input for decision making.  
These studies were accompanied by a literature review (Webster & Watson, 2002) on 
different risk quantification theories and their limitations. Reviewing the theoretical 
foundations set the basis for articulating the need to more thoroughly explore various ways to 
represent epistemic uncertainty.  
In addition, interviews were carried out with the two case companies but also with four 
other companies (Yin, 2013) in order to broaden the understanding of various design challenges 
and related uncertainties and the applicability of the collected and developed methods. If was 
further confirmed that the tools employed in exploratory studies are part of current best 
practices. Details regarding each set of interviews are available in Section 3.2. The interviews 
were coded and analyzed in ATLAS.ti using grounded theory approach (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990). 
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The results of this stage, conceptual development of non-probabilistic framework in 
design, are found in Section 3.2 and Chapter 4. This stage primarily addresses research question 
2 by building upon research question 1, because the objective was to develop the framework 
and collect advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods through iterative work with 
the case companies.  
Prescriptive study (PS) 
In this thesis PS is the basis for answering research question 3 (i.e. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
The objective of this stage was to develop concrete means to support design risk management 
and decision making by utilizing advanced risk and uncertainty quantification. To achieve that, 
the research question was divided into three sub-questions, each corresponding to one group of 
methods from the non-probabilistic framework developed in Chapter 4.  
This stage includes the development of two case studies and one conceptual 
development of the approaches toward the needs in the field. The first step of the development 
of the case studies was to generate the data needed for the analyses in accordance with the 
company’s processes. Second, advanced risk and uncertainty analyses were performed and 
compared with some of the already existing approaches. Finally, the results were presented to 
the practitioners; the feedback is documented and elaborated in the corresponding Chapters 5 
and 6. In the case of the only conceptually developed support for the design needs (Chapter 7), 
the actual synthetic case development was not included due to the limitations of this study and 
data availability. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 include the main results of this stage. 
To answer research question 4, this stage aimed to develop decision making support in 
the form of a tailoring approach (Chapter 8). To do so, first the literature review on risk 
management maturity models was introduced as a basis to further expand on an existing 
maturity model. Additionally, the developed tailoring approach was tied to the overall ISO 
31000 risk management process, allowing immediate implementation of the practices basing 
their risk management process on this standard. The main insights from this stage are 
elaborated in Chapter 8. 
Descriptive study II (DS II) 
 The objective of this stage was an initial evaluation of the support developed during the 
prescriptive studies. A qualitative assessment sought to discover whether the support did or 
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could improve the companies’ processes during the prescriptive case studies. This was 
organized through the follow-up interviews and presentations at two companies, followed by 
practitioners’ feedback. However, the confidentiality, data accessibility, and time 
considerations of this doctoral study did not allow for a comprehensive evaluation, including a 
wide implementation of the proposed approaches in the companies’ processes.  
This stage aimed to demonstrate the overall and preliminary findings, and prepare the 
results for others to pursue additional studies in this direction, highlighting some potential 
limitations or challenges. This corresponds to the definition of an initial study by Blessing and 
Chakrabarti (2009): “An initial study closes a project and involves the first few steps of a 
particular stage to show the consequences of the results and prepare the results for use by 
others.” The results can be found in the final subsections of Chapters 5 to 8 (Sections 5.5, 6.5, 
7.5 and 8.4).  
The following elaborates more on the empirical work conducted in this thesis.  
2.4. Empirical studies 
 
This section introduces the companies involved in this study, the developed case studies 
and the conducted interviews (Table 3). 
Table 3 Overview of industry engagement and corresponding research method 
Method of 
empirical 
data 
collection 
RQ1 + RQ2 RQ 3.1 RQ 3.2 RQ 3.3 RQ 4 
Exploratory 
in-depth 
case studies 
Interviews Case 
study 1 
Case 
study 2 
Interviews Interviews 
Company 1  ●   ● ● 
Company 2  ● ● ●  ● 
Company 3 ● ●    ● 
Company 4      ● 
Company 5  ●    ● 
Company 6 ● ●    ● 
 
Interviews 
 Interviews were used as one of the main research methods throughout the research 
project (RAND Corporation, 2009). Semi-structured interviews (RAND Corporation, 2009) 
were organized in such a way that information regarding the companies’ risk management 
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process, design process and current challenges were documented. The questions were 
developed around open, hypothetical, or comparative lines of questioning (Kvale, 2008). 
Moreover, follow-up interviews (Kvale, 2008) were organized when needed. 
 In total, 36 interviews were conducted. Details regarding each of the interviews, coding 
principles and interviewees can be found in Section 3.2 and Chapter 8. The following sections 
will briefly introduce the six companies that were involved in the interviews and/or case 
studies, in particular their area of work and design challenges. 
Company 1: Design of large-scale engineering systems 
 The first case relates to a large Danish company with extensive experience in designing 
and managing large-scale engineering projects, such as long-life cycle infrastructure systems. 
It works on projects of different sizes (from megaprojects to small design solutions). For 
instance, it designs for first-of-a-kind engineering projects in which it faces severe 
uncertainties, but also helps small practices achieve their goals. Its risk management approach 
needs to provide support for the whole spectrum of different design activities and to ensure 
proper and timely response and monitoring.  
Company 2: Oil and gas exploration, designing new systems 
 The exploration and commercial production of oil and gas is the main business of the 
second case company. A significant risk in the design and early execution of a new production 
project is the placement of exploration drill wells. The objective is to find a new oil or gas field, 
based on a sound analysis of the prospect's risks and potential hydrocarbon volumes: what is 
the chance that a well will find (contain) hydrocarbons, how much could be there? The design 
challenges are to understand the best process and infrastructure design to explore and exploit 
these fields. The company explores different locations and prospects, and its performance 
depends directly on the success rate of drilling, determined in the early design phase of the 
project. Test drillings are very expensive and represent a significant investment. To increase 
the success rate with regard to identifying prospective oil deposits, the opinions of multiple 
experts are solicited as part of the early project design risk management. Given that the 
subsequent detailed design of the whole production system is based on these analyses, attaining 
higher accuracy in the estimates is of great engineering and financial importance.  
Company 3: SME, design in construction 
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 The third organization is an engineering and consulting SME that provides design 
services for construction projects. It experienced several risks in the design phase and sees 
severe delays in its currently most challenging project. 
Company 4: Consultancy for the Design phase  
 This international, multidisciplinary engineering consultancy company is an example 
of an organization that provides design services for construction projects. It provides 
consultancy services for projects such as design of airports, design of transportation systems, 
hospitals and similar. It also constructs some projects of its own. 
Company 5: Public Organization  
 This international organization provides design services for a number of different 
projects and systems. It provides services for other NGOs, governments, the private sector and 
private foundations. It mainly focuses on procurement services, project management, and 
infrastructure. In addition, it offers some financial management services (such as managing 
grants) and human resources (some organizations sometimes outsource their recruitment 
process). It is currently designing its risk and quality framework. The biggest challenge is to 
design a framework for the whole spectrum of its practice (applicable and manageable for those 
working in the field in war zones as well as for desk workers). 
Company 6: Large-scale high-tech infrastructure design in energy sector 
 The sixth case company is involved in designing and deploying large-scale high-tech 
infrastructure in the energy sector. Designing and operationalizing both onshore and offshore 
systems is part of its expertise.  
Brief description of exploratory case studies (with companies three and six) 
The exploratory case studies (Yin, 2013) form a coherent body of work with a company for 
each study. This includes a number of continuous empirical engagements that are detailed 
below. 
Exploratory case study 1: 
 To document the current challenges in design risk management practice, an exploratory 
in-depth case study (Yin, 2013) was conducted with a case company involved in designing and 
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deploying large-scale high-tech infrastructure in the energy sector. Its risk management is 
recognized as one of the best practices due to its advanced way of dealing with risk and 
uncertainties throughout the process, as well as the adopted and developed tools and 
decisionmaking processes. The collaboration also included interviews with the company’s 
senior project risk manager, as well as the analysis of the implementation of a complex, 
quantitative engineering design and deployment project risk model in Primavera. The key 
insights of the interviews and the analysis are described in Section 3.4. 
Exploratory case study 2: 
 The second exploratory case study was developed to document the potential, but also 
the limitations of currently one of the most employed risk tools in Nordic risk management 
practice. RamRisk was used to conduct the analysis for a design phase of a construction project. 
Details regarding the project, RamRisk, the analysis and the findings are available in Section 
3.4. 
Case study 1 and 2 (with Company two) 
 Overall, the research project includes two different synthetic case studies. Due to 
confidentiality reasons, there was no opportunity to analyze real project data. However, based 
on the work with the industry partners, we developed similar and representative cases without 
revealing any confidential information.  
 Yin (2013) describes a case study as a research strategy within social science research, 
with different case study types to be selected. Case studies are chosen to: “Investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Further details and design of the case 
studies, as well as risk management context of the studies, are available in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. The work was carried out with the large Danish oil and gas company.  
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2.5. Chapter summary 
  
The chapter covers theoretical and practical considerations related to the key 
methodological choices, and in particular the rationale behind the focus on risk and uncertainty 
quantification and its representation. Furthermore, the chapter details the research aims and 
objectives, and research questions that narrowed the scope and organized research. Also, the 
design research methodology stages are described and linked to chapters in the thesis, outlining 
the research questions. Finally, this chapter provides information about the case companies and 
the specific methods used during development and application of the non-probabilistic 
framework. 
 
 
  
   40 
 
3. Theory of risk quantification and current state-of-the-art 
in risk management practice  
“In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.” 
– Albert Einstein  – 
 
This chapter introduces the key theoretical foundations that create a basis for the work 
presented in the following chapters. More specifically, it presents current perspectives and 
trends on risk and uncertainty quantification. The aim is not an exhaustive presentation, but 
rather a presentation of what recent authoritative sources describe as state-of-the art thinking 
on risk.  
Risk assessment research has traditionally focused on the development of probabilistic 
methods, tools and procedures for risk management and risk analysis (see e.g. Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981; Dubois & Prade, 2009; Goerlandt & Reniers, 2015). This consequently led to 
tendencies in both research and practice to make risk assessment into a well-defined operation 
for evaluating different hazards, technologies and safety issues (Renn, 1998). The problem with 
such routinization of risk assessment is that formal analysis may obscure a number of the 
conceptual foundations and limitations of the methods used (Aven & Anthony, 2015). 
Additionally, it can also lead to a false degree of certainty when dealing with human actions 
and interventions (Ferson & Ginzburg, 1996). This chapter highlights main strengths and 
weaknesses of the current view on risk and asks whether that view is still feasible. Three main 
aspects are discussed: modeling, data, and human behavior; other general challenges are 
summarized. The chapter concludes that given the increasing scope of large-scale systems (or 
systems of systems), the field needs to more thoroughly consider concepts and theories that 
promise to overcome current limitations in the way we deal with uncertainties. Chapter 4 
further explores possibilities for overcoming these challenges through advanced risk and 
uncertainty quantification. 
This thesis investigates advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods. In that 
context, this chapter represents the first step: it describes the reasons, needs and motivation for 
advanced risk and uncertainty quantification by documenting the challenges in current practice 
(answering research question 1), based both on the current state in literature, as well as on 
empirical work. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 provides a short introduction to risk. 
Section 3.2 further introduces and describes uncertainty. Section 3.3 outlines the current state-
of-the-art in engineering systems risk management. In Section 3.4 the exploratory in-depth case 
studies are described and challenges in current practice are documented. In Section 3.5 I open 
the discussion (that continues in Chapter 4 where the methods are introduced) for the need to 
explore alternative approaches. 
3.1. Definitions of Risk 
 
Attempts to manage risks should first start from attempts to answer the question: “What 
is risk?” Risk is ubiquitous in almost every human activity (Bernstein, 1996). We talk about 
the risk of a terrorist attack, risk of losing an investment, risk of falling from a ladder, risk of 
being involved in a traffic accident, risk of contracting a disease, risk of bankruptcy, risk of 
extinction of certain plant species, and so on. These are very different situations, but they share 
some common elements. First, people talking about them care about the outcomes. They are 
concerned about a terrorist attack that can happen and jeopardize their own or other people’s 
lives and property; they can lose their savings or investments, which can even result in 
bankruptcy; they can fall and injure themselves; they can become involved in a traffic accident 
and either be injured or lose their lives; they can have a disease that may influence the quality 
of their lives, etc. That is to say, talking about risk is pertinent when a person, a group of people, 
an organization, or a whole society can be exposed to something they do not want to be exposed 
to (Fischhoff, 1995). They want to avoid being exposed to negative consequences of their or 
others’ activities, that is, they do not want to lose or jeopardize something that they value: their 
lives, property, health, environment, valuable items, including money, etc. 
Ironically, being exposed to the possibility of unwanted events can be a voluntary and 
desirable thing (Rowe, 1975). In the past, the risk of a ship sinking or being robbed by pirates 
on the way from Europe to India was offset by the rewards from selling cargo brought back to 
Europe. People risk their lives in return for the benefits they can get. High risks can simply be 
taken in return for emotional pleasure, honor, and fame. An example is extreme sports. In this 
regard, there is a strong consensus among risk theorists that a risk definition should 
accommodate both undesirable and desirable outcomes (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
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Second, people do not know whether the future unwanted events they may be exposed 
to will happen or not. This means that there is uncertainty about these events happening. Hence, 
exposure and uncertainty are two essential components that constitute risk (Holton, 2004). 
Suppose a man leaps from an airplane without a parachute. If he is certain to die, he 
faces no risk. Risk requires both exposure and uncertainty. There is no uncertainty here. Or we 
can assume he does not value his life. Hence, he faces no risk in losing something that does not 
have any value to him.  
We can look at the concept of risk in different ways. As soon as we have some 
objectives, aims, or targets we run a risk of not fulfilling, achieving, or hitting them. A project’s 
objectives defined upfront may not become fulfilled at the project end. Hence, we can say there 
is risk of not fulfilling them. Aims, objectives and targets and uncertainty about their 
achievements are also the components of risk. From this angle and concisely, risk can be 
defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO, 2009). 
There are a number of other definitions of risk that are in line with the above commonly 
accepted foundational components of risk. What is common for them all is that they address 
exposure and uncertainty and accommodate both desirable and undesirable outcomes. A range 
of different definitions used today is summarized by Aven (2011), Kreye (2011) and Aven et 
al. (2015). Renn (1998) summarizes three underlying questions that a proper definition should 
cover (a similar set of questions is formulated by Kaplan and Garrick (1981)):  
1. What are undesirable outcomes and who determines what undesirable means? 
2. How can we specify, qualify or quantify the possibilities of undesirable outcomes?  
3. How do we aggregate different classes of undesirable outcomes into a common 
concept that allows comparisons and the setting of priorities?  
In the following, I provide an overview of various definitions of risks (following Aven, 2011): 
1) Risk = Expected value (loss)  
a) The risk of losing any sum is the reverse of expectation, and the true measure of it is 
the product of the sum adventured multiplied by the probability of the loss.  
b) Risk equals the expected loss. 
c) Risk equals the product of the probability and utility of some future event. 
d) Risk equals the expected disutility.  
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2) Risk = Probability of an (undesirable) event  
a) Risk is the chance of damage or loss.  
b) Risk equals the probability of an undesirable event. 
c) Risk means the likelihood of a specific effect originating from a certain hazard 
occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances.  
3) Risk = Objective uncertainty  
a) Risk is the objective correlative of the subjective uncertainty; uncertainty considered 
as embodied in the course of events in the external world.  
b) Risk is measurable uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty where the distribution of the 
outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from 
statistics of past experience). 
4) Risk = Uncertainty  
a) in regard to cost, loss or damage.  
b) about a loss.  
c) of the happening of an unfavorable contingency.  
d) of outcome, of actions and events.  
5) Risk = Potential / possibility of a loss 
a) Risk is the possibility of an unfortunate occurrence. 
b) Risk is the possibility of an unfavorable deviation from expectations. 
c) Risk is the potential for realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event.  
6) Risk = Probability and scenarios / consequences / severity of consequences  
a) Risk is a combination of hazards measured by probability; a state of the world rather 
than a state of mind.  
b) Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects.  
c) Risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci), where si is the ith scenario, pi is the probability 
of that scenario, and ci is the consequence of the ith scenario, i=1,2, …N; i.e. risk 
captures: What can happen? How likely is that to happen? If it does happen, what are 
the consequences?  
d) Risk is the combination of probability and extent of consequences.  
7) Risk = Event or consequence  
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a) Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain. 
b) Risk is an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something 
that humans value.  
8) Risk = Consequences/damage/severity of these + uncertainty  
a) Risk = Uncertainty + Damage. 
b) Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of events/ consequences (of an 
activity) and associated uncertainties. 
c) Risk is uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an 
activity with respect to something that humans value.  
d) Risk is the deviations from a reference level (ideal states, planned values, expected 
values, objectives) and associated uncertainties.  
9) Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO). 
While there is no single agreed definition of risk, the understanding of the risk concept 
has evolved over the last decades. The latest renewed interest of researchers in a definition of 
risk comes from the opinion that if the definition is shaky, the application is shaky (Aven et 
al., 2014). The risk concept (Aven, 2011) should be distinguished from how we measure or 
describe that concept. Several initiatives were carried out in order to bring formality and unity 
to the terminology. The latest one, conducted by The Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), which 
brings together representatives from both academia and industry, suggested a new SRA 
glossary (Aven et al., 2015). The new glossary allows for different perspectives, distinguishing 
various concepts, for which overall qualitative definitions are provided, and the measurements 
of those concepts, for which examples of metrics are provided. There are different ways to 
measure, but they are all based on the same concept of risk having two features – uncertainty 
and consequence. The novel description of risk, first introduced by Aven, Baraldi, Flage and 
Zio (2014) is based on three features: uncertainty, consequence and knowledge. I see this 
research trend as yet further proof that there is a need to carefully address the quality of 
information and background knowledge when analyzing risks in engineering systems and their 
design.  
It is normal in daily life to compare risks when choosing between alternatives. For 
example, one may have reason to assume that the risk of arriving late to an appointment is 
greater if you drive by car through a city center compared to taking the metro. In daily life, we 
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can simply do comparison by gut feeling or rather simple contemplation. However, gut feelings 
would be a very shaky basis for responsible decisions that may result in large losses (Hubbard, 
2009). Engineers make decisions by articulating with numbers. To be able to compare risks we 
need some measures. As there are basically two components of risk: human values that are at 
stake and uncertainties, they must be defined in a way that is susceptible to measuring 
(Hubbard, 2009).  
For that reason, I will continue with understanding and defining the concept of 
uncertainty. 
3.2. Definitions of Uncertainty 
 
Based on Holton's (2004) review of common usage, uncertainty is a state of not 
knowing whether a proposition is true or false. Alternately, uncertainty is defined as the 
complement to certainty (Smithson, 1989) (Figure 2). That is, uncertainty is the lack of 
certainty. If given in this way, it is sensible to ask: what is certainty? Or what statements can 
we be certain about? Rene Descartes’1 best known philosophical statement in this regard was: 
“Cogito ergo sum”, which translates from Latin into English as “I think, therefore I am.” 
According to him, this is the only certain statement one can make. Any others can be doubted; 
thus they are uncertain. Other contemporary thinkers were also rather skeptical about being 
completely certain. For example, Jacob Bronowski’s2 often quoted thought is similar. He says 
that achieving “knowledge is an unending adventure at the edge of uncertainty.” On this very 
general note, uncertainty can be seen as the state of knowledge between complete ignorance 
and certainty (Smithson, 1989).  
However, the division of knowledge into the three categories is too coarse. It can be 
nuanced. Some more recent developments are presented in Chapter 7 (Table 9). As Bertrand 
Russel3 says: “When one admits that nothing is certain one must, I think, also admit that some 
things are more nearly certain than others.” Assume you are going to watch two tennis 
matches: one in which the rank of the contenders is very different: player A is ranked as number 
5, while player B is ranked as number 85; the second match is played by players C and D about 
whom you do not know anything. You will perhaps be much more certain about the statement 
                                                          
1 Rene Descartes is a French philosopher, 1596-1650 
2 Jacob Bronowski is a Polish-born British mathematician, historian, theatre author, poet and inventor, 1908-
1974 
3 Bertrand Russel is a British philosopher, 1872-1970 
   46 
 
“Player A will win over player B” than about the statement “Player C will win over player D” 
(Hubbard, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2 Uncertainty as a lack of certainty (following Smithson 1989). 
 
In order to intelligently deal with uncertainty, we need to be able to present it and reason 
about it. There are primarily three ways of reasoning about it: formal logics, fuzzy reasoning 
and statistical reasoning (Nisbett, 1993). By applying a formal logic to a possibly complex 
statement, represented as a set of formulas, one can deduct whether the statement is true or 
false. However, deducting to what extent one statement is more certain than another is not 
possible with this bi-valued logic (Ramsey, 2009). This type of formal logic-based reasoning 
is also referred to as the logic of Aristotle (Carruccio & Quigly, 2006). An alternative is to 
introduce the third value for a statement that is neither true nor false (Lejewski & Łukasiewicz, 
1967). It is also possible to derive four-, five-, and even infinite-valued logic (Dunn & Epstein, 
1977). However, the derivations, which are based on rather complex axiomatic systems, are 
not easily comprehensible and adaptable to observations, and they are exercised in the 
framework of formal and traditional epistemology (Smithson, 1989).  
Lofty Zadeh suggested in his seminal work (Zadeh, 1978) an infinite-valued logic 
known as fuzzy set theory, and its extension as fuzzy logic or fuzzy reasoning. As the key 
concept, the theory proposed the membership function as a degree to which a statement is true 
and false (Lakoff, 1975). A completely new calculus was proposed, which is an alternative way 
of thinking and modeling complex systems using a higher level of abstraction originating from 
our knowledge and experience. Fuzzy logic resembles human reasoning in its use of imprecise 
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information to make decisions. It allows expressing imprecise subjective knowledge such as 
very old and a long time and mapping it into exact numbers within the range [0, 1]. The theory 
captures both the uncertainties associated with human cognitive processes and uncertainties 
resulting from a lack of knowledge on the subject matter of interest (Taroun, 2014). The type 
of uncertainty that can be captured by fuzzy logic is also called ambiguity (Klinke & Renn, 
2002). 
The third way of reasoning about uncertainty is statistical reasoning. It involves various 
methods for representing uncertainty, assessing the measures of uncertainty, modifying the 
assessments to take account of new information, and combining them to calculate other 
quantitative measures and to draw conclusions (Dani & Joan, 2004). The most common 
representation of uncertainty uses probability, but it is by no means the only one (Swart et al., 
2009; Dubois & Prade, 2012). The reason for having many other representations is the rather 
complex nature of uncertainty. In the risk community there is general agreement that there are 
at least two types of uncertainty that should be addressed in risk analyses: aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainty (Helton & Burmaster, 1996).  
Aleatory uncertainty has a stochastic nature and cannot be reduced by acquiring 
relevant knowledge (Bernardo & Smith, 2009). For example, the wind speed in a given 
geographic point at a given point of time in the future is an uncertain value that has a pure 
stochastic nature. Regardless of the number of measurements, one cannot become more certain 
of the speed’s value in a relatively remote future. This type of uncertainty is best represented 
by probability.  
However, the other type of uncertainty – epistemic – arises due to a lack of knowledge 
and can be reduced by collecting data and information, and by acquiring new knowledge (Paté-
Cornell, 1996). For example, the parameters of the probability distribution of time to failure of 
an electronic device produced in large numbers and exploited for a long time in very similar 
environments can be known very precisely. But exploiting the same device in different and 
more aggressive environments will introduce uncertainty over the parameters of the 
distribution that can only be removed by collecting and observing the time to failure in the new 
conditions. The uncertainty about the parameters of a probability distribution is epistemic.  
In contrast to aleatory uncertainty, there are different views on how epistemic 
uncertainty should be represented, which has given rise to the development of different 
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mathematical structures that can capture both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty (Nilsen & 
Aven, 2002). At present, there is no clarity about which of the existing theories should be 
employed when available evidence is provided in very different forms. 
Many of the theories that can capture the two types of uncertainty are covered by the 
generic term ‘Imprecise Probability’. They are mathematical models that measure chance or 
uncertainty without sharp numerical probabilities. These models include Dempster-Shafer 
belief functions, comparative probability orderings, convex sets of probability measures, 
interval-valued probabilities, possibility measures, plausibility measures, and upper and lower 
expectations or previsions. To capture aleatory uncertainty these models use different types of 
probability, while the probabilities are not presented as point-valued quantities in order to 
capture epistemic uncertainty. 
At large, probabilities have two broad categories of interpretations: frequentist and 
subjective (Bernardo & Smith, 2009). The frequentist probabilities are associated with random 
physical phenomena like weather conditions, and systems such as roulette wheels and rolling 
dice. Frequentists posit the probability of an event as its relative frequency of occurrence after 
repeating the attempts to observe the event many times under similar conditions. This is how 
aleatory uncertainty can be characterized numerically. If a fair coin is repeatedly tossed many 
times, the empirical frequency of the two outcomes (head and tail) converges to the limit ½ as 
the number of trials tends to infinity. 
If we denote 𝑛𝐴 the number of occurrences of an event A in N trials, then the probability of 
this event is 𝑃(𝐴) = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑛𝐴
𝑁
. 
The frequentist view has its problems when we are concerned with events in the future 
that have never been observed, but are considered possible, or that have been observed but only 
rarely (possibly only once) or multiple times but under different conditions (Jaynes, 2003). 
These are in fact the situations a risk analyst faces. To be able to resolve the conflict of having 
only few (or no) observations of an event, the risk of which we want to measure, the subjective 
interpretation of probability is invoked (Jaynes, 2003). In this case probability is regarded as a 
measure of the degree of belief of the individual assessing the uncertainty. This probability 
captures both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, and is often referred to as Bayesian 
probability (Jaynes, 2003). In principle it can be assigned to any statement, even when no 
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random process is involved, for example to the likelihood that a suspect has committed a crime 
based on the existing evidence. 
In process risk analysis both interpretations play a role, as the number of collected 
observations of a failure event can be representative to make an assessment of its objective 
probability as the expected frequency (Poirier, 2014). However, conditions for the failure may 
be unknown, so the “experiment” is no longer random and well-defined. Hence a resultant 
attributed probability can be ‘corrected’ by an expert, which makes it eventually subjective. Or 
the subject can adopt probabilities assessed as frequencies, which is a way of reconciling the 
frequentist and subjectivist view. Generally, risk analysis experts state that all risk calculations 
for slightly complex systems are subjective, because the results cannot be tested against 
experiments. 
The use of Bayesian probability has caused both philosophical and practical debates on 
whether beliefs must follow the laws of probability, whether they should be expressed as a 
single number even though the knowledge support is very poor, or whether it is justifiable to 
use them in safety risk assessments (Beard, 2004). In the latter case, individual assessments by 
those who are not exposed to safety risks influence the safety of the people exposed to them. 
Finally, subjective probabilities can be broadly classified into two different categories 
(interpretations): behavioral and evidential (Jaynes, 2003). The behavioral interpretation is 
given to probability if it is elicited by observing the choices of an individual, or it is provided 
by an individual who commits to acting accordingly when making choices. If we assume that 
the individual is rational, conclusions can be made on his subjective probabilities by offering 
him different options. 
Evidential subjective probabilities reside on a different interpretation “in which the 
probability (…) measures a logical (…) relation between the hypothesis and available 
evidence” (Kyburg, 1987). Individuals provide evidence in some form that can be transformed 
into probabilities by employing sets of axioms or conventions. There is more than one way of 
doing this. Examples are the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and Walley’s theory of 
coherent imprecise previsions (Walley, 1991). 
Finer distinctions within the class of subjective probabilities are described by Walley 
(1991). Furthermore, exposure to negative consequences is the second essential component of 
risk. Negative consequences in engineering are as varied as individual industries and 
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construction projects. Figure 3 brings together all the concepts and views introduced above on 
what risk is and how we can reason about it.  
Risk
Uncertainty
Exposure 
• Loss of human life
• Loss of property
• Loss of money
• Loss of social capital
• Worse quality of life
• Lower quality
• Delays
• Environmental damage
Components
AND
Frequentist SubjectiveOR
Probabilities
Formal logics
Fuzzy 
reasoning
OR
Reasoning
Statistical 
reasoning
OR
OR
Aleatory Epistemic
Types
AND
Behavioral EvidentialOR
Interpretation
 
Figure 3 Overview of the concepts introduced so far: Risk components and their taxonomy (following 
Kozin, 2017). 
 
3.3. Current state-of-the-art in risk management   
 
During the last decades, management of risk in engineering design and associated 
projects and systems has attracted attention from researchers and practitioners in areas such as 
engineering design (Lough, Stone,  &. Tumer, 2009), project management (Raz & Michael, 
2001), or safety-related risk management (Paté-Cornell, 1996). The Project Management 
Institute (PMI) represents the largest professional organization dedicated to the project 
management field, and lists risk management as one of the ten main areas of project 
management (PMI, 2008). Furthermore, risk management courses are usually a part of most 
training programs for project managers. In accordance with the current view of project 
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management as a life cycle process, project risk management is often perceived as a process 
that accompanies a project from the initiating through the planning, execution, monitoring and 
control phases all the way to the completion and closure (Raz & Michael, 2001). 
 Arguably, risk management has become an integral part of many formalized design 
processes for complex technical or socio-technical systems (Unger & Eppinger, 2011). The 
comparisons of risk management process steps under various design frameworks (Raz & 
Hillson, 2005; Oehmen et al., 2014), including the generic ISO 31000, illustrate several points 
(Table 4): 1. All risk management process frameworks quantify risks, including qualitative 
ways of representing risks and uncertainty, as in some cases and for some practices that is only 
what is needed or feasible to achieve (e.g. high-medium-low evaluation). 2. Quantification of 
risks is directly linked to improved decision making, program stability and problem solving. 3. 
Risk and uncertainty quantification is only a part of risk analysis (which in turn is only a part 
of the overall risk management process). This implies that we not only need to improve the 
“quality” of numbers we generate during risk quantification, but also the way they are 
integrated into the overall risk management and associated decision making processes. In 
addition, the quality of input data, knowledge and information on which we base our 
assessments also has profound implications on the overall outcome. 
Many of the issues that occur during the design of engineering systems are due to a lack 
of knowledge. It can be argued that epistemic uncertainty might sometimes be reduced by 
additional research and information gathering. However, that might lead to additional and 
hidden costs and delays, thus making it not feasible. This leads to “real-life” situations in design 
where actions that have significant impact on the subsequent processes and outcomes have to 
be taken on the basis of incomplete information. A major weakness of risk management today 
is that the methods used do not fully capture epistemic uncertainty (Aven & Zio, 2011). The 
previously mentioned various ISO standards and different professional and regulatory 
guidelines represent a significant progress in risk management practice. However, it is still 
open to debate how applicable, appropriate, and effective those guidelines are (Pender, 2001; 
Zwikael & Ahn, 2011).  
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Table 4 Comparison of risk management process steps under various design frameworks (adapted from 
Oehmen et al., 2014) 
ISO 31000  
(ISO, 2009) 
PMI  
(PMI, 
2008) 
NASA 
(Dezfuli 
et al., 
2010) 
DoD  
(DoD, 2006) 
INCOSE  
(INCOSE, 
2007) 
SEI 
(Gallagher, 
1999) 
Communi-
cation and 
consultation 
Implicit Commun-
icate 
document 
Implicit Planning Communicate 
Establishing 
the context 
Plan RM Implicit   Implicit 
Risk 
identification 
Identify 
risks 
Identify Risk 
identification 
Risk 
identification 
Identify 
Risk Analysis Risk 
analysis 
Analyze Risk Analysis Risk 
Assessment 
Analyze 
Risk 
Evaluation 
     
Risk treatment Plan risk 
response 
Plan Risk mitigation 
planning 
Risk 
Analysis 
Plan 
   Risk mitigation 
plan 
implementation 
Risk 
Handling 
  
Monitoring 
and review 
Monitor 
and control 
risks 
Track Risk tracking  Track 
Control 
 
  The question: “What is an acceptable way to quantify epistemic uncertainty?” is the 
underlying challenge motivating this study. Unlike for aleatory uncertainty, there is no general 
agreement on how to address epistemic uncertainty (e.g. Oberkampf et al., 2004; Beer, Ferson, 
& Kreinovich, 2013). However, the scientific communities agree that the two types of 
uncertainty should be modeled differently, and yet, there is still a tendency in practice to 
employ one approach (the approach developed for aleatory uncertainty) for coping with all 
types of uncertainty. In other words, it is desirable to have a single method capable of 
quantifying all uncertainty (Goerlandt & Reniers, 2015), or at least a structured method to 
select appropriate methods of uncertainty quantification based on the specific uncertainty 
profile of the situation being analyzed.  
 Over the last decades probabilistic methods have been the predominant choice for risk 
assessments. A number of different approaches have been developed and applied in different 
contexts (for more details, please refer to section Table A.3 in Appendix 3 for a comparison of 
different methods). Practitioners’ standards and guidelines have been developed according to 
such applications and their advancements. 
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 However, a number of challenges have been identified in the established methods and 
in the attempt to use a single method to quantify all uncertainty (the corresponding findings 
from the literature accompanied by the empirical findings from this thesis are presented in 
Section 3.4), and new questions have emerged: Is probabilistic treatment appropriate for 
addressing epistemic uncertainty? Do we need more than probabilistic approaches to quantify 
uncertainty? 
 As a consequence of the identification of these issues, scholars from a probabilistic 
background have begun to acknowledge the limitations of their approaches and suggest 
developing extensions to the approaches that allow epistemic uncertainty to be better addressed 
(Hubbard, 2009).  
 There are also others that challenge that view and instead suggest that other mechanisms 
are needed. As they see probabilistic techniques as inadequate, they developed alternatives – 
non-probabilistic methods – that have certain merits and will be discussed later in the thesis. 
The response from the probabilistic community is that those approaches themselves are limited, 
as uncertainty can only be properly handled in a probabilistic view (Colyvan, 2008). They 
subsequently extended probabilistic techniques in an attempt to deal with the limiting issues 
that were identified (e.g. research on second-order uncertainty (Barrett & Lampard, 1955), 
etc.).  
 We are currently in the situation where sets of competing methods are proposed by the 
academic community – probabilistic and non-probabilistic methods – and without a clear 
understanding of how and when to use what method in order to cope with the challenging risk 
management role in design. 
The thesis helps to address this gap through the following steps:  
1. The thesis provides a summary of the limitations, as identified in the literature, of 
the currently widely used (probabilistic) risk approaches. Furthermore, it 
introduces the reader to the ways probabilistic methods have been extended – and 
to the experiences with those approaches (research question 1 and contribution 1) 
 
 The increased need to adequately cope with epistemic uncertainty also comes from the 
fact that large-scale engineering design solutions today often cover several systems and their 
interconnections, operating over a longer period. Such an evolving, iterative, social, and 
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complex nature of engineering systems design corresponds to a multiplicity of plausible 
futures, several variants for system models, a range of outcomes, and associated weights or 
preferences regarding the various outcomes. In order to apply a certain method, we need to 
simplify a real situation to a “practical” model. More assumptions need to be made in order to 
have calculable data. This is especially the case when using probabilistic methods, as it has 
been proven that those methods face challenges when dealing with a higher level of uncertainty 
(Helton & Oberkampf, 2004; Walker, Lempert, & Kwakkel 2013). It is not justifiable to make 
significant assumptions when the overall level of ignorance is high. To provide more concrete 
insights and to document some of these modeling challenges, and inspired by the aphorism “all 
models are wrong, but some are useful”, the exploratory case studies described in Section 3.4 
consider more details on when the current best-practice modeling becomes arbitrary for use 
and what the industry needs are.  
 In their study, Aven et al. (2014) showed that probabilities can always be assigned 
under the subjective probability approach, but that the origin and amount of information 
supporting the numbers is not reflected by the numbers produced. Their example clarifies that 
one may subjectively assess that two different events have probabilities equal to, say, 0.7, but 
in one case the assignment is supported by a substantial amount of relevant data, whereas in 
the other by effectively no data at all. This is the main argument in the critique of the 
probability-based approach to dealing with epistemic uncertainty. There is a particularly 
interesting case in situations when there is no information at all, in which case probabilistic 
approaches assign 0.5 probability by default (Bernardo & Smith, 2009).  
 Most other challenges are described in the corresponding chapters where the proposed 
alternative method is introduced. For instance, some of the challenges include the choice of a 
prior function in probabilistic modeling (Ferson, Ginzburg, & Akcakaya, 1996), subjectivity in 
expert opinions (Cooke, 1991), interpretation of results (Fortin & Gagnon, 2006), etc. 
 Within the probabilistic view of uncertainty, the research mostly considered further 
improvement of the developed approaches, further verifying and enabling higher precision in 
estimates (e.g. Kwiatkowska, Norman, & Parker, 2011). However, such focus on higher 
accuracy in modeling (providing more decimals or complete/detailed distributions) often leads 
to a false degree of precision (Ferson, 1996). Also, research suggests that predictions that are 
provided by action-outcome probabilities entail a certain degree of (first-order) uncertainty and 
that these probabilities themselves embody second-order uncertainty. Some advancements 
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involve complicated sensitivity studies that are often cumbersome and can be difficult to 
interpret (Renn, Klinke, & Van Asselt, 2011). Conditional probabilities also attract special 
attention from researchers (Hogg, McKean, & Craig, 2005). However, even such extensions 
can be challenged (Sims, 2001). 
 Others significantly contributed to the field by introducing new paradigms/terms such 
as “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” (e.g. Pawson, Wong, & Owen, 2011). Tamed 
and wicked problems aimed to provide the context under which a certain modeling is more 
appropriate than others (Atie, 2008).  
 A range of different uncertainty and risk management methods has been applied to the 
mentioned problems. Group processes, such as the Delphi technique (Rowe & Wright, 1999), 
have helped large groups of experts combine their expertise into narratives of the future. This 
can be understood as an advanced method, where plausible future scenarios are developed 
without necessarily quantifying the associated uncertainties. In their work (Ferson & Ginzburg, 
1996) illustrate examples in risk analysis for which classical Monte Carlo methods yield 
incorrect answers when used to quantify higher levels of uncertainty. IT development has 
brought statistical and computer simulation modeling that allows capturing quantitative 
information about the extrapolation of current trends and the implications of new driving 
forces. On the other hand, formal decision analysis can systematically assess the consequences 
of such information. Some more recently developed approaches, such as scenario planning, 
help individuals and groups accept the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the long-term 
future and consider a range of potential paths, including those that may be inconvenient or 
disturbing for organizational, ideological, or political reasons (Schoemaker, 1995). 
2. The thesis explains the opposing views and why they emerged (research question 2 
and contribution 2) 
 
 However, despite this rich legacy of approaches, one key aspect remains a problem. 
The commonly used methods that are briefly outlined above face challenges when dealing with 
long-term multiplicity of plausible futures, unknown causal structures, assigning probabilities 
and difficulty in identifying preferred solutions. In the following, the thesis briefly introduces 
why and which alternative approaches emerged for coping with such situations. More detailed 
descriptions and a broader overview are provided in Appendix 4. 
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 The shift toward the application of analytical tools started in 1980s, mainly through the 
following two approaches. In his seminal work, Lotfi Zadeh (1978) described the concept of 
the Fuzzy Sets Theory introduced in the previous section. On the other hand, the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (e.g. Dey, 2001; Singh & Singh, 2011) was recognized for its merits in 
relation to qualitative problems and factors that are often complicated and/or conflicting. Such 
a systematic approach allows decision makers to avoid addressing their problems intuitively, 
which suffer from inaccuracy and inconsistency. 
  An initial work on imprecise probabilities in the engineering design context was 
published by Chris Paredis and his colleagues (Aughenbaugh & Paredis, 2005). Even though 
their focus is rather on the technical aspects of design, their approach was not broadly accepted. 
However, after a decade we should revise this direction, as circumstances (computational 
support and maturity of the field) have changed. In contrast, some researchers focused on 
identifying situations for which more information is needed to reliably continue with the 
simulations (Goh, McMahon, & Booker, 2007). 
 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL, 2016) recognized the need to investigate research 
on epistemic uncertainty, and therefore initiated workshops in which approaches (some of 
which are described in this thesis) were presented. They produced reports (Sentz & Ferson, 
2002), as well as guidelines (Ferson et al., 2003) with a slightly more technical and modeling 
focus.  
 Other initiatives for example include workshops and publications on ‘Decoding rings’ 
– the attempt to clarify and unify the terminology on risk and uncertainty (e.g. Aven et al., 
2015); SRA focused on creating a special issue on foundational issues (Aven & Anthony, 2015) 
and questioning the definitions of risk (Aven, 2011; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). 
 In addition to the previously described theoretical and methodological challenges of the 
most widely used methods, there are challenges that go beyond the quantification challenge 
itself. Different studies report the misuse and/or misrepresentation of probabilistic results 
(Love, Edwards, & Irani, 2012; Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin, & van Wee, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 
2007; Flyvbjerg, Morris, Pinto, & Söderlund, 2013). Misuse can be due to two reasons: 1) 
inadequate or insufficient understanding/knowledge/skill of the practitioners when using a 
method, or 2) deliberate manipulation of results to support a desired outcome. 
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Misrepresentation can occur on two levels: 1) externally, for bidding purposes and winning 
different contracts, or 2) internally, sending a desired message to the top management.  
 Such findings represent one of the main reasons for clarifying concepts, discussing their 
adequate usage and informing on alternatives. Furthermore, these aspects have been confirmed 
through the empirical work presented in Section 3.4. One of the interviewees explained: “I had 
two types of experiences: when risk owners would ask me to highlight their risk so they can use 
that as an argument to get more funding for their project, and when risk owners would ask me 
to remove a risk from reporting as their boss said anyone with a top-level risk will be fired.”  
 This created the need to research and scientifically confirm methods that could help 
modelers overcome a broad spectrum of issues, both from the practical and academic point of 
view. To involve higher transparency in processes, methods application, background 
knowledge, results and their limitations, but also to clarify assumptions is central to achieving 
this goal. After being introduced to the non-probabilistic framework, one of the interviewees 
described it as: “a more honest approach to the reality of challenges and complexities faced 
when quantifying risk and uncertainty.”  
3. The thesis highlights the merits from applying the non-probabilistic methods and 
presents empirical work on documenting challenges (research question 3 and 
contribution 3) 
 
Other than providing an understanding for the need to further research this topic, the 
thesis highlights the importance of risk and uncertainty quantification in the field. It further 
details the existing challenges and identifies the critical situations for which non -probabilistic 
methods offer better results (Section 9.2). Each group of methods is separately analyzed and 
findings are presented in corresponding chapters (the overall summary is presented in Chapter 
10). 
 
4. The thesis provides advice for the communities on implementing non-probabilistic 
risk management techniques (research question 4 and contribution 4) 
 
 After presenting the work carried out during this PhD project (in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 
8), a discussion on its integration with the current state-of-the-art is presented in Chapter 9. 
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Recommendations for specific situations are provided, followed by a broader discussion on the 
characteristics of a good quantification practice (Section 9.2). 
The next section reports on the empirical work regarding the challenges in current risk 
management practice.  
 
3.4. Understanding and documenting challenges of existing methods from 
practitioners’ point of view 
 
This section presents the two exploratory case studies. The objective is to address 
research question 1. The research leads to contribution 1, i.e. current risk management faces 
challenges, and the most widely used risk quantification methods need improvement. 
Exploratory case study 1: research design, data collection, coding and analyses  
In order to investigate the industry needs, I conducted the first exploratory in-depth case 
study (Yin, 2013) with a case company involved in designing and deploying large-scale high-
tech infrastructure in the energy sector. The purpose is to describe the current state and to 
address the initial phase of theory building. For this reason, theoretical sampling is appropriate 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) as the case company is selected and the case is developed for 
illuminating and extending the relationships and logic among the constructs. As explained in 
Chapter 2, confidentiality concerns limit to what extent I can elaborate on the empirical work 
presented in this chapter. Following Eisenhardt (1989), I build on the argument that replication 
logic is key to theory building from case studies. Furthermore, the exploratory approach is 
applicable as this is the early stage of the theory-building cycle (Cash, 2018). The case study 
data were collected using a multimethod approach consisting of quantitative (probabilistic) 
modeling and interviews over the course of nine months.  
We jointly developed and analyzed the implementation of a complex, quantitative 
engineering design and deployment project risk model in Primavera. A junior risk analyst 
working daily with the tool also helped in this process. The case was designed to illustrate their 
modeling process and availability and the quality of data needed for such types of analyses. 
The practitioners monitored the data used to ensure that the synthetic input to our model 
corresponded to real-world scenarios. Possibilities for different analyses were investigated and 
discussed, such as tornado diagrams, risk correlations, cluster risks, and cascading effects. 
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 Interviews were organized to allow for potential triangulation, enrich the overall setup 
of the performed modeling, support the modeling data, and document additional challenges 
with current approaches (both related to this type of modeling but also more general in risk 
management). I conducted nine interviews with their senior project risk manager, each lasting 
between one to two hours. Three sessions were excluded from the analysis as they served more 
for ‘building relationship’ purposes than establishing content. Additional meetings were 
organized when needed to clarify modeling. It was agreed there will be no recording, and I 
took notes during the meetings. Two senior researchers also attended the first four meetings, 
ensuring that the design and progress of the study were carried out carefully, stepping in with 
additional ‘What if’ questions as appropriate. The follow-up calls were arranged when more 
clarification was needed. The semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 1996) were designed to 
investigate the current risk management practice by asking the participants in three ways. First, 
I asked about what he perceived to be instances of good and bad risk management, encouraging 
him to go into as much detail as possible with the experiences. Second, we discussed modeling 
challenges in current best practices. Third, we discussed the potential of the non-probabilistic 
approaches in current practices.  
 The interviews were iteratively coded and analyzed in ATLAS.ti based on a grounded 
theory approach (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The process of coding was to use open codes and 
line by line coding as well as second-stage-codes that were then grouped. For an example see 
the figure in Appendix 1. The preliminary conclusions and emerging coding constructs were 
discussed and validated with the company in informal and formal meetings throughout the 
process. In addition, I requested an independent senior researcher from the field to read through 
the data and codes in the process (to reduce the chance of bias and hear about possibilities to 
extend the list of questions/topics). 
It is worth noting that the interviewed manager has more than 20 years of experience. 
He was able to provide many insights from different industries he had the opportunity to work 
in (telecommunication, construction, energy) and highlight areas that would not necessarily 
emerge from the initial literature review. For instance, the importance and impact of 
assumptions made when choosing distributions, gaming and political aspects of decision 
making affecting the analysis, correlations among risks, computational capacity and a “lucky 
manager” problem. 
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Key insights from Exploratory Case Study 1  
Quality of probabilistic models: The key challenges occurred around the issue of model size 
and complexity. The engineering activities at hand generated a large number of activities and 
resources that needed to be modeled, including their dependencies, each of which was analyzed 
in terms of schedule risk. A large number of probabilities and probability distributions is 
required to run risk assessment simulations, e.g. regarding the duration of each task. Quality 
issues arose as to how representative the model actually is of the underlying project. It was 
difficult to justify simplifications that were made during the modeling process, particularly 
regarding the impact on the outcome of the risk assessment.  
Quality of data and results: The data used to generate probabilities and probability 
distributions are perceived to play a critical role in the outcome of the risk assessments. While 
some probability distributions were developed based on similar past projects, others relied on 
expert opinion and group consensus, based on various elicitation techniques. However, their 
representations in the system are identical, and do not reflect the quality or reliability of the 
input data. They are also required to be put in as fixed probabilities and / or probability 
distributions. In addition, various mathematical and computational tools are used during the 
simulations, without always fully appreciating their prerequisites or limitations. 
Use and integration of results: Most analyses rely on advanced mathematical concepts 
employed during the simulation and computation of the risk assessment. Their meaning and 
implications cannot be fully appreciated without a deep understanding of the tools and methods 
used. The same applies to the origin and quality of the data, which can often no longer be 
judged from the presentation of the results. Finally, existing tools do not explicitly address the 
“gaming” aspects of tailoring risk analysis approaches to produce the desired results, or 
interpret results one-dimensionally to suit a particular preconceived notion of a desirable 
outcome. 
An interesting part of the interviews relates to the ‘lucky manager’ problem. The 
problem relates to the possibility of perceiving a manager (or management) lucky in terms of 
a project/portfolio/system performance rather than competent in his/her (their) capacity to 
handle a broad range of activities, including risk management. This was to an extent studied 
by Geraldi, Lee-Kelley and Kutsch (2010). The interviewee raised the question on how to 
distinguish between managers who conducted thorough risk management, but faced major or 
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unlikely risks materializing, and managers that undertook no risk management at all, but did 
not suffer from any larger risks occurring during their projects. After two iterations, it was 
decided that the topic is outside of the thesis’ scope, and it was not coded separately, nor was 
further research carried out. However, I conducted an initial literature review on the topic and 
asked the independent senior researcher if he had any experience with it. 
The senior researcher commented: “There is no such a thing as a lucky manager. One 
can fail in managing large projects in so many ways that an incompetent, but lucky person 
could potentially be lucky in one situation, but for sure not in others. Therefore, if they executed 
a large-scale project efficiently, they knew what they were doing.” 
Exploratory case study 2: research design, data collection, coding and analyses  
To investigate the industry needs in a completely different area of design work and with 
a completely different risk management process, I conducted the second in-depth exploratory 
case study. This study analyzed a design phase of a large construction project in the city center 
of Reykjavik worth almost a billion Icelandic kronor and with project delivery scheduled for 
late 2019. The project includes a hotel, apartments, bars, restaurants and a music hall and is 
managed by an engineering and consulting SME that provides design services for construction 
projects. In general, the study confirms the findings described above. 
The study was designed on the same pillars as the previous one – an exploratory case 
study for which the data were collected as a multimethod study consisting of quantitative 
(probabilistic) modeling and interviews. While the research design was the same, the difference 
is that this case study took fewer iterations than the first one, as it came later in the theory-
building process. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, each lasting from one to one-
and-a-half hours. The study was conducted over the period of six months. More on the specifics 
of the interviewees is available in Section 8.4. As the company does not have an established 
risk management, individual interviews were conducted with an engineer with risk 
management training, a fire and safety engineer, the project manager, a structural engineer, the 
HVAC design manager, an electrical engineer-designer, an architect and design manager, and 
the project owner. Semi-structured interviews (Yin, 2013) were designed to cover three topics: 
the interviewees’ background and experience and relation to managing risk; their role in the 
project and potential issues (risks) they considered; the main challenges they experienced in 
this project and in their practice; their view on the proposed modeling (RamRisk); quality of 
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data in their work. ‘What if’ questions were used as an additional way to draw out the risk 
management challenges for the participants. The wrap-up question encouraged reflections on 
clashes experienced in relation to risk management in projects in which they were involved, 
but also on what would be a way to improve their practice.  
 The second exploratory case study investigated RamRisk in order to document the 
potential, but also the limitations, of one of the currently most widely employed risk tools in 
Nordic risk management practice. Given that the company had no established risk management 
procedures, by using the tool RamRisk it was feasible to demonstrate the benefit of an early 
involvement of such risk analysis, as well as its practicability for the project outcome. An initial 
risk register was taken from available online sources in terms of project cost and schedule. The 
register was then updated and discussed with practitioners who helped assign probabilities for 
the specific risks. Possibilities for different analyses were investigated and discussed, such as 
tornado diagrams, FN curves, and risk matrix. 
The tool allows assigning responsibilities of identified risks to different users, which 
was one of the main needs of the project contractor. However, the insights regarding the 
limitations of the tool are aligned with the previous study: 1) there are challenges in modeling 
and assigning probabilities, 2) the quality and availability of data is a main constraint, as 
there is no developed culture toward documenting and articulating risks, 3) use and 
integration of results is seen as rather challenging, as they first need to establish a culture 
that values and understands the need for risk management, but also that the employees have 
the adequate educational level (possibly achieved through courses and seminars on risk). 
Moreover, a number of behavioral aspects were mentioned, such as lack of interest from the 
managerial side to implement formal procedures, lack of response during data gathering, and 
cross-sectoral learning/knowledge sharing. 
Additional Interviews: data collection, coding and analysis 
The findings from the two exploratory case studies were supplemented by interviews 
in three more companies. These interviews, on the other hand, provided a number of additional 
challenges in current risk management practice that are generally aligned with the literature 
findings described in Section 3.3. I conduced semi-structured interviews according to the topics 
discussed (current tools and methods, quality of data used for analyses, limitations of the 
current methods, communication of the results to decision makers, risk-informed decision 
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making). The types of questions were developed around open, hypothetical, or comparative 
lines of questioning (Kvale, 2008). The findings from the interviews are summarized as follows 
(please see Appendices 1 and 2): 
Current tools and methods: The choice of the case companies was conducted as to cover a 
broad range of design activities and solutions. Accordingly, there was also a large variety of 
methods employed in their practices. Yet, none of the methods or processes used specifically 
focus on epistemic uncertainty. 
Quality of data used for analyses: Only the interviewees in two highly specialized companies 
in terms of risk quantification expressed the importance of the quality and availability of data 
in the whole process. The others did not consider if and how the quality of data impacts their 
risk management process and related decision making. Two companies analyzed if they could 
store data from various projects and implement knowledge sharing across departments.  
Limitations of the current methods: The two companies where risk quantification practices 
are well established reported the inability of their methods (such as the ones used in the 
exploratory in-depth case studies) to represent the quality of data on which they performed the 
analyses. They find it crucial for this to be communicated to decision makers together with the 
results. One company that was only establishing a risk management process explained that the 
issue with implementing formal, quantitative methods lies in the educational level of its 
employees.  
Communication of the results to decision makers: In terms of more advanced quantification, 
communication was seen as challenging as decision makers cannot necessarily comprehend all 
available results. In terms of less quantitatively oriented practices, communication was also 
seen as challenging, as there was not enough awareness and appreciation for discussions 
regarding risk. Moreover, time pressure was a commonly reported issue.  
Risk-informed decision making: What was also commonly reported is that regardless of the 
analyses or the results of a risk assessment, a number of things influence the final decision. 
Managers’ personal ambitions and gaming aspects are recognized as important elements 
influencing the final decision. 
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Reflections 
Some of the limitations resulting from the choice of research methods include: 
 Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations to enrich the findings. However, as their validity can be 
challenged, ways how rigor can be improved are elaborated in Section 9.3.  
The coding scheme in interviews presents several potential problems including non-
reproducibility and subject selection bias due to the author’s field of expertise. The sample 
selection within the second study-company is potentially tainted, as the interviewee choice is 
biased and directed by the initial interviews. 
One limitation comes from the fact that no industry partner in the project was able to 
provide access to project documentation. Significant time and efforts were spent on building 
connections, relationships and trust. Different possibilities for collaboration were discussed, 
but a number of these attempts did not succeed. Study material is potentially not well 
triangulated because of limitations on access to risk documentation. Please refer to Section 9.3 
for more details. Furthermore, interviews with practitioners from one company had to be 
excluded due to the complications with signing the NDA. Furthermore, a three-hour interview 
with the head of the risk management team in a large construction company was also excluded 
as it was established rather late in the process. However, the collected data were aligned with 
the ones described above. This can also be seen as an informal check of the constructs and 
biases developed through the coding.  
 
3.5. Discussion and summary 
 
Considering the importance of design in engineering systems, methods to deal with risk 
and uncertainty are essential. By introducing and reviewing the main streams and concepts in 
literature, and by conducting empirical work, this chapter identified that there is still space for 
improvement both from the risk and uncertainty quantification and risk management process 
point of view. Current methods are not coping with all challenges that appear during an 
engineering systems lifecycle. The following chapters aim to address these gaps (Chapters 4, 
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5, 6 and 7 regarding quantification, and Chapter 8 regarding the whole risk management 
process).  
Starting with the probabilistic treatments of uncertainties and by acknowledging its 
large merit, limitations and challenges are also provided that lead to the need for frameworks 
beyond probability. This highlights the need for a search for alternatives, possible 
improvements of risk and uncertainty representations, and a summary of the main paradigms 
that have to some extent been researched by different communities. As explained, current risk 
management practices rely on available risk management process frameworks that are based 
on the probabilistic view of risk. Methods that can effectively and reliably deal with uncertainty 
due to a lack of knowledge are still missing. A handful of alternative approaches is available, 
but their implementation seems fraught with difficulties.  
Acknowledging risk and uncertainty assessments as decision-support tools requires that 
the meaning and practical interpretation of the computed quantities are presented and 
communicated to the decision makers in an understandable format (Aven et al., 2014). There 
are three critical questions from a decision maker’s perspective:  
1. For a specific situation, which is characterized by a lack of knowledge, what 
options do    
I have?  
2. How reliable is the first answer I get, and can I use it confidently? 
3. How cost-effective is a particular analysis method? 
The thesis argues that non-probabilistic methods allow us to better address these three 
questions. It proposes to use non-probabilistic methods to be transparent when there is a lack 
of knowledge and to address identified issues in a more structured manner, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, instead of simply ignoring the degree and quality of available knowledge. 
By including additional judgments, we are taking into account available information and yet 
clearly articulate which parts are not known. The use of non-probabilistic methods can 
contribute to current engineering systems design practice, with the goal to faithfully represent 
and express the knowledge available to best inform a decision-maker and support the decision 
making process. 
  As Polanyi, a research philosopher, said: “We can know more than we can tell.” This is 
often how experienced managers’ or experts’ way of working is explained. The current practice 
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needs to take a step forward from relying on “manager’s experience”, which can be seen as a 
simple “way out” to dealing with epistemic uncertainty rather than its management.  
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4. Conceptualization and collection of non-probabilistic    
methods 
 
“We know more than we can tell” 
– Michael Polanyi –  
 
This chapter introduces a collection of advanced methods to risk and uncertainty 
quantification that promise to better cope with the challenges in current practice. These 
methods are introduced under the ‘non-probabilistic’ framework and are structured into three 
groups. The first group of methods is based on imprecise probabilities, the second represents a 
group of semi-quantitative approaches, and the third group of methods is based on exploratory 
modeling. 
As introduced in Chapter 1, uncertainty and risk represent one of the key challenges in 
design-related decision making. “Newness” and lack of knowledge are characteristics of 
design, and yet, typical risk management methods in design rely on probability-based risk 
quantification methods that are heavily dependent on previously collected data (Ferson, 
Ginzburg, & Akcakaya, 1996). In Chapter 3, I discuss to what degree current risk management 
approaches are appropriate for real-world design challenges. The chapter argues that current 
approaches primarily focus on aleatory uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty due to the inherent 
randomness of the physical world) and that other methods are needed to address epistemic 
uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty due to lack of knowledge) and ambiguity (i.e. differing 
interpretation of identical factual information on uncertainty). The non-probabilistic 
framework is then presented and the methods are described. I illustrate the methods with 
application examples in other fields and discuss their relationship to the key challenges in 
decision making processes of designing engineering systems. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of their application potential in design, as a basis for the following chapters. 
In the context of this thesis, this is an important step: It provides the conceptual 
development of advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods for design needs and 
establishes the non-probabilistic framework. This chapter describes the methods, and provides 
a unique and clear structure (answering research question 2 by building upon research question 
1). 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 provides a unique set of advanced risk 
and uncertainty methods, structured in three groups. Section 4.2 describes the methods. In 
Section 4.3 their design context is analyzed. In Section 4.4 I acknowledge limitations and 
criticism related to non-probabilistic approaches, and in Section 4.5 a summary of the chapter 
is provided together with a link to the following chapters.  
4.1. Conceptualizing the non-probabilistic framework in the context of 
engineering systems design 
 
It is important to make a distinction between uncertainties that can be treated through 
probabilities and uncertainties that cannot. The thesis acknowledges the large merit of 
probability-based methods when it comes to uncertainties of stochastic nature, but also points 
out limitations that lead to the need for frameworks beyond probability when it comes to 
uncertainties due to lack of knowledge.  
Non-probabilistic methods collected across different domains are here systematically 
presented in three groups as the non-probabilistic framework. The framework supports 
“beyond probabilistic” reasoning by using the non-probabilistic methods and also aligning 
them to the overall design and risk management needs (more details in Chapter 8). From each 
group of methods I briefly describe those that have the potential to better address the industrial 
risk management challenges discussed in Section 3.4. I further provide an overview of the 
fields in which these methods have been broadly discussed and used.  
4.1.1. Imprecise probability 
 
Imprecise probability (Walley, 1991) expands the possibilities of established 
probabilistic risk quantification to reason more reliably with limited information on actual 
probability distributions. The approach allows decision makers to review and discuss coherent 
and plausible ranges of probabilities. Given that probabilities cannot be known precisely if the 
modeler only has partial information at hand, imprecise probability suggests constructing 
probabilistic measures of interest as precisely (or imprecisely) as available data allow, in the 
form of intervals.  
a) Coherent upper and lower probability 
In coherent upper and lower probability, the major novelty is the idea to drop a central 
assumption of Bayesian theory, which states that uncertainty should always be measured by a 
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single (additive) probability measure. There is a large number of arguments that support the 
concept of coherent upper and lower probability and why it is needed (Kozin & Petersen, 1996). 
Given that it does not require unjustified assumptions, which is the case with traditional 
approaches as argued in Section 3.4, the use of this method nicely builds on Colyvan's (2008) 
argumentation. 
 
b) The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence originates from the work of Dempster (1967) 
in the context of statistical inference. It was later formalized by Shafer as the theory of 
evidence. In their study, Beynon, Curry, and Morgan (2000) pointed out that the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence, as a technique for modeling reasoning under uncertain, imprecise 
and incomplete information, seems to have numerous advantages over the more traditional 
statistical methods. The main feature of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is the 
possibility to include additional judgments in evidential reasoning. This permits the theory to 
measure and take into account the weight of evidence, which arguably also addresses the 
argument about ambiguity from the previous chapter.  
4.1.2. Semi-quantitative methods 
 
Semi-quantitative methods represent quantitative methods that are combined with 
additional qualitative information. From the various semi-quantitative representations that are 
developed in different fields (see for example Flage & Terje, 2009; Berner & Flage, 2015; 
Aven, 2008), the NUSAP scheme is presented here (Brocéliande team, 2015).  
 
c) The NUSAP scheme 
The NUSAP scheme (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990) can again be seen as an extension of 
established probabilistic modeling of uncertainty. It adds qualitative information to the 
uncertainty and risk analysis in a structured manner, informing the modeling, analysis and 
decision-making process by making issues such as data origin, quality and key assumptions 
transparent. The acronym “NUSAP” stands for Number, Unit, Spread, Assessment, and 
Pedigree – the five elements that constitute an information set regarding uncertainty in the 
method. Connected to the partial information available argument from Section 4.2, it is 
important to note that the NUSAP scheme makes the background knowledge, as well as 
assumptions, transparent. That allows clear and easier communication with parties involved in 
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decision-making processes.  
4.1.3. A family of related conceptual approaches based on Exploratory Modeling 
 
A family of related conceptual approaches is based on exploratory modeling, which 
uses computational experiments to run simulations. It represents the third group of non-
probabilistic methods. The underlying idea is that instead of determining the best predictive 
model and solving for the risk mitigation procedure that is optimal (but fragilely dependent on 
assumptions), it is wiser to seek among the most robust actions when dealing with uncertainty 
due to lack of knowledge. That is, those actions that at least lead to a satisfactory result under 
a large number of possible future development scenarios. Considering the argument about 
limitations of a rational decision maker from Section 4.1, these sets of methods represent a 
completely new way of thinking: instead of the traditional “predict and act” paradigm, they 
bring a “monitor and adapt” one.  
 
A family of conceptually related methods for dealing with uncertainty: 
• Assumption-Based Planning was developed at the RAND Corporation almost 30 years 
ago as a tool for improving the adaptability and robustness of an existing policy/plan/design 
(Dewar et al., 1993) 
• Robust Decision Making (RDM) uses multiple views of the future to iteratively stress test 
one or more candidate strategies over many scenarios and refine the strategies in light of 
this (Walker, Haasnoot, & Kwakkel, 2013)  
• Adaptive Policymaking was specifically developed to support the implementation of long-
term plans despite the presence of uncertainties (Haasnoot et al., 2012) 
• Adaptation Tipping Points and Adaptation Pathways both approach the timing of 
actions and were developed for water management (Haasnoot et al., 2012) 
• Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways combines the work on Adaptive Policymaking with 
the work on Adaptation Tipping Points and Adaptation Pathways (Haasnoot, Kwakkel, & 
Walker, 2013). 
In this thesis, I introduce Robust Decision Making, because it is the most developed approach.  
d) Robust Decision Making 
Robust Decision Making (RDM) has been developed over the last 30 years, primarily 
by researchers associated with the RAND Corporation (Dewar et al., 1993). The RDM 
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framework uses multiple views of the future to support a thorough investigation of modeling 
results that helps to identify a policy/plan/design (Lempert, Popper, & Bankes, 2003; Groves 
& Lempert, 2007), that: (1) is robust; (2) avoids most situations in which the 
policy/plan/design/system would fail to meet its goals; and (3) makes clear the remaining 
vulnerabilities. As Chapter 7 explores RDM in depth, a more detailed description and 
discussion is omitted from this chapter.  
 
Since its development, RDM has been applied to strategic planning problems in a 
variety of fields, including climate change (Lempert, Schlesinger, & Bankes, 1996), complex 
systems (Lempert, 2002), economic policy (Seong, Popper, & Zheng, 2005), and flood and 
water risk management (Herman et al., 2014). 
4.2. Description of the methods  
4.2.1. Imprecise Probability 
 
During the last three decades, a number of mathematical structures have been developed 
that relax the strong axioms of probability theory (Kolmogorov’s axioms) and thus allow 
capturing epistemic in addition to aleatory uncertainty. This group of theories is referred to as 
the “theories of imprecise probabilities.” Imprecise probability is a generic term for a range of 
mathematical models that measure chance or uncertainty without sharp numerical probabilities 
(e.g. “can be”, “for example”, interval-valued). These models include belief functions, Choquet 
capacities, comparative probability orderings, convex sets of probability measures, fuzzy 
measures, interval-valued probabilities, possibility measures, plausibility measures, and upper 
and lower expectations or previsions (Walley, 1991). Imprecise probability admits that 
probabilities cannot be known precisely if the modeler only has partial information at hand.  
The major novelty in the concept is to drop a central assumption of Bayesian theory, 
which states that uncertainty should always be measured by a single (additive) probability 
measure. Unlike the Bayesian “dogma of precision”, in order to characterize the uncertainty of 
an event with imprecise probabilities, we need both lower and upper probabilities. 
There are a large number of arguments that support the concept of imprecise 
probabilities. The following list is taken from Kozin and Petersen (1996) and illustrates from 
the practical point of view why imprecision in probabilities is needed:  
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• to reflect the amount of information on which they are based; 
• to model a state of complete ignorance, meaning a total absence of relevant information; 
• to combine several sources of information; 
• to combine different probabilistic judgments generating an imprecise model; 
• to treat disagreement among group members over probabilities obtained by judgments 
in the same way as conflict between several assessments of one individual: both are 
sources of imprecision; 
• to capture uncertainties of some problem situation more faithfully, not only due to 
randomness. 
Football example (Walley, 1996)  
Consider a football game whose possible outcomes are win (W), draw (D) or loss (L) 
for the home team. To express its uncertainty about the outcome, the user makes the judgments: 
Probably not W, 
W is more probable than D, 
      D is more probable than L. 
What can we say about the probabilities of the three outcomes?  
The theory of coherent imprecise probabilities allows computing interval-valued 
probabilities based on the above partial and imprecise statistical information that is closer to 
the natural language, although tied to probability. The answer to the question is: P(W) = [1/3; 
1/2], P(D) = [1/4; 1/2], P(L) = [0; 1/3].  
If more non-conflicting judgments are provided, the bounds for the probabilities 
become tighter. Many other kinds of qualitative or quantitative judgments could be added to 
the three we have considered, for example, 
if not D then W is very likely, 
W is between 1 and 2 times as probable as D, 
I am willing to bet on L at odds of 4 to 1, 
W has precise probability 0.4. 
The theory of coherent imprecise probabilities can also accommodate different 
reliabilities of different sources of information, if there are grounds to assume that one source 
of information is more reliable than another. 
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4.2.2. The Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
 
Other imprecise probability theories allow deriving interval-valued probabilities given 
a different type of input. One of those theories is the theory of belief functions, the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence. In their study, Beynon, Curry, and Morgan (2000) emphasize that 
the theory was popularized in the literature of artificial intelligence and Expert Systems, but it 
has also been applied to certain extents in the fields of face recognition, statistical classification, 
target identification and medical diagnosis. 
The main feature of the Dempster-Shafer theory is the possibility to include additional 
judgments in evidential reasoning. This permits the theory to measure and take into account 
the weight of evidence. Another key feature highlighted by Beynon et al. (2000) is that, unlike 
in possibility theory and statistical reasoning, there is no need to force our probability or belief 
measures to sum a unity. Hence, possibility theory can be considered a special case of 
Dempster-Shafer’s theory. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is based on complex mathematical 
explanations, a discussion on which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. One study by Walley 
(1996), where the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is mathematically exhaustively 
explained, is followed with a set of six examples, each mathematically grounded. The authors 
of this thesis tried to find an example where an extent knowledge of mathematics is not 
necessary to follow the argumentation, but, having failed to do so, focus on one example of a 
key feature that is mentioned above.  
Example: reliability analysis (quoted from Aven, 2014): 
“To illustrate, suppose that a diagnostic model is available to indicate with reliability 
(i.e. the probability of providing the correct result) of 0.9 when a given system has failed. 
Considering a case in which the model does indeed indicate that the system has failed, this fact 
justifies a 0.9 degree of belief in such an event but only a 0 degree of belief (not 0.1) in the 
event that the system has not failed. This latter belief does not mean that it is certain that the 
system has failed, as a zero probability would; it merely means that the model indication 
provides no evidence to support the fact that the system has not failed. The pair of values {0.9; 
0} constitutes a belief function on the propositions ‘the system has failed’ and ‘the system has 
not failed.’” 
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4.2.3. NUSAP (Number, Units, Spread, Assessment, and Pedigree) tool 
 
In contrast to the previously presented theories, where expert knowledge is required to 
interpret the results, a different technique was developed during the 1980s. The idea is to draw 
attention to the properties of numbers (which are often ignored) and to offer transparency when 
it comes to the quality of information. The NUSAP scheme targets a broader audience and the 
origin of the data plays a bigger role. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), alarmed by the misuse of 
numbers in debates about nuclear safety levels, and later by the misuse of scientific findings 
by climate change “skeptics” to delay climate action, constructed the NUSAP notation. With 
the focus on policy-related research, they proposed that nowadays tasks should not only include 
the management of uncertainties, but also the assessment of quality and communication with 
the public.  
This thesis argues that high-quality decision making not necessarily requires the 
elimination of uncertainty, but rather its effective management, as offered by the NUSAP 
scheme. The NUSAP measure can capture more background features than imprecise 
probabilities, however, at the “cost” of being a qualitative measure. Engineering systems design 
risk management approaches must be based on coping with a lack of knowledge at least as 
much as on the application of knowledge (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990). The NUSAP measure 
has a large information content, but by being a qualitative expression, there is no strict formal 
way to base decision making on it. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) coined the term NUSAP as an acronym for the five 
categories of information included in their measure: Number, Units, Spread, Assessment, and 
Pedigree. The essential idea is that a result of any analysis, including risk and uncertainty 
quantification, should not be a single number, but should be accompanied by additional 
information to allow decision makers to interpret its overall meaning value (here introduced 
through the four additional categories). The “unit” measure states whether we are talking about 
percentage, money, or something else. “Spread” and “Assessment” are related to uncertainty. 
Spread is used to express the random error, and the systematic error is expressed by 
Assessment. The most significant novelty comes from the “Pedigree” measure, which informs 
on the information feed, or in other words, the origin and quality of data analyzed. By providing 
detailed information to the decision maker on how data were collected, what the sample size 
and similar measures are, the NUSAP measure lets them judge the overall value and meaning 
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of the presented data. It eliminates uncertainty or misinterpretation on whether for example a 
probability measure is just a guess or based on extensive simulation and testing.  
There are guidelines for NUSAP application (Brocéliande team, 2015) and the 
following list is quoted according to the same source.  
Typical strengths of NUSAP are: 
• NUSAP identifies the different types of uncertainty in quantitative information and 
enables them to be displayed in a standardized and self-explanatory way. Providers and 
users of quantitative information then have a clear and transparent assessment of its 
uncertainties. 
• NUSAP fosters an enhanced appreciation of the issue of quality in information. It 
thereby enables a more effective criticism of quantitative information by providers, 
clients, and, generally, users of all sorts, expert and laypersons. 
• NUSAP provides a useful mean to focus research efforts on the potentially most 
problematic parameters by identifying those parameters, which are critical for the 
quality of the information. 
• The diagnostic diagram, a NUSAP method, provides a convenient way in which to view 
each of the key parameters in terms of two crucial attributes. One is their relative 
contribution to the sensitivity of the output, and the other is their strength. When viewed 
in combination on the diagram, they provide indications of which parameters are the 
most critical for the quality of the result.  
4.3. Applications of non-probabilistic risk and uncertainty quantification 
methods 
4.3.1. Current applications of non-probabilistic methods 
 
Non-probabilistic methods have so far been applied in several areas. To my knowledge, 
the methods have mostly been used outside the design, product development, and project 
management domain even though they were developed some time ago. 
One well-recognized application of imprecise probabilities is in the domain of artificial 
intelligence. In a seminal study, Walley (1996) compares four measures that have been 
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advocated as models for uncertainty in expert systems. The measures are additive probabilities 
(used in the Bayesian theory), coherent lower (or upper) previsions, belief functions (used in 
the Dempster-Shafer theory), and possibility measures (fuzzy logic). His work is considered as 
a reliable scientific background for deeper understanding, mathematical explanations and 
representative examples of the mentioned theories. Findings in his study demonstrate that each 
of the four measures is useful for particular kinds of problems. However, only lower and upper 
previsions, here introduced as coherent upper and lower probability, perform in a sufficiently 
general way to model the most common types of uncertainty. 
The methods have also been introduced and applied to the following fields: 1) 
Civil/structural engineering (Zio, 2009; Berner & Flage, 2015); 2) Risk, resilience and 
vulnerability of critical infrastructures (Zio, 2007); 3) Environmental risk assessment 
(Guyonnet et al., 2003); 4) Offshore oil and gas installations (Lavasani et al., 2011); 5) Risk 
assessment of radioactive waste repositories (Helton, 1993). 
Previous applications of coherent upper and lower probabilities: The potentials of 
coherent upper and lower probabilities have been analyzed in the field of reliability and safety 
assessments (Kozin & Petersen, 1996; Ferson & Ginzburg, 1996). Due to the important impact 
of safety and reliability analyses on human, environmental and economic conditions, it is 
essential they comprise the maximum amount of useful information. The main question in 
those analyses is whether a potentially dangerous technical object meets the regulation values 
or not. In cases of small samples of operational data, precise probabilities represent an arbitrary 
solution. On the other hand, the use of coherent upper and lower probabilities does not offer a 
simple Yes or No answer, but accompanies both answer options, meaning that they offer 
information on what is more probable. That is usually sufficient for judging which hypothetical 
events are most likely to happen. Only when the regulation value lies outside the upper and 
lower interval, it is possible to determine the precise Yes or No answer.  
Previous applications of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence: The Dempster-
Shafer theory has also been applied to a certain extent in the fields of facial recognition (Ip & 
Ng, 1994), statistical classification (Denoeux, 1995), target identification (Buede & Girardi, 
1997), medical diagnosis (Yen, 1989), risk assessment and applied biomathematics (Ferson et 
al., 2003) and climate change (Ben Abdallah, Mouhous-Voyneau, & Denœux, 2013). A full 
overview of the research directions is available in (Denoeux, 2016). Significant progress was 
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made in signal processing by implementing imprecise methods thinking for reliability analysis 
(Kozin & Petersen, 1996).  
 
Figure 4 Graphic presentation of an electronic device consisting of components "-" and Integrated 
Circuits (rectangles) (Kozin & Petersen, 1996). 
In this example (Figure 4), the set of all components Ω contains 220 components “-”. 
For the system S, e.g. an electronic device, consists of four integrated circuits n1, n2, n3, n4 
and the rest n5. By knowing the reliabilities of subsystems in case of a system failure, we obtain 
probabilities of finding a failed component in each of the subsystems. By using the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence it is possible to calculate same probabilities for other subsystems, 
such as k1, k2, k3. The analogy of this example with clusters-of-risks issue will be elaborated 
in Section 4.4.3. 
To date, the author is aware of only one application of the Dempster-Shafer theory in 
the wider context of engineering projects (Taroun & Yang, 2013). This work shows the 
application of the Dempster-Shafer theory for handling the risk assessment of a construction 
project. To describe the methodology, the authors use an illustrative case study – a real project 
from a large construction company. A senior manager from a large construction company with 
an annual turnover of £4.3 billion participated in this study.  
Taroun and Yang’s study also includes feedback on the methodology introduced from 
a large number of practitioners working in different construction companies. The evaluation 
criteria were based on four aspects: 1) analysis complexity, 2) methodological clarity, 3) time 
and resource consumption, and 4) quality and usefulness of the results. Overall, the feedback 
was positive. The understandable approach based on the use of the Microsoft Excel package 
was marked as simple and practical. What attracted managers’ attention was the concept of 
ignorance and the flexibility of providing incomplete assessments. Interestingly, the 
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practitioners pointed out that they see the method introduced as particularly beneficial for large-
scale and unique projects. However, some of them expressed their concern related to the large 
number of inputs. Finally, one of the conclusions was that in order to master the tool and input 
values it requires some time and understanding of different situations.  
Previous applications of the NUSAP Method: Some of the experiences in applying 
the NUSAP system for environmental uncertainty assessments are summarized in the work of 
van der Sluijs et al. (2005). The authors emphasize that complex environmental problems are 
affected by all types of uncertainty, and that mainstream uncertainty methods such as the Monte 
Carlo analysis are not suitable to address all issues. They also point out that what is 
characteristic for this class of problems is that quantifiable uncertainties are dominated by 
unquantifiable ones. Therefore, they promote the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments that is obtained through the NUSAP tool. Another line of argumentation lies in 
the fact that the NUSAP tool provides more transparency and a better public understanding of 
our actual capacities to understand and predict complex environmental risks. This is again 
closely connected to the role and impact of design and its call to consolidate (unite) different 
aspects, stakeholders and functions in a system. An example how the NUSAP method could 
be used in the oil and gas industry is available in the study by Berner and Flage (2016), and for 
uncertainty communication in environmental assessments in the study by Wardekker et al. 
(2008).  
4.3.3. Discussion of non-probabilistic methods in engineering systems design  
 
In order to avoid a loss of trust in scientific estimations of risks that can occur in the 
design of large-scale engineering systems, we need to carefully address two things. First, it is 
essential to clarify the limitations of our current capacities to avoid unrealistic expectations 
from science. Second, it is important to allow more transparency and more precise clarifications 
of what we know exactly, and of what is not certain, through a decision making process. To 
achieve this, and in order to achieve more concise decision making, we need to carefully 
address the following three aspects.  
1) Quality of models: In addition to leading the research into the improvement of 
existing methods, we need to dedicate more attention to the models that have the explicit 
capability to deal with epistemic uncertainty. In particular, the thesis argues that in situations 
that are dominated by weak knowledge and information, stronger assumptions have to be made. 
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When calculating a single-valued probability those premises should not simply be dismissed, 
but rather elaborated. Even the probabilistic opponents Bernardo and Smith (2009) stated “In 
practice, there might, in fact, be some interval of indifference […].” 
For instance, the application of imprecise probabilities in design risk management 
would allow computing interval-based probabilities when weak information is available, 
instead of unjustified simplifications that can occur during the modeling process. In the 
exploratory case studies, I identified situations where, in order to continue with the modeling, 
experts needed to “guess” the distributions since the information available was not adequate.  
2) Quality of data: The quality of the data used for risk assessments plays a key role. 
A more accurate reflection of the actual state of knowledge used in risk assessment is required. 
The whole risk management process should be transparent and clear about the information 
available, its quality through assumptions made, types of analysis and their limitations, 
representation of the results produced, and finally their interpretation. Furthermore, no 
“impossible predictions” should be expected from the analysts when scarce knowledge has to 
be fitted into a probability distribution. 
For instance, the application of the NUSAP scheme in design risk management would 
allow to inform decision makers about the background quality of the available information. 
Throughout the first exploratory case study, the senior project manager explained that 
transparency in the origin of the data collected is essential when communicating with the 
decision makers, and that this concept allows a systematic and easily understandable 
representation.  
3) Use and interpretation of results: On the other hand, the interpretation of the results 
is equally important. Considering its importance in the decision making process, a general 
understanding of the produced results should be a priority. Higher “decision relevance” in the 
presentation of assessment results is feasible, as additional information is included. That brings 
additional validity to the results.  
 
For instance, the application of Dempster-Shafer in design risk management would 
allow computing natural language statements. In addition, through the exploratory case study 
we identified clusters-of-risk issue that are not supported by current risk management tools 
(Kulikova, 2016). A cluster of risk is a term for the same risks that can occur at different 
locations. In a project it is necessary to know whether to mitigate that risk, rather than which 
specific location will be impacted. Therefore, like in the example of the electronic device, you 
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are interested in the likelihood of a system component failure and not in discovering which 
component is most likely to fail.  
4.4. Limitations and criticism of non-probabilistic methods 
 
There are different opinions on whether non-probabilistic methods are the only right 
choice for such a complex issue as that of this thesis. First of all, putting into operation a new 
method for analysis, planning, and management requires a certain investment. In some cases 
that investment can be significant (Raz & Michael, 2001). The implementation of a novel 
approach in a general sense is usually followed by skepticism, since its usage might reveal 
unpredicted complications. Therefore, the practice needs a solid justification before even 
attempting to involve changes.  
Furthermore, lack of operational meanings and interpretations are the key critique 
points for alternative uncertainty representations and treatment in risk assessment, as stated by 
Flage et al. (2014). In their discussion, Aven and Zio (2011) tackled some researchers’ 
concerns ‒ an imprecise probability result is generally considered to provide a more 
“complicated”, i.e. harder to process, representation of uncertainty. In their study, they 
acknowledge arguments against imprecise probability, such as that simple representation 
should be favored. The use of imprecise probabilities goes against of the idea of simplicity, and 
for many, particularly first-of-a-kind applications, it will lead to initial confusion and 
difficulties. Others strongly defend the Bayesian approach and heavily criticize any other 
attempt to perform uncertainty analysis (Aven & Zio, 2011). 
Implementation of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence was not readily accepted in 
the risk community. After several iterations it was proven as a valid method, or at least as a 
mathematically sound one, however, the use of the Dempster rule has been seriously criticized 
when significant conflict in information is encountered (Sentz & Ferson, 2002). Furthermore, 
as stated in the same report, other researchers have developed modified Dempster rules that 
attempt to represent the degree of conflict in the final result. Mathematical representation of 
epistemic uncertainty has proved to be challenging. Calculating Dempster-Shafer intervals can 
be highly computationally expensive (Swiler, Paez, & Mayes, 2009). Several studies, such as 
Bauer's (1997) elaborated on ways and methods to overcome this difficulty. Various 
approximation algorithms have been suggested that aim at reducing the number of important 
elements in the belief functions involved. More recently, Xiao et al. (2015) worked on 
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possibilities to improve the computational efficiency of the evidence theory. One of the 
directions in current research is exactly toward transforming these methods into more 
computationally usable ones, including the development of a “computational toolbox” as it 
exists in various commercial and non-commercial forms for probabilistic risk assessment.  
However, some methods, for example the NUSAP scheme, are at least less complex 
than other methods. According to the Brocéliande team (2015), the NUSAP’s weaknesses are 
the novelty of the method, and the limited, but significant and growing, number of practitioners 
using it. In addition, the Pedigree scoring is to a certain degree subjective. The choice of experts 
to do the scoring is also a potential source of bias (Brocéliande team, 2015). 
The main challenge with exploratory-modeling-based methods is their computational 
complexity and the fact that they provide results that are more complex, contextual and 
provisional (Bankes, Walker, & Kwakkel, 2013). Some of the details are further discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
Reflections 
There are certain limitations in terms of the collection of the non-probabilistic methods.  
The literature review was based on searches conducted in Google Scholar, Web Of 
Science and internal DTUFindIt databases by using keywords. I first performed an exploratory 
search for publications (Rowe, 2014). In this search multiple fields were encountered (such as 
engineering systems design, project management, megaproject management, risk analysis, and 
product development). A large number of articles and books were identified through this search 
approach. The results from the exploratory search served as input for the later more structured 
search that was complemented with the input from subject matter experts within the risk field. 
This was done as a literature review can sometimes encounter challenges in identifying seminal 
works.  
The literature review iterated between four phases: 1) planning and scoping, 2) 
conceptualizing the review, 3) searching, evaluating and selecting literature, and 4) analyzing 
the literature. Initially the collection was limited to the non-probabilistic methods in risk 
analysis and their use outside engineering systems design. Later it was expanded with adjacent 
topics of high relevance such as decision making and expert judgment elicitation. An 
exploratory and systematic search was applied to each new sub-topic, consulting subject matter 
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experts in regard to the keywords. Key concepts within each discipline were identified and 
iteratively served as input for the other sub-topics as they were (to some extent) related. 
The list is not exclusive; it is expandable as the non-probabilistic framework supports 
adding different methods that can fit into one of three groups. If or when developed, a new 
group can be added. 
4.5. Summary 
 
This chapter provides a collection of advanced methods for risk and uncertainty 
quantification by answering research question 2. These methods are introduced under the non-
probabilistic framework and have been organized into three groups. The first group is based on 
imprecise probabilities, the second represents a group of semi-quantitative methods, and the 
third group is based on exploratory modeling. 
 As argued in this chapter, the methods introduced lack concrete application examples 
in order to demonstrate their full potential. That sets the basis for the next three chapters 
(Chapter 5, 6 and 7) in which the respective focus is on one group of methods. For that reason 
research question 3 was refined into the sub-questions (3.1, 3.2, 3.3), each corresponding to 
one group of non-probabilistic methods addressed in the corresponding chapters.  
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5. First group of methods: Improving expert judgment 
elicitation by leveraging different data formats 
 
“An expert is a person who has made all the mistakes that can be made in a very narrow 
field.” 
― Niels Bohr ― 
  
Chapter 5 illustrates the problem of imprecision and how we can employ the first group 
of non-probabilistic approaches to better support decision making. In the context of the thesis 
it represents an important empirically-based step. The chapter summarizes a variety of useful 
data formats and aggregation methods and introduces probability bound analysis, Dempster-
Shafer structures’ mathematical kin. 
Oil and gas investment risk analysis uses elicitation of subjective probabilities to predict 
the size and properties of hydrocarbon deposits and to quantify the relevant uncertainty. These 
risk assessments are a central element of the decision making support for allocating investments 
into designing exploration activities. However, the use of such subjective probabilities to 
describe epistemic uncertainty has been challenged by different scholars (Beer, Ferson, & 
Kreinovich, 2013). I examine the current practice at a large Danish company exploring offshore 
oil and gas reservoirs and identify possibilities for improvements in the use of expert elicitation 
of probabilities. I explore different techniques for generating and aggregating experts’ 
judgments. First, the study introduces different data formats (points, intervals, weighted 
intervals, confidence-boxes, beta distributions, Burgman elicitations) and explores the impact 
of using them in the expert’s ability to provide their assessments. The study finds that it is 
helpful for experts to provide their assessments in the format they are the most comfortable 
with. This depends on the specific situation, their state of knowledge, and personal disposition. 
Second, the study explores the effectiveness (in terms of decision support) of four aggregation 
methods (averaging, mixture, enveloping, pooling). To that end, I interview managers in the 
company regarding the implications of these alternative aggregation methods in their 
managerial practice, as well as their ability to work with the different data formats previously 
studied with the experts. While there are still obstacles to implementing sophisticated expert 
elicitation and aggregation practices, a clear need for such type of analysis is recognized, and 
options for step-by-step implementation are discussed. At the end the challenges are 
highlighted that relate to the impact of the choice of aggregation method on decision making. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
A common approach to risk analysis is based on using probability models to reflect 
aleatory uncertainties (i.e. variation in large populations of similar units) and using subjective 
probabilities to describe epistemic uncertainties about the unknown parameters of the 
probability models (Nilsen & Aven, 2002). However, the use of subjective probabilities has 
been criticized; it is argued that the approach provides results that are too precise in relation to 
the available information (Beer, Ferson, & Kreinovich, 2013). 
Expert judgments are often unavoidable in risk analysis, decision making, and 
forecasting, as risk analysists do not have access to complete and accurate data (Cooke, 1991). 
The role of experts is important because their judgments can provide valuable information, 
particularly in view of the limited availability of “hard data” regarding many uncertainties in 
risk analysis (Renn, 1998; Zio, 2009). More formally, consulting several experts when 
considering risk estimates and forecasting problems has increasingly become customary 
practice after World War II (Clemen & Winkler, 1999). The motivation for using multiple 
experts is simply the desire to obtain as much information as possible. Expert judgments are 
provided on the probabilities of events of a certain interest. Procedures for combining expert 
judgments are often compartmentalized as mathematical aggregation methods or behavioral 
approaches (Clemen & Winkler, 1999).  
 
In this chapter, I consider the problem of using multiple experts in oil and gas prospect 
risking. In this context, a “prospect” may be defined as “a specific locality within an area where 
we possess or may acquire a lease or concession and which we believe to have geological or 
economic characteristics that may warrant testing by drilling” (Harbaugh, Davis & 
Wendebourg, 1995). The main business of our case company is the exploration and commercial 
production of oil and gas. Exploration activities carry very significant costs, and are thus 
supported by detailed expert risk assessments, i.e. the so-called prospect risking. A decision to 
drill an exploration well with the objective to find a new oil or gas field should be based on a 
sound analysis of the prospect risks and its possible volume: what is the chance that a well will 
contain hydrocarbons, and how much could it be at what level of technical and commercial 
difficulty of extracting it? The company explores different locations and prospects, and its 
performance directly depends on the success rate of drilling. Test drillings are very expensive 
and represent a significant investment. To increase the success rate with regard to identifying 
perspective oil deposits, opinions of multiple experts are solicited. The study reported in this 
   85 
 
chapter investigated two aspects: 1) The effectiveness of using different “data formats”, i.e. 
uncertainty representations, from the single expert’s point of view; 2) the effectiveness of 
alternate methods of combining single experts’ elicitation into an overall decision-support basis 
for management. Some of the wider literature discussing elicitations is also available (e.g. 
Burgman et al., 2006). 
 
 The work presented here aims to fill a research gap in the practical application of expert 
elicitation in risk assessment. While there has been significant development in terms of 
research in aggregation methods from the mathematical and philosophical point of view 
(described in Section 5.4.1), it has been recognized (Mosleh, Bier, & Apostolakis, 1988; 
Cooke, 1991; Otway & Winterfeldt, 1992; Renn, 1998) that there are challenges in their 
application, but also in the effective representation of epistemic uncertainties (Ferson & 
Ginzburg, 1996; Dubois, 2010). I focus on finding solutions that are feasible to implement in 
practice, given that some of the advanced methods may be either too complicated or simply 
too time consuming to use. Risk analysis in this case can be seen as the basis for decisions to 
drill or not to drill a well, and as such form the link between subsurface evaluation and the 
business aspects of the petroleum industry.  
industry.  
5.2. Case study 
 
Hydrocarbon exploration is a high-risk business that relies heavily upon predictions 
accompanied by significant uncertainty. Thus, there is a need to more thoroughly investigate 
objective means of estimating the outcomes of the exploration of prospects. The search for oil 
and gas can be seen both as a business endeavor and a scientific activity. In exploration, risks 
deal with the potential of loss, such as the cost of drilling a dry exploratory hole versus a 
compensating gain, such as the discovery and production of commercial quantities of 
hydrocarbons.  
The alternative outcomes to the drilling of a prospect can be expressed as a discrete 
probability distribution. There is a probability that the hole will be dry and a complementary 
probability that it will be a discovery well. If it is a discovery, the distribution can be subdivided 
to express the probabilities attached to different volumes of oil that may be discovered at 
different levels of technical difficulty (and cost) of extracting it (Harbaugh, Davis & 
Wendebourg, 1995). If we can estimate the form of this distribution, it can be linked to the 
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financial gains or losses corresponding to each of the alternative outcomes in the distribution. 
This linkage provides a succinct summary of the alternative financial gains and losses resulting 
from drilling a well, and weighs them according to the probability of their occurrence. The 
challenge in assessing risk is to obtain and use the most appropriate probability distribution for 
a prospect, and to use this as an input to financial analysis. 
To properly formulate a decision, the experts in the company are asked to provide their 
opinion on five factors that are of key importance to finding oil and gas in sufficient volume 
and quality. Their competences are related to offshore drilling, where the costs per well-attempt 
are much higher than in onshore drilling and therefore represent a significant investment. In 
our case study, we focus on the five following factors (parameters), which are part of the 
company’s concerns: 
Source (We need a source of the oil - what is the risk that the source rock exists or does not 
exist in the area?) 
Charge and timing (When the oil starts to migrate (bubble off from the source rock) - where 
does it go? Does it go into a structure? Is the area we want to drill favorable to receive the 
oil? When did the oil arrive there?) 
Reservoir (A reservoir consists of reservoir rock that is completely different from the source 
rock. The porosity of this rock must be large, so it can receive the oil. What is the 
probability of reservoir rock presence in that location?) 
Seal (What is the probability of a so-called cap rock existence? We must have a seal on top.)  
Trap geometry (The concept of subsurface heat, the shape of the reservoir. The oil is trapped 
by the combination of seal and shape. Is the geometry of the reservoir suitable for oil to 
stay trapped?) 
At the moment, the way of generating the associated probabilities (i.e. the data used in 
the subsequent analysis) is based on expert elicitation. Sessions with geologists and 
geophysicists are organized, where each of them provide their opinion as a single point estimate 
on each of the five mentioned parameters. The experts then discuss their beliefs and findings 
and jointly agree upon the probabilities.  
Through the interviews with practitioners, several problems were identified with this 
way of working: 
• Single points do not reflect uncertainty around the estimate: 
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Experts are supposed to provide a single point, precise estimate. Many argue that in some 
situations, given the available information, experts might not be able to provide such a 
precise estimate and/or the confidence in such estimates can vary depending on the situation 
or information available. 
This information is also lost when the results are used as input for financial analyses and 
calculations on the strategic level. 
• The final result does not reflect whether there was an agreement among the experts: 
As the first step in current practice, each of the experts provides his/her own estimates. 
Then they discuss their opinions, and after debating reach a common estimate. In this way 
the decision makers lose the information regarding the uncertainty of the results; the more 
disagreement at the beginning, the more uncertain is the result. 
• Dominant person: 
The experts discuss their beliefs and are supposed to agree on the estimates. Here 
behavioral aspects become very important, as it has been noted that normally one dominant 
person takes the lead, so that the rest follow or are overpowered. Experts who have 
legitimate counterexamples are overruled. 
• Background knowledge not presented to the decision maker: 
When results are presented to the decision maker, the background knowledge and 
information on which the judgments were based are not included. The decision maker only 
sees the final estimates, which do not clearly differentiate between assumptions and 
personal biases of the experts. This can significantly impact the decision quality. 
 
The challenges documented above reflect the need to explore various ways of eliciting 
and aggregating the data that would support the decision maker in obtaining a final result in 
these situations. Furthermore, risk and uncertainty are not only associated with drilling 
operations, but also with field development and production after discoveries are made. These 
are important components of risk in the oil and gas industry, but are beyond the scope of this 
thesis which focuses solely on evaluating prospects. However, the approach of this thesis on 
how to generate expert elicitation data and how to aggregate different expert opinions is likely 
to be useful for all of the mentioned situations.  
Section 5.3 suggests several ways of expressing data. Section 5.4 elaborates on 
aggregation methods.  
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5.3. The elicitation of expert opinions through different data formats 
5.3.1. The motivation for reviewing different data formats to elicit expert 
opinions 
 
 The usefulness of the Bayesian approach is well argued and documented for drawing 
inferences and quantifying uncertainty when frequentist data are limited (Jaynes, 2003). 
Nevertheless, several limitations have been acknowledged, and the use of Bayesian probability 
has also been challenged (Colyvan, 2008; Coolen-Schrijner et al., 2011; Aven & Anthony, 
2015). Using a single probability (or a precise probability distribution) to describe uncertainty 
hides how much of the uncertainty is epistemic versus aleatory (Ferson, 1996; Walker, 
Lempert, & Kwakkel, 2013) as well as the strength of the underlying knowledge supporting 
that probability (Flage et al., 2014).  
These issues have led to a discussion regarding the theoretical and practical basis for 
alternative approaches to uncertainty representation in risk assessment (Aven & Anthony, 
2015). The available research indicates that methods by which expert opinions are elicited can 
have a significant effect on the accuracy of the resulting estimates (Flage et al., 2014). 
Therefore, method choice, and the corresponding data format, play a crucial role in the whole 
risk assessment. A choice of an alternative approach to uncertainty representation should be 
accompanied by the corresponding format of elicitation of opinions. 
Literature on the use of expert opinions can roughly be categorized into two areas: 1) 
techniques for improving the accuracy of estimates, and 2) techniques for aggregating the 
opinions of multiple experts. From that perspective this work can be seen as a two-fold 
contribution. First the thesis reviews different data formats. Different formats and ways of 
providing expert judgments vary from field to field. However, the field lacks a comprehensive 
review that summarizes available options. The need for such a review is also confirmed through 
research that concludes that experts may be hesitant to assign subjective (precise) probabilities 
that may be perceived as unreliable or untrustworthy (Hubbard, 2009). Second, the thesis 
applies different aggregation methods for the particular case study in Section 5.4. For both 
parts, I use R as an open source programming language for data analysis and visualization. 
The main streams of literature are provided in the following sections, but additional 
relevant work includes: 
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- Literature reviews on the topic such as: (Ouchi, 2004; Burgman et al., 2006; Werner et 
al., 2017), etc. 
- Seminal and related work such as: (Mosleh, Bier, & Apostolakis, 1988; Otway & 
Winterfeldt, 1992; Cooke & Goossens, 2000; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Bolger & 
Rowe, 2015). 
5.3.2. Data formats to represent expert elicitation results 
 
 Based on a review of the literature, I consider six different data formats: 
• Points (Otway & Winterfeldt, 1992) 
• Intervals (Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010) 
• Weighted intervals (Cooke, 1991) 
• Confidence-boxes (C-boxes) (Ferson et al., 2003) 
• Beta distributions (Jaynes, 2003), and 
• Burgman elicitations (Burgman et al., 2006). 
 
Confidentiality concerns preclude me from presenting actual elicited data from the case 
company in this thesis. For the purpose of the analysis I wrote the code in the R language 
(Appendix 5) that randomly generated illustrative data, which however correspond to 
“normalized” versions of the actual, observed data. The purpose is to illustrate different 
situations, challenges attached to them, and how differently those challenges can be addressed. 
In practice, the numbers can be easily replaced by the exact estimates of the experts. As a result, 
the written code can be seen as a toolkit that is available for application in a range of specific 
scenarios. 
 
For each of these data formats the thesis generated illustrative values for these four 
cases/situations, visualized in Figure 5: 
• when the experts mostly agree on the estimates (Consistent) 
• when they mostly disagree (Diverse) 
• when there is one outlier (Outlier), and 
• when their opinions can be divided into two groups (Bimodal). 
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Figure 5 Four introduced situations. 
 
The following figures (Figure 6 and Figure 7) show examples of generated data for one 
factor introduced in Section 5.2. In the study, this is repeated for all five factors (source, charge 
and timing, reservoir, seal, and trap geometry). Figure 6 illustrates different data formats 
generated per expert. The code is written for ten experts, however the program visualizes up to 
nine fields at the same time. For that reason, different data formats are plotted for only nine 
experts. Figure 7 illustrates these different data formats for all 10 experts.  
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Figure 6 Generated data per each expert with all data formats. 
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Figure 7 The controversy for each model. 
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5.4. Aggregation of experts’ judgments 
5.4.1. State-of-the-art 
 
Forecast accuracy can be substantially improved through the combination of multiple 
individual forecasts (Paté-Cornell, 1996). Development of the combination of individual 
predictions has taken place within econometric theory (Sharpe, 1964). However, as forecasts 
concern future events that are uncertain, another area of expansion has been the combination 
of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
probabilities, probability distributions, and probabilistic quantities (Clemen, 1989). During the 
last three decades, yet another trend was noticed in the aggregation of probabilistic judgments. 
It is related to the recognition that at least two types of uncertainty can be identified: aleatory 
and epistemic. If individual forecasts are provided in a form that admits epistemic uncertainty, 
a set of specialized combination rules has been developed, which is discussed in the following. 
Clemen and Winkler (1999) distinguish between behavioral and mechanical ways of 
aggregating the judgments of experts. In behavioral aggregation, the experts themselves 
produce a combined or consensus view. To do so, interactive, structured discussion methods 
can be employed, or non-interactive consensus-building techniques be used such as the Delphi 
method. The so-called mechanical aggregation methods combine individual opinions by means 
of mathematical formulas; this process is entirely impersonal as soon as an aggregation 
algorithm is chosen. The simple average of point forecasts is a straightforward approach that 
is computationally efficient. A simple alternative is the geometric average that is defined as the 
n-th root of the product of n numbers (Jaynes, 2003). The conceptual drawbacks of these 
methods are that the aggregates are not sensitive to differential expert information, quality or 
dependence (Clemen, 1989).  
A method compensating for a lack of individual sensitivity is to multiply each opinion 
by a weight that can reflect, for example, the performance of an expert in generating “correct” 
past judgments, or his or her background knowledge on which the judgment is based. The 
weights can be derived from expert calibration sessions (Cooke, 1991) and then a weighted 
average serve as the combined value. This method is rather difficult to implement in practice, 
as it is organizationally complex and time demanding. Furthermore, it is based on a rather 
strong assumption that experts’ performance in new elicitation sessions is as good as in the 
calibration sessions. 
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All methods mentioned above have a common drawback: the degree of disagreement 
among the experts is lost as soon as their opinions are combined. Preserving the disagreement 
may have an important impact on how the decision maker uses the information and what 
conclusions he or she can draw. A way to preserve the level of disagreement is to consider the 
elicited individual point-valued probabilities as the realizations of a random variable, and to fit 
a probability distribution into this sample. This will yield a second-order uncertainty model 
that is uncertainty about the probability of interest (Jaynes, 2003). The beta distribution defined 
by the interval [0, 1] is a natural candidate to model the second-order uncertainty (Goodman & 
Nguyen, 1999). 
Although there are several aggregation methods that can accommodate different 
analysts’ dispositions (as discussed above), there are still two points that motivate a search for 
different approaches. One point is that experts may feel uneasy in providing precise (point-
valued) probabilities on uncertain future events, and may consider that the state of their 
knowledge allows only interval-valued, comparative or other imprecise judgments to manifest 
their degree of epistemic uncertainty on the issue in question. The other point is that subjective 
probabilities are dependent on the subject’s ability to process available probability-related data 
and background information. An inability to address these two points by the “mechanical 
methods” discussed above may lead to questions about the validity of the elicited probabilities. 
Methods that allow for providing interval-valued probability judgments together with 
accounting for knowledge support neither fall in the behavioral nor the mechanical category. 
These methods suggest extracting probability-related knowledge in a predefined format from 
experts and then, by applying mathematical algorithms, producing probabilities. The 
externalized knowledge can be explicitly revised by other parties, and improved and corrected 
if needed. This is conceptually a very different way of deriving probabilities that is transparent, 
traceable and repeatable, and that contributes positively to trust in the results. Let us refer to 
this approach to probability elicitation as post-probabilistic. Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the 
two approaches to deriving subjective probabilities. 
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Figure 8 Direct (conventional) way of eliciting subjective probabilities. 
 
Figure 9 Non-probabilistic way of deriving subjective probabilities. 
A format for extracting expert knowledge can be as comparative judgments, which are 
rooted in the hypothesis of comparable uncertainty (Bourgeois et al., 2016). If a baseline 
probability for comparison is known, the result is an interval-valued probability. For example, 
it may be sensible to assume that the probability of failure of a gas valve being used outdoors 
is equal or greater than the probability of failure of a similar valve deployed indoors. Given the 
latter probability is known, (let denote it by Pind) the interval [Pind, 1] is the extracted 
knowledge. Given the probability of failure of a similar valve working in more aggressive 
environments, say on oil and gas offshore platforms (Poff), a narrower interval can be derived, 
[Pind, Poff]. This type of extracted knowledge obtained from different subjects can be 
combined and, as an outcome, an aggregated probability interval can be algorithmically 
derived. As a more nuanced approach, confidence or reliability factors can be attributed to each 
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extracted interval or comparative judgment; a combined estimate can then be derived by 
applying some algorithmic rules. 
A set of combination rules is available to accommodate a rather wide variety of interval-
valued kinds of information provided by multiple experts, along with different assumptions 
with regard to the confidence level to those judgments (Kozine & Utkin, 2002; Kozine & Utkin, 
2005). For example, by assuming 100% confidence in all provided interval-valued judgments, 
the conjunction rule should be used for combination. By admitting complete ignorance about 
the reliability of the elicited interval-valued judgments, the unanimity rule should be applied. 
Another combination rule should be used if confidence levels are different for all or for some 
judgments (Kozine & Utkin, 2005). Other simple rules are described in (Kozine & Utkin, 2002) 
and can be applied to some special cases possibly encountered in practice. Such special cases 
can for example be nested or adjacent intervals derived from experts. 
In the following section I describe the combination of probabilities elicited from 
multiple experts in different formats. 
5.4.2. Aggregation for the case study  
 
  Systematic comparisons between different approaches can serve to address some of the 
previously raised challenges and provide new insights for practitioners and guide future 
research directions. However, relatively few comparisons between different methods exist. For 
instance, Dubois and Prade (2009) compare Bayesian probabilities, belief functions and 
possibility theory.  
Sandia reports (Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Ferson et al., 2003) provide a general methods 
introduction and examples. A purely mathematical viewpoint could consider arbitrary 
operations for combining estimates involving uncertainty. However, the goal is to combine 
different estimates in a sensible and meaningful way. Therefore, we focus on a more specific 
– case – application that is of high relevance for the field and apply the four aggregation 
methods (averaging, mixture, enveloping and pooling).  
The following aggregation methods were considered in this study: 
Averaging  
Introduced in Section 5.4.1. 
Mixture 
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The idea behind mixture is that there are multiple values of a quantity that are expressed 
at different times, or in different places or under different situations. (Ferson et al., 2003) 
exemplify mixture through the story of blind men who encountered an elephant and all 
recounted very different stories. One, feeling the trunk, said the elephant was like a snake. One, 
feeling the elephant’s leg, insisted the animal was like a tree. A third, feeling the animal’s side, 
asserted that an elephant was like a wall. The point of the statements is that all of these things 
are true at the same time. Stochastic mixture offers a perspective that can see how a quantity, 
like an elephant, can manifest different or conflicting values.  
Pooling 
  Pooling can be seen as a weighted linear combination of the expert’s opinions (Clemen 
& Winkler, 1999). 
Enveloping 
Enveloping should be used to aggregate the estimates into one reliable characterization 
when the reliability of individual estimates is uncertain. Enveloping can be used as a strategy 
that allows a risk analysis to proceed even though the eliminations could not be taken to 
completion to identify a single scenario. For instance, a police officer getting conflicting 
statements from the witnesses while investigating a crime might choose enveloping as a 
strategy (i.e. arresting everyone mentioned as suspicions) (Ferson et al., 2003). 
 
Discussion on the results:  
  The empirical findings are in line with the literature: there is no single all-purpose 
aggregation method for expert opinion (Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010).  
In general, initial results report the following. For Consistent situation (introduced in 
Section 5.3.2), averaging can be used. On the other hand, averaging should not be the first 
choice for Bimodal situation, as the information regarding the two groups of opinions would 
be lost. Instead envelope can be preferred. Pooling on the other hand has the highest potential 
when the estimates are provided in the form of distributions. And mixture has its advantages 
for the situations like Outlier. Figure 10 illustrates introduced aggregation methods for 
generated data in this study.  
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Figure 10 Example of different aggregations (averaging, mixture, pooling, enveloping) for the generated 
data. 
 
5.5. Feedback from the company on different data formats and alternative 
aggregation methods  
 
I discussed our preliminary results with the experts in the company, and interviewed 
the chief analyst about the respective potential of the introduced methods. Furthermore, I asked 
for feedback on both opportunities and challenges that can be noticed at this stage. To 
summarize the insights: 
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• Highly needed: there is a need to further develop the expert judgment elicitation process 
in the company. By introducing “blind risking” and more mathematically-based ways of 
aggregating the estimates, several challenges in the current practice can be addressed 
(dominant person, consensus among the experts, background knowledge, etc.). 
• Geologists’ profession is hierarchical and senior driven: seniority plays a role when 
assigning weighs to the estimates, while this is not necessarily justified. Aggregation 
methods that can overcome this limitation are greatly needed in the field.  
• Flexibility for the experts: The ability to use different data formats represents a major 
contribution that allows the experts to choose the format they feel the most comfortable 
with. Furthermore, this allows them to express uncertainty in their estimates more precisely 
(for instance, by choosing broader ranges for intervals or lower confidence level in 
weighted intervals). Also, they are then able to make a comparison with previous 
cases/projects and elaborate on whether and why their estimates differ from case to case.  
 
The interviews also reveal several challenges with the introduced alternative 
approaches.  
At the moment, there is a gap between the required mathematical skill set and the 
educational background of the employees. Only a small number of employees are 
professionally trained in uncertainty quantification methodologies (two to three persons). The 
introduction of more sophisticated mathematical analyses may therefore present a problem and 
meet with resistance.  
 
Furthermore, communicating the results and different data formats to other departments 
in the company can be complicated. The reservoir analyses and their output need to be aligned 
with the other analyses on the strategic level, such as Expected Monetary Value (EMV). 
 
Some research that confirms this problem is available in the study by Caron and 
Ruggeri (2016). Introducing big changes that would affect many of the company’s procedures 
is very demanding, as changes in data formats would change the overall calculations. Instead, 
a step-by-step implementation with examples from smaller projects can lead to further 
developments. What the practitioners are most interested in is whether, and if so how, the 
decision (to drill or not) can change. If estimates are more accurate when using the alternative 
approaches, it is possible to expect other initiatives. This work is one step toward achieving 
that goal.  
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5.6. Conclusions and future research 
 
 Expert judgment elicitation is an important part of oil and gas risk analysis. A number 
of challenges in combining experts’ judgments have previously been addressed. Mostly, the 
research attention was on foundational and mathematical issues in order to further develop 
methods. However, the practical application of more advanced methods for generating and 
aggregating experts’ elicitation judgments still requires more research (understanding) and in-
depth studies. This chapter emphasizes the need to evaluate and more thoroughly explore 
alternative approaches to generating and aggregating expert judgment elicitations.  
 
Research on this topic is common for multiple domains. Different engineering practices 
use experts in their processes; forecasting (e.g. weather or market analysis) relies heavily on 
combining experts’ judgments. Understanding specific processes and related challenges helps 
developing and applying the methods in the best possible way. The thesis argues that depending 
on the data available, knowledge base and experts’ expertise, different methods and techniques 
should be taken into account. There is no one-method solution for all challenges and practices. 
Furthermore, the choice of an aggregation method can greatly impact decision making. 
Therefore, a careful analysis of the available options is needed, as well as a good understanding 
of the benefits of using each of the methods.  
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to collate different data formats used in expert 
judgment elicitation. For the particular needs of the case study, I provide options regarding 
aggregation methods. Furthermore, the thesis describes the obstacles to the practical 
application of some of the methods. However, the thesis first raises awareness of the lost 
information regarding uncertainty about the numbers produced by experts. Second, the thesis 
provides freedom for the experts to express their opinions in the format they feel most 
comfortable with. Third, the thesis offers a useful toolkit for conducting analyses, not only for 
petroleum exploration practices, but for risk analysis in general.  
 
There are several options to further improve current practices. An interesting area of 
research could be to investigate techniques for the evaluation of aggregation methods. Another 
interesting direction can be seen in decision analysis based on different aggregation methods. 
Moreover, the need is also recognized to explore ways of visualizing uncertainty that are 
sufficiently understandable and useful for communication on all managerial levels. 
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Finally, decision makers should be encouraged to fully take into account the results of 
the analyses. Transparency in the level of uncertainty surrounding the results would help in 
attaining the necessary level of trust in the calculations.  
 
Reflections 
The coding of the collected data was checked in multiple ways. Different subject matter 
experts (researchers) were shown parts of the raw data and the analyses to discuss the method 
of coding as well as the analyses themselves. A professor and two PhD students completely 
independent of the project scrutinized the mathematical approach to aggregation in order to 
verify that the approach is in line with the intent. Even though risk researchers, mathematicians 
and data scientists reviewed the applicability of the method and the application process and 
analysis, there may have been a bias toward certain types of aggregation models that I favored, 
partially due to the extent to which they were discussed and due to my background/skills in 
mathematics.  
The case/sample selection was chosen as a representative case (Flyvbjerg, 2006a; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) due to the fact that the company has a mature risk management 
with experienced people and available resources. Many corporations of this size engage in 
purely quantitative risk management that serves as input for decision-making. Case selection 
was performed carefully as the selection process is crucial (Flyvbjerg, 2006a; Gibbert, Ruigrok, 
& Wicki, 2008). The selected company employs a separate risk function and has experience 
with aggregation methods. Expert judgment elicitation is relevant for its decisions.  
The field of oil and gas is highly reliant on expert judgments, making it a very relevant field to 
study. As many other fields employ similar, even identical tactics in equally volatile markets, 
the learnings from this case study may inform other contexts. To strive for improving rigor in 
relation to external validity, an overall nested case study approach was applied (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Multiple case studies were applied within one company (please see 
Chapter 6), which is known as a nested case study. This improves rigor as the studies can 
inform each other and the researcher obtains more complete knowledge (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & 
Wicki, 2008).  
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6.  Second group of methods: Qualifying risk 
quantifications through the application of the NUSAP 
tool and de-biasing of expert judgment 
 “Assumptions are made and most assumptions are wrong” – Albert Einstein 
“Assumptions are dangerous things” – Agatha Christie 
This chapter focuses on the communication, visualization and representation of the 
background knowledge in risk assessment. Based on a case study, a set of methods from the 
second group of non-probabilistic approaches is applied to visualize uncertainty surrounding 
data and risk quantification results. The specific method chosen is NUSAP, as previously 
introduced in Chapter 4. In addition to the general application of the method, the research 
interests developed during the case study to include a deep focus on two aspects of the NUSAP 
method application: Part of the qualification of risk quantification results (as through the 
NUSAP approach applied in this chapter) is to evaluate the degree of expert judgment biases 
in risk quantification. This resulted in the development of an approach to quantify and correct 
biases in expert judgments in risk assessments. Similarly, a key (arguably, the key) aspect of 
NUSAP-type characterization approaches is to inform and to increase decision-makers’ trust 
in risk quantifications. That area will be the second “deep dive” in this chapter, in addition to 
the general NUSAP method application. 
The synthetic case study was developed in collaboration with the company in the oil 
and gas sector, as introduced in Chapter 5, where the company’s risk management and expert 
judgment elicitation processes are described in detail. Here the focus is on the quality of the 
background knowledge available for the assessments, and ways to communicate it when 
presenting the results. For this purpose, first the NUSAP tool is employed. The findings are 
described and documented in Section 6.2, together with feedback for practitioners. This fruitful 
collaboration led to opening two related “deep dive” questions: First, how can we facilitate the 
communication among different stakeholders (both internally and externally) to clearly 
articulate levels of trust. For this purpose, I introduced them to the RiskImaging tool and 
demonstrated how their practice could benefit from such a type of analysis (Section 6.3). 
Second, we developed a tool for calculating and correcting biases identified in their expert 
judgments as presented in 6.4. The chapter summary and conclusions are described in 6.5.  
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 I argue that the approaches introduced in this chapter, along with the elaborated 
findings, are applicable to different engineering practices with a similar risk management 
process and/or challenges – they do not depend on the specific application area, but on the set 
of risk management (and risk quantification) methods that are employed by an organization. 
The cases serve to provide guiding examples to practitioners.  
As a general note, the discussions in this chapter are based on representative data 
generated in collaboration with the case study partners. Due to the confidentiality issues, the 
actual data cannot be used.  
6.1. The importance of background knowledge and its representation 
 
 The background knowledge for an analysis refers to the available information and data, 
prior experience and knowledge of the managers and analysts, and the understanding of a 
phenomenon (such as a particular process, technology or system components and their 
interconnection, etc.). The number and strength of assumptions accompanying such analyses 
can vary significantly, and thus impact the quality and trustworthiness of the final risk 
assessment result (Apostolakis, 2004). The treatment and management of uncertain 
assumptions in quantitative risk assessments and during the subsequent processes of risk 
management and decision making have recently attracted attention from a number of 
researchers (Aven, 2013b). One of the reasons for the classification of uncertain assumptions 
is because it can be useful for determining how uncertainty can be treated in a risk assessment. 
However, the benefit of such a classification and clarification can be further improved if the 
critical assumptions can be effectively communicated to the decision makers in order to be able 
to decide how to manage the risk/uncertainty in question, and what the accuracy and overall 
“trustworthiness” of the results is. It is also important that other stakeholders that are not 
directly involved in the implementation of a risk assessment can get an overview of which 
assumptions have been identified as critical. The involvement of other stakeholders (for 
instance team leaders) can in some cases be essential as they can be closer to the operation (the 
execution of an activity) than the decision makers and/or risk managers, making them better 
suited to point out potential deviations from critical assumptions.  
Another underlying premise is that there should be a balance between the resources 
used to treat an assumption and the criticality of the assumption in question. The criticality of 
an assumption can be considered to depend on the assumption setting to which it belongs. Some 
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research on this topic was previously done by (Flage et al., 2014; Berner & Flage, 2016). The 
criticality of assumptions in the different settings ranges from low to high. A setting with high 
criticality has weak background knowledge, a moderate/high belief in a deviation from the 
original assumption, and a moderate/high impact of this deviation on the risk index. An 
example of a range of different settings is provided in Table 5.  
Table 5 Settings faced when making assumptions in risk assessments (based on Berner & Flage, 2015) 
Belief in deviation 
from original 
assumption  
Sensitivity of risk 
index  
Strength of knowledge  
Strong Moderate/Weak 
Low Low Setting I Setting II 
 Moderate/High Setting III Setting IV 
Moderate/High Low 
 Moderate/High Setting V Setting VI 
 
For a critical discussion, I would draw attention to the Setting I as one way to 
characterize black swans. A black swan is described as “a surprising extreme event relative to 
present knowledge and beliefs” (Aven, 2013a). When an assumption is recognized as Setting 
I, it does not mean that the assumption absolutely cannot deviate – it would “just” surprise us, 
as black swans do. Furthermore, in some cases the sensitivity evaluation can be misleading. 
Further details on the strategies related to assumption setting and their impact when deciding 
the overall risk management strategies are e.g. elaborated by Berner (2016). 
On the other hand, when involving, informing and/or reporting to the stakeholders on a 
higher hierarchical level, such as corporate portfolio and strategy level, it is of great importance 
to have the ability (in the form of a tool) to communicate the quality of background knowledge 
on which the estimates are made, as it may impact the overall corporate direction or lead to 
additional research. An effective, easy to comprehend and sufficiently informative approach is 
desirable. For these reasons, the chapter explores the NUSAP notational scheme that was 
developed in order to address new types of policy problems referred to as problems “where 
facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1990).  
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6.2. Visualizing and communicating uncertainty around data and analysis’ 
results 
 
Efforts to develop approaches to represent uncertainty in risk assessments follow both 
quantitative and semi-quantitative lines, where semi-quantitative is to be understood as 
quantitative representation supplemented with qualitative assessments of aspects not 
sufficiently and appropriately captured by the produced numbers. The latter type of approach 
can be referred to as extended quantitative risk assessment, and has parallels with the so-called 
NUSAP notational scheme of uncertainty and quality in science for policy. 
Working in the field of policy-related research, Funtowitcz and Ravetz developed a 
novel approach for dealing with the uncertainty and quality of available information. The 
acronym “NUSAP” stands for Number, Unit, Spread, Assessment and Pedigree, the five 
elements that constitute an information set regarding uncertainty in their method. The 
underlying idea is that a single number does not inform sufficiently, therefore properties of 
numbers should not be ignored. Moreover, the developers’ view on certain uncertainties 
associated with problem framings and assumptions can only be described through a qualitative 
connotation, since those uncertainties cannot be quantified. 
The NUSAP tool allows results of a risk and uncertainty analysis to be represented as 
a “Number” accompanied by additional information to allow decision makers to interpret the 
overall meaning of the value. Here it is introduced through the four additional categories. 
“Unit”, which may also be a conventional kind, expresses whether we are talking about 
percentage, money or something else. Uncertainty is in this case addressed by “Spread” and 
“Assessment”. Spread is characterized by random error or a variance of statistics. Those values 
are obtained through sensitivity analysis, Monte Carlo simulations or in combination with 
experts’ judgments. On the other hand, Assessment expresses the systematic error, which for 
statistical test might be the level of significance or for estimates just the qualifier pessimistic 
vs optimistic. Finally, the novelty of the tool comes with “Pedigree”. This category informs on 
the information feed, or in other words, the origin and quality of data used for the analysis. By 
providing detailed information to the decision makers on how data were collected, what the 
sample size and similar measures are, the NUSAP measure allows them to judge the overall 
value and meaning of the presented results. In order to minimize subjectivity and arbitrariness, 
it eliminates uncertainty or misinterpretation on whether, for example, a probability measure is 
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just a guess or based on extensive simulation and testing. It is given in the form of a matrix, 
where qualitative information for one pedigree criterion is structured. Different Pedigree 
matrixes can be obtained for different sorts of information. Thus, the NUSAP scheme provides 
qualitative information on the degree of aleatory uncertainty. 
One of the biggest strengths of the NUSAP is that it can be combined with already 
existing practices (and methods). The utilization of visualization tools is considered essential, 
as it has been argued that multiple representation techniques are beneficial for learning (for 
instance for remembering) (Cheng, Lowe, & Scaife 2001; Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003). The 
combination of pedigree scores (a sequential representation technique) and radar diagrams (a 
visual representation technique) is an example of a combination of multiple representation 
techniques. In addition, diagrams enable faster scanning (search) through information (Larkin 
& Simon, 1987).  
The case study and data generating process 
The synthetic case development consisted of the following steps: 1) meetings and 
interviews with practitioners, 2) formulating the characters and their personalities, 3) 
discussing the possibilities for the application of the proposed approaches, 4) sampling the data 
needed for the application and evaluation of the proposed approach for communicating the 
uncertainty surrounding the results, which led to 5) identifying the potential experts’ biases and 
other behavioral and organizational aspects that should be taken into account and are of interest 
to a particular company (this would also serve as the input for the additional analyses described 
in the following Sections 6.3 and 6.4). 
The company’s risk management process: As described in the previous chapter, it 
organizes expert elicitation sessions during which the experts are requested to provide their 
estimates as single number inputs. They provide their opinions in the form of estimates for the 
five different factors regarding the company’s oil and gas exploration (Source, Charge and 
timing, Reservoir, Seal and Trap geometry). After that, they need to find a consensus on the 
joint estimates, which is then presented and used for decision making (Figure 10). This input 
is used for deciding on whether or not to invest in drilling in a certain location, or when 
choosing between different locations. The higher need for accuracy in the estimates comes 
from the fact that the market is increasingly competitive, most resources of the North Sea (that 
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is the main location focus for some of the projects) are already found and it takes a while to 
design and then put into operation the whole system once oil and gas are found.  
A number of challenges were identified (during several brainstorming sessions) and 
described in the previous chapter. For instance, it was noted that there is often a dominant 
personality among the experts that takes over the discussion and influences the others’ opinion. 
In addition, the input from younger/less experienced colleagues is taken (valued) notably 
differently from that of the more experienced ones, and so on. Currently, they do not reflect on 
the information/data on which the opinions are based, nor on if there was agreement or 
disagreement among the experts in the first place.  
I generated the data illustrated in Figure 11 based on their current process. After each 
of the experts provides the estimates for the five different factors (Source, Charge and timing, 
Reservoir, Seal, Trap geometry), the total estimates are calculated based on the geometric mean 
for the concrete prospect. Paleocene Prospect represents an area (location) that is well explored 
and understood, but most probably has small quantities of lower-quality oil and gas. On the 
other hand, Triassic Prospect represents an area (location) that has not been explored much, 
maybe in a few test drills, but has the potential for containing large quantities of high-quality 
oil and gas. 
 
Figure 11 The synthetic risk data. 
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The application of the proposed approach  
 The application of the proposed approach consists of the combination that includes the 
NUSAP matrix (Pedigree) and radar diagrams. They are introduced as the extension of the 
current process. As the first addition to providing the regular data/analysis, the expert team is 
asked to deliver the additional two tables. Second, the expert team works on providing radar 
diagrams.  
Step 1: 
 In order to help experts to communicate the two different situations (Paleocene and 
Triassic Prospect), the use of the NUSAP matrix (Pedigree) is proposed. For both cases the 
differences are highlighted (Table 6 and 7).  
Table 6 Pedigree scores for Paleocene Prospect data 
Level Proxy Empirical Theoretical 
basis 
Method Validation 
4 Exact 
measure 
Large sample 
direct 
measurements 
Well 
established 
theory 
Best available 
Practice 
Compared 
with 
independent 
measurements 
of same 
variable 
3 Good fit or 
measure 
Small 
sample 
direct 
measurements 
Accepted 
theory 
partial in 
nature 
Reliable 
method 
commonly 
accepted 
Compared 
with 
independent 
measurements 
of closely 
related 
variable 
2 Well 
correlated 
Modeled/ 
derived data 
Partial theory 
limited 
consensus on 
reliability 
Acceptable 
method 
limited 
consensus 
on reliability 
Compared 
with 
measurements 
not 
independent 
1 Weak 
Correlation 
Educated 
guesses / 
rule of 
thumb estimate 
Preliminary 
theory 
Preliminary 
methods 
unknown 
reliability 
Weak / 
indirect 
validation 
0 Not clearly 
related 
Crude 
speculation 
Crude 
speculation 
No discernible 
rigor 
No 
validation 
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 As illustrated above, the first table corresponds to the Paleocene Prospect for which the 
committee agrees on the overall scoring Level 3. That means that there are ways to measure 
the area (ground) and a number of test results are available (sample size is representative). The 
theory and method used to acquire the data are well-established in the field and used frequently. 
The committee pointed out that for some Paleocene Prospects, scoring can even go to Level 4 
for sample size and theory and method applied. In total, the available background knowledge 
represents a sound basis for conducting risk analysis and supporting related decision making.  
Table 7 Pedigree scores for Triassic Prospect data 
Level Proxy Empirical Theoretical 
basis 
Method Validation 
4 Exact 
measure 
Large sample 
direct 
measurements 
Well 
established 
theory 
Best available 
practice 
Compared 
with 
independent 
measurements 
of same 
variable 
3 Good fit or 
measure 
Small 
sample 
direct 
measurements 
Accepted 
theory 
partial in 
nature 
Reliable 
method 
commonly 
accepted 
Compared 
with 
independent 
measurements 
of closely 
related 
variable 
2 Well 
correlated 
Modeled/ 
derived data 
Partial theory 
limited 
consensus on 
reliability 
Acceptable 
method 
limited 
consensus 
on reliability 
Compared 
with 
measurements 
not 
independent 
1 Weak 
correlation 
Educated 
guesses / 
rule of 
thumb estimate 
Preliminary 
theory 
Preliminary 
methods 
unknown 
reliability 
Weak / 
indirect 
validation 
0 Not clearly 
related 
Crude 
speculation 
Crude 
speculation 
No 
discernible 
rigor 
No 
validation 
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 In case of the Triassic Prospect, the scoring is significantly lower (Table 7). Hardly any 
correlation is available, data are based on educated guesses, and there is just an initial 
understanding of the theoretical and methodological basis for the assessment. In total, the 
available background knowledge is significantly weaker than in the previous case. That is why 
further analyses and knowledge gathering are recommended. 
 Overall, the practitioners consider this step easy to understand and easy to present. It 
provides the means to screen the main information quickly and takes into account valuable 
information (that would otherwise be lost). Furthermore, it is recognized that once the decision-
makers are familiar with this step (table content and format), they can comprehend the 
information faster. That is a big plus as it means that it would not impact the length of the 
meetings needed for reporting, which is of high importance when having limited time available 
with managers.  
Step 2: 
 The already presented work can be further supplemented with the following 
information represented in the form of radar diagrams (Figure 12). In the first place, we inform 
decision makers (through a visual form as well) about 1) the Availability of geological studies 
on which assessments are based. This refers to the fact that depending on the project and the 
potential drilling location, a different number of studies can be available, as well as their details 
(quality). For instance, in some areas the company invested in a number of test drills, where in 
other cases there was less testing. 2) Time for assessment brings the information regarding the 
process for the assessment. If the committee has been requested to provide the opinions under 
time pressure (either due to business/market criticality or organizational reasons) it should be 
noted that such an assessment can lack a detailed analysis. 
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Figure 12 An example of a good quality of inputs for the assessment. 
Furthermore, 3) Method used refers to information regarding the method used to collect, 
analyze and interpret data – if it is a common, well-established approach in the field that all 
experts are aware of, if it is a trial version of a novel approach, a not commonly used one, or if 
only some experts had a previous opportunity to use it. Finally, the 4) Expert consensus 
provides input on whether or not consensus was reached among the experts (the level of 
disagreement among practitioners). Because they need to provide a joint single number 
estimate, the information regarding the level of uncertainty surrounding that single estimate is 
lost. There can be a number of reasons for disagreement among the experts, which should not 
be ignored. On the other hand, if there is one fully shared view on a particular situation, it 
strengthens the argument for a certain decision.  
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Figure 13 The comparison with another project. 
Also, a visual comparison between different projects (Figure 13) allows argumentation 
to the decision makers if 1) more data/time is needed, 2) more research/resource is needed, or 
3) simply elaborating on some detail that in the experts’ view can be of significant value. 
 
Figure 14 An example of a lack of consensus. 
 
Finally, we identified the situation of a particular interest that requires further details. 
In case there is hardly any agreement among the experts, the question is what can we do other 
than just inform the decision makers? This Step 2 supports this need in the form of an additional 
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feature to the already available results. The radar diagram (see Figure 14) enables the 
visualization of this uncertainty and can be used to facilitate the discussion around the need to 
understand where this disagreement comes from and if more information should be collected.  
6.3. Behavioral and organizational aspects 
 
Step 3: 
A better understanding of the team working on the project is seen as one way to further 
understand the above-mentioned type of uncertainty. For each of its projects the company 
engages five to ten of its experts (depending on present availability, size of the project, priority, 
etc.). The “personalities” identified are described below (Table 8).  
For each of the characters/personalities a specific radar diagram is formed. Again, four aspects 
are considered according to the company’s needs: 
1. Experience in the company (knowing the processes, techniques, work environment) 
2. Years of experience (in the field, could be working in different companies) 
3. Similar cases/projects (as projects/locations can vary) 
4. The capability and willingness to “stand out” during a meeting (not everyone is ready 
to confront the others and defend their initial estimate). 
 
Figures illustrating personalities are provided next to the diagrams, for the sake of more 
“commercial” visualization and utilization inside the company (Table 8). The inspiration for 
the characters comes from the children’s stories of Mr. Men and Little Miss (Hargreaves, 
1971).   
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Table 8 Meet the team: Experts' characters and corresponding radar diagrams 
Meet the team 
Character  Character description Character radar diagram 
Mr. Clever (correct 
prospect risk – opposite 
to Mr. Wrong) 
 
 
With 30 years in the 
industry but with no 
international experience 
(due to family reasons) 
this is the company’s 
best and most 
experienced North Sea 
geologist. He always 
undertakes forensic 
levels of technical 
analysis, with an eye for 
detail and loves 
prospect 
characterization. He has 
drilled, seen a huge 
amount of the 
company’s portfolio, 
and has developed a 6th 
sense for risk 
calibration in the North 
Sea. 
 
Little Miss Sunshine 
(wrong risk – opposite to 
Mr. Grumpy) 
 
 
Only 3 years in the 
industry, very keen and 
enthusiastic. Not 
enough experience to be 
jaded, skeptical or even 
realistic yet. After being 
complimented in her 
first appraisal for being 
really positive she has 
since made a virtue of 
pathological optimism. 
Rather than work the 
prospect in any detail, 
she has anchored on the 
play risk as she thinks 
this will provide a 
hiding place in the 
meeting! 
 
 
 
 
   115 
 
Mr. Brave (right risk in 
the end but made up of 
extremes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He gets off the fence 
early and either loves or 
hates each of the 
petroleum systems’ 
elements. He was on a 
training course that 
emphasized polarization 
of risk and he 
emphasizes this all the 
time now. He does not 
do anything by halves! 
 
 
Mr. Grumpy (wrong 
risk with a pessimistic 
bias) 
 
 
 
 
Thirty years with the 
company, and close to 
retirement. He is long in 
the tooth and an old 
skeptic. Thinks the basin 
is old and tired and 
wants our prospecting 
fortunes to reflect his 
basin scale bias. He 
thinks all new concepts 
have been tested, and if 
it works he thinks it will 
be small benefit. A 
classic line in the risk 
meeting was that “he 
worked these prospects 
in 1985 and they were 
rubbish then and still 
rubbish now.”  
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Mr. Fussy (roughly the 
right risk but lots of false 
precision)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tends to work things to 
the nth degree. Cannot 
see the wood for the 
trees and always thinks 
that we know more than 
we actually do. Will 
argue the toss about a 
change from 0.95 to 
0.97 for the sake of 
looking like he was 
“right” and won an 
argument. Loves to de-
rail the meeting and 
twist off about tiny 
changes. Has been seen 
cutting his grass three 
times on the weekend! 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Topsy-Turvy (right 
risk but wrongly 
attributed – seal and trap 
mixed up and source and 
charge mixed up) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Topsy-Turvy (right 
risk but wrongly 
attributed – seal and 
trap mixed up and 
source and charge 
mixed up) 
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Mr. Wrong (not a clue! 
- random number 
generation) 
 
 
 
Five years with the 
company but has 
worked for 10 different 
firms already in his 
career (all with different 
risk methodologies). In 
the middle of a messy 
divorce and often not 
fully concentrating 
while at work. Did not 
open the pre-read and 
has no idea about these 
prospects and is hung-
over and off the pace 
today, claiming he had 
a dodgy kebab last 
night! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The addressed behavioral aspects support the better understanding of uncertainty 
coming from background knowledge and information. For instance, in the case of an outlier 
(situation Outlier in Chapter 5), the focus could be on that character, looking for the reasons 
why he/she stands out from the group. It should be discussed whether the opinion should be 
ignored in the particular case or accepted/ further analyzed. In the case of a bimodal situation 
(situation Bimodal described in Chapter 5, representing two groups of opinions inside the 
expert committee), the diagrams can be grouped and visually evaluated if the groups are based 
on a certain pattern (i.e. more experienced team members versus less experienced) or not.  
6.4. Analysis of different concepts 
 
Step 4:  
 When considering ways to better understand behavioral and organizational aspects, it 
is essential to explore methods that can support the communication of different perspectives. 
After understanding different personalities (and stakeholders) it is also necessary to facilitate a 
discussion about different views. For that reason, I investigated the RiskImaging tool, which 
was developed in the USA and has been used in the pharmaceutical industry to address similar 
needs (Ramas, 2016). 
 Due to confidentiality reasons, I describe here what the tool enables and how I 
suggested (exemplified for the company’s needs) to use it in its processes/meetings/workshops. 
The goal of using the tool is to predict/document/visualize how risk is perceived by different 
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stakeholders (depending on if we use historical data, current measures, or experts’ judgments). 
The tool allows creating risk profiles – visualizing combined frequency and adversity intervals 
(see Figure 15).  
 Risk profiles visualize uncertainty in terms of estimated frequency and adversity of risk 
(Goerlandt & Reniers, 2015). In case of drilling success, the frequency is estimated for the 
success rate, whereas adversity refers to the amount and quality of oil. Uncertainty (expressed 
in the form of the interval) is based on the collection of experts’ judgments – the more coherent 
and similar their estimates, the tighter the interval, and vice versa. The first risk profile (on the 
left) corresponds to the Paleocene Prospect (higher frequency and lower adversity). The second 
risk profile (on the right) corresponds to the Triassic Prospect (lower frequency of success and 
higher adversity). 
The illustrated risk profiles can be compared with others from different projects, and 
the arguments for deriving decisions can be provided. In case of a large overlap of risk profiles, 
there is a strong argument for deriving the same drilling decision as in the compared project, 
whereas in case of a lack of similarity in risk profiles it becomes evident that either additional 
research is needed, or the decision should be the opposite to that made in the compared project. 
Emotions and attitudes affect perception, which also varies across interest groups. 
Without further discussion on the neuroscience approach of risk perception, the thesis provides 
insights for attitude parameters – burden of proof, dispute tolerance, and uncertainty in 
adversity and frequency. The tool further allows visualizing the estimates of a single expert 
inside the risk profile – enabling discussion on a certain bias of the specific expert. 
Furthermore, the tool allows adding grouped stakeholder views – for example, differentiating 
between managers’, scientists’ or economists’ groups of opinions. 
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Figure 15 Preview of Risk Profiles in Risk Imaging. 
 
Step 5: 
Although simple scaling, shifting, or inflating corrections are widely used to account 
for biases and overconfidence, much better distributional information is usually available to 
the analyst. Fully using this information can yield corrected estimates that properly express 
uncertainty and make them more suitable for use in risk analysis and decision making. These 
advanced corrections express biases as distributions rather than as simple scalar values. 
Such methods (and calculations) are necessary, because in many cases estimates in risk 
analysis have been documented to be biased in a number of different fields (Cooke, 1991). For 
instance, some biases are such that analyses based on these point estimates are guaranteed to 
result in average net losses over time, having exactly the opposite effect of their intended 
purpose. Some of the biases in estimates are just based on negligence concerning model 
assumptions, which would be relatively simple to fix with more correct assumptions, or more 
honest contractors. For example, ignoring the fact that costs of materials increase significantly 
over the time that is required to complete a large public sector project has been found to explain 
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20–25% of bias in estimated costs of these projects (Morris, 1990). Most of the bias, however, 
tends to be related to much more complicated psychological and sociological phenomena, such 
as self-interest bias (or a lack of incentives for accurate estimates, e.g. Flyvbjerg, Holm, & 
Buhl, 2007), undue optimism and risk aversion (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003), poor 
management, poor communication, bureaucratic fecklessness (Morris, 1990), and many other 
reasons (e.g. Cantarelli et al., 2010). 
First, predictions can be plotted and convolved with an empirical distribution in the 
evidence space of observed errors (from data quality or validation studies) to add uncertainty 
about predictions associated with a model error. Second, predictions can be shifted/adjusted to 
remove some of the uncertainty associated with the measurement protocol. In both of these 
cases, the structure of errors can be characterized as a distribution and transferred into the 
evidence space with arbitrary complexity. The thesis illustrates the requisite calculations to 
make these corrections with numerical examples from the case company. 
The calculations performed during this thesis (Figure 16) propose the correction in the 
evidence space. The main reason for that is the ability to move distributions without exceeding 
0-1 probability limitation. Second, the deviation from the “true value” is easier to spot – as it 
is represented as a distance from the true value on the X axis. The identified personalities from 
Section 6.3 thus have a formula that assesses the deviation.  
The use of such a tool is seen as potentially very useful in practices that have good and 
large historical data sets. They can use the calculations to improve their future estimates by 
correcting the experts’ opinions for the patterns identified in the historical data. The tool has 
great potential for future research.  
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Figure 16 De-biasing of expert judgment in Evidence space. 
6.5. Summary of the findings - Chapter conclusions  
 
In this chapter the answer for research question 3.2 is provided. It focuses on the 
representation of background knowledge in risk and uncertainty assessment. Based on a case 
study, a set of methods from the second group of non-probabilistic approaches (semi-
quantitative approaches) are applied to visualize uncertainty that surrounds data and results. In 
addition, calculations to quantify and correct biases in expert judgment in risk assessments are 
developed, as well as qualitative approaches to inform levels of trust of decision makers into 
risk quantifications.  
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In summary, the key insights obtained through the methods application were: The 
NUSAP tool can successfully represent background knowledge, it is easy to understand, and 
helps the experts to communicate the two different situations (Paleocene and Triassic 
Prospect), which was one of their main problems. Furthermore, it can be incorporated as an 
additional feature to their current practice, without affecting (substantially changing) their 
current process. The development of characters and inclusion of behavioral and organizational 
aspects was greatly appreciated by the practitioners. Risk Imaging allowed visualizing different 
stakeholders’ views, which is important on the individual (different personalities and biases), 
group (financial, legal, procurement, etc. departments have different priorities thus different 
risk profiles), and external levels (the company, competitors, regulatory bodies). The tool helps 
facilitating the conversation about these differences. A great potential is seen in de-biasing 
expert judgment calculations, as it could provide valuable insights from the historical data. It 
is also a step forward toward decreasing the subjective impact of practitioners.  
The categories, aspects, and steps developed in this case study can be updated, changed 
or added depending on a company’s needs. Here, the thesis offers an example of the proposed 
approach (consisting of five separate steps). It can also be seen as a toolkit of methods that 
allow support for different needs (representing and communicating background knowledge, 
visualizing uncertainty surrounding results, better understanding of the behavioral aspects, 
different stakeholders’ perspectives). A company and its practitioners can decide (also on a 
project level), how many steps they want to take – if deep-dives are needed.  
The initial evaluation and feedback from practitioners states that some of the limitations 
are recognized as changing and adding more steps into one type of analysis may lead to 
additional changes in other processes and analyses. All these additional steps should be 
compatible with other processes and e.g. financial analyses for further aggregation inside the 
company – for portfolio and strategy levels. To properly integrate and add the new steps to all 
departments may be a rather long process. Nevertheless, having a handy way is seen as the first 
step in that direction.  
Reflections  
The reflections from the previous chapter are also relevant here (Section 5.6). 
Furthermore, when studying experts’ role in risk management, a number of steps were taken 
to mitigate biases. When discussing experts there is a tendency to favor their duration of 
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expertise, but time does not equate quality, so other measures such as the quality of expertise 
must be taken into account. Even when experts themselves try to describe their expertise or the 
rationale of their choices, the really highly skilled may not even themselves understand the 
rationale behind their expertise, as the ‘processing’ is hidden in their subconscious (Malcolm, 
2005), which we are not able to document. There may be biases in the way we understand what 
an expert is and the way we judge the pedigree as well as other parameters included. It is also 
an important consideration if biases are stationary, or if and how much they will change over 
time, or due to events and new experiences. 
The study places relevant focus on the qualitative and human aspects of the 
quantification process. There are potentially contextual limitations to the case study, as the 
methods were customized to the requirements of the company and real-life situations. 
Therefore, the exact methods may not apply in other contexts; they might need additional 
customization for a specific context. This realization is also in line with the topic of tailoring 
risk management (Chapter 8), where I point out a gap as well as a need to adequately choose 
and use methods. It is a limitation that most methods face; they must strive to satisfy contextual 
applicability and not be used ‘right off the shelf’.  
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7.  Third group of methods: Exploring approaches for 
coping with deep uncertainty and introducing Robust 
Decision Making 
 
“When you become comfortable with uncertainty, infinite possibilities open up”  
- Eckhart Tolle - 
Acknowledgement: The content of this chapter is based on the previously published 
article (Tegeltija et al., 2018a). The chapter quotes the article with only minor edits to 
harmonize the language with the remainder of the thesis. As the first author, I have initiated 
the research question, collaboration with a scholar from another University and collaboration 
with industry. I have carried out the empirical work and drafted the first version of the 
manuscript. Lastly, I have consolidated the comments from other authors and polished the final 
version of the manuscript.  
Uncertainty assessment and management, and the associated decision making, are 
increasingly important in a variety of scientific fields. While uncertainty analysis has a long 
tradition, meeting sustainable development goals through decision making in long-term 
engineering system design demands the addressing of “deep uncertainty” (Walker, Lempert, & 
Kwakkel, 2013). Deep uncertainty characterizes situations where there is no agreement on 
exact causal structures, let alone probabilities. In this case, traditional, probability-based 
approaches cannot produce reliable results, as there is a lack of information and experts are 
unlikely to agree upon probabilities. Due to the nature of large-scale engineering systems, this 
chapter argues that methods to better cope with deep uncertainty can make a significant 
contribution to the management of engineering systems design. I introduce a set of methods 
that use computational experiments to analyze deep uncertainty and that have been successfully 
applied in other fields. I describe Robust Decision Making (RDM) as the most promising 
approach for addressing deep uncertainty challenges in engineering systems design. I then 
illustrate the difference between applying traditional risk management approaches and RDM 
through an example, and complement this investigation with findings from an interview with 
a company that puts RDM into practice. I conclude with a discussion on future research 
directions. 
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In the context of this thesis, this is the final step in investigating applications of the non-
probabilistic methods (by answering research question 3.3). In comparison to the previous two 
chapters, this chapter is more literature-based and conceptual, as it does not have the same 
amount of empirical content. This is due to the nature of the methods, which, for an extensive 
assessment and proper case development, require long-term industry collaboration, including 
access to confidential information, which is outside the scope of this thesis. However, an initial 
empirical evaluation is here included and documented in the form of discussion (interviews) 
with the industry (see Section 7.5) to set the basis for further research and application of the 
methods introduced here.  
This chapter discusses the need to go beyond probability-based tools in order to better 
address challenges in engineering systems design, and introduces the notion of deep uncertainty 
and its representations. It is structured into six parts. After the introduction in Section 7.1, the 
notion of deep uncertainty is explained in Section 7.2. An overview of the methods used to 
analyze deep uncertainty is provided in Section 7.3. I then describe one of the methods, RDM, 
in more detail in Section 7.4. The next section, Section 7.5, is a conceptual discussion, where 
I elaborate on RDM in contrast to traditional approaches in the context of engineering systems 
design challenges through an example of water resource management. Moreover, I interviewed 
the head of the risk management department in a large-scale engineering company (introduced 
as Company 1 in Chapter 2) on their experiences with RDM, life cycle engineering and deep 
uncertainty management. The final section, Section 7.6, presents conclusions and a discussion 
of future research directions. 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, the life cycle engineering (LCE) research field has grown 
significantly. Achieving sustainable design and product development remains one of the central 
issues for the manufacturing industry (Takata & Umeda, 2007), but also for other domains 
where the LCE concept has been disseminated, that is, the food, building and textile industries 
(Alting & Legarth, 1995). Additionally, these industries have dealt with a paradigm shift from 
a product-centric to a service paradigm, which assists customers with accompanying services 
and systems for the products produced (Beuren et al., 2013).  
This transition to a service paradigm brought the need to enable a bigger-picture view 
and management practice that corresponds to such integrated systems and services. In 
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particular, this is the case when the focus is on the sustainability, environmental impacts, and 
life cycle aspects of these solutions/systems. The current trend towards achieving desirable life 
cycle properties (i.e., “-ilities”) of the systems can be carried out through LCE (Alting & 
Legarth, 1995). LCE enables a systemic perspective for achieving sustainability goals in 
engineering systems and their design. That is why I further discuss the introduced methods in 
the context of LCE, as the challenges raised are mostly related to the life cycle aspects of 
engineering systems.  
Both researchers and practitioners have suggested that the development of LCE, and in 
particular life cycle assessment (LCA), should keep pace with the complex and changing 
product development systems (Chang, Lee, & Chen, 2014). LCA is an important tool for 
assessing the environmental impacts of product and service designs to support the achievement 
of sustainability. These changes lead to the increased importance of addressing uncertainty 
throughout the whole life cycle of a product or service. Uncertainty considerations are 
particularly relevant for the accuracy of LCA (Hellweg & Canals, 2014) and, therefore, 
research in that direction is of great significance for the field.  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, design and engineering activities often bring novelty, 
uniqueness, and first-of-a-kind solutions to an engineering problem (Gidel, Gautier, & 
Duchamp, 2005). The most important decision making situations in such cases are dominated 
by so-called “deep uncertainty”: uncertainties for which experts do not agree upon models to 
describe interactions among a system’s components, and subsequently do not agree upon 
corresponding probabilities and possible outcomes (Lempert, Popper, & Bankes, 2003). This 
leads to limited applicability of traditional risk and uncertainty management approaches and 
an increased need for developing novel approaches. While there is no consensus among 
researchers on a single approach for coping with deep uncertainty, there is an agreement about 
the need to model it differently. However, the tendency in practice is still to employ traditional, 
probability-based approaches. The increasing societal and business criticality of product 
development projects raises the need to explore more thoroughly the various fundamental 
approaches to describing and quantifying deep uncertainty as part of LCE and, 
correspondingly, overall engineering systems design. 
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7.2. Deep uncertainty and its representations 
 
It is important to distinguish between uncertainties that can be treated through 
probabilities and uncertainties that cannot. Different taxonomies and representations of 
uncertainty have been developed. An uncertainty matrix is proposed by Walker et al. (2003), 
which synthesizes various taxonomies, frameworks, and typologies of uncertainties from 
different fields. The taxonomy has been further extended by Kwakkel, Walker and Marchau 
(2010) ‒ see Table 9. The goal of this synthesized overview is to support modelers in 
identifying uncertainties and communicating these uncertainties to decision makers. The 
typology of Walker et al. (2003) conceptualizes uncertainty as a three-dimensional concept. 
These three dimensions are 1) the level dimension, 2) the location dimension, and 3) the nature 
dimension. Of these, the level dimension tries to capture differences in the types of scales that 
are used in practice when assigning likelihood to events (Kwakkel, Walker, & Marchau 2010). 
Within this taxonomy, deep uncertainty is understood as Level 4 and Level 5. This 
understanding is broadly consistent with the work of Lempert, Popper, and Bankes (2003), who 
define deep uncertainty as “the condition in which analysts do not know or the parties to a 
decision cannot agree upon 1) the appropriate models to describe interactions among a 
system’s variables, 2) the probability distributions to represent uncertainty about key 
parameters in the models, and/or 3) how to value the desirability of alternative outcomes.” 
In their work, Walker, Lempert, and Kwakkel (2013) further explain and categorize 
each level of uncertainty. Most of the LCE problems faced by decision makers are 
characterized by higher levels of uncertainty. The following include several considerations 
involved in designing a bridge or a tunnel with a 100-year life span: estimating traffic intensity 
for the next hundred years, allowing the chosen design to adapt to the addition of any new 
installations and technologies that can/should be added to the system, estimating changes in 
the sea level, etc. As there is a wide range of outcomes for the alternatives that could take place, 
the question is how to best prepare for any combination of alternatives that may happen. The 
evolving, iterative, social and complex nature of LCE corresponds to a multiplicity of plausible 
futures, several variants for system models, a range of outcomes and associated weights or 
preferences regarding the various outcomes (corresponding to Level 4 or 5 uncertainty, as 
described in Table 9).   
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While many of the traditional analytical quantitative approaches are designed to deal 
with Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 uncertainties (Paté-Cornell, 1996; Walker, Lempert, & 
Kwakkel, 2013), it has been proven that those methods face challenges when dealing with 
higher level uncertainty, that is, deep uncertainty (Walker, Lempert, & Kwakkel, 2013). It can 
be argued that deep uncertainty may sometimes be reduced by further research and information 
gathering. However, this may lead to additional and hidden costs and delays, thus making it 
infeasible. This leads to “real life” situations in LCE, where actions have to be taken now, that 
we know are based on incomplete information and have significant impact on following 
processes and outcomes. The thesis argues that deep uncertainty-based approaches can offer 
relevant support to these types of decision situations. 
Table 9  Synthesized uncertainty matrix by Kwakkel, Walker and Marchau (2010) and the progressive 
transition of levels of uncertainty from complete certainty to complete ignorance by Walker, Lempert and 
Kwakkel (2013) 
Location Level 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Context A clear 
enough 
future 
Alternate 
futures (with 
probabilities) 
Alternate 
futures with 
ranking 
 
A multi-
plicity of 
plausible 
futures 
An unknown 
future 
 
 
 
 
     
System 
model 
A single 
(determinis-
tic) system 
model 
A single 
(stochastic) 
system model 
Several 
system 
models, one 
of which is 
most likely 
Several 
system 
models, with 
different 
structures 
Unknown 
system 
model; we 
know we 
don’t know 
System 
outcomes 
A point 
estimate for 
each 
outcome 
A confidence 
interval for 
each outcome 
Several sets 
of point 
estimates, 
ranked 
according to 
their per-
ceived 
likelihood 
A known 
range of 
outcomes 
Unknown 
outcomes; 
we know 
we don’t 
know 
Weights on 
outcomes 
A single set 
of weights 
Several sets of 
weights, with 
a probability 
attached to 
each set 
Several sets 
of weights, 
ranked 
according to 
their per-
ceived 
likelihood 
A known 
range of 
weights 
Unknown 
weights; we 
don't know 
we don’t 
know 
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A range of traditional uncertainty and risk management methods has been applied to 
Level 4 and Level 5 problems. Group processes, such as the Delphi technique (Rowe & Wright, 
1999), have helped large groups of experts to combine their expertise into narratives of the 
future. This can be understood as a “Level 4” method, where plausible future scenarios are 
developed without necessarily quantifying the associated uncertainties. In their work, Ferson 
and Ginzburg (1996) illustrate examples in risk analysis for which classical Monte Carlo 
methods yield incorrect answers when used to quantify higher levels of uncertainty. On the one 
hand, the development of Information Technology (IT) generated statistical and computer 
simulation modeling that allows the capturing of quantitative information about the 
extrapolation of current trends and the implications of new driving forces. Formal decision 
analysis can systematically assess the consequences of such information. Some more recently 
developed approaches, such as scenario planning, help individuals and groups to accept the 
fundamental uncertainty surrounding the long-term future and consider a range of potential 
paths, including those that may be inconvenient or disturbing for organizational, ideological, 
or political reasons (Schoemaker, 1995). 
However, despite this rich legacy, one key aspect remains a problem. The traditional 
methods briefly outlined above face challenges when dealing with the long-term multiplicity 
of plausible futures, unknown causal structures, probabilities and difficulty in identifying 
preferred solutions. In the following section, I introduce a family of conceptually related 
approaches that are used to cope with such situations, that is, deep uncertainty. 
7.3. A family of related conceptual approaches for coping with deep 
uncertainty  
 
 The deep uncertainty literature rests on three key concepts: 
1) Exploratory modeling: In the face of deep uncertainty, one should explore the 
consequences of the various presently practically irreducible uncertainties for decision making 
(Lempert et al., 2006; Weaver et al., 2013). This exploration uses computational scenario-
based techniques for the systematic exploration of a very large ensemble of plausible futures 
(Bankes, 2002; van Asselt and Rotmans, 2002; Bankes, Walker, & Kwakkel, 2013). 
2) Adaptive planning: Decision robustness can be achieved through plans that can be adapted 
over time in response to how the future actually unfolds (Kwakkel, Walker, & Marchau 2010; 
Wilby & Dessai, 2010; Haasnoot, Kwakkel, & Walker, 2013). 
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3) Decision support: The aim of decision advice is to facilitate learning about a problem and 
potential courses of action, not to dictate the right solution. This entails a shift from a priori to 
a posteriori decision analysis (Tsoukiàs, 2008). 
  One method of decision making would be to determine the best predictive model and 
solve for the optimal uncertainty mitigation procedure. However, this method is fragile, 
depending on assumptions. In conditions of deep uncertainty it is better to seek, among the 
alternative decision options, those actions that are most robust ‒ that achieve a given level of 
goodness across the multitude of models and assumptions consistent with known facts (Walker, 
Hassnoot, & Kwakkel, 2013). From an analyst’s and a manager’s point of view, this means 
that the aim is no longer to answer the question of “What will happen?” but rather “Given the 
agreement that one cannot predict everything, which actions available today are likely to best 
serve me in the future and keep my options open?” 
 A family of approaches exists for dealing with deep uncertainty: 
Assumption-Based Planning was developed at the RAND Corporation almost 30 
years ago as a tool for improving the adaptability and robustness of an existing 
policy/plan/design (Dewar et al., 1993). 
Robust Decision Making (RDM) uses multiple views of the future to iteratively stress 
test one or more candidate strategies over many scenarios, and refine the strategies in light of 
this (Walker, Haasnoot, & Kwakkel, 2013).  
Adaptive Policymaking was specifically developed to support the implementation of 
long-term plans despite the presence of uncertainties (Haasnoot et al., 2012).  
Adaptation Tipping Points and Adaptation Pathways are both approaches that 
consider the timing of actions and were developed for water management (Haasnoot et al., 
2012). 
Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways combines the work on Adaptive Policymaking 
with the work on Adaptation Tipping Points and Adaptation Pathways (Haasnoot, Kwakkel, & 
Walker, 2013). 
RDM is a promising approach to address the challenges in LCE, as it offers a structured 
method for planning under deep uncertainty and it is the best-known deep uncertainty 
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approach. Simulation models are used to evaluate different designs over a wide variety of 
different conditions. Next, using scenario discovery (Bryant & Lempert, 2010; Kwakkel & 
Jaxa-Rozen, 2016), the analyst can discover conditions under which designs fail. In light of 
this, designs can be improved. RDM, together with a set of model-based tools, can support 
decision making under deep uncertainty in LCE by providing recommendations that enable 
managers to choose and improve a design that produces satisfying outcomes across a broad 
range of possible future conditions. 
7.4. Robust Decision Making to manage deep uncertainty  
 
RDM has been developed over the last 30 years, primarily by researchers related to the 
RAND Corporation (Dewar et al., 1993). The RDM framework helps decision makers to use 
multiple views of the future in support of a thorough investigation of modeling results that, 
according to Lempert, Popper, and Bankes (2003) and Groves and Lempert (2007), helps to 
identify a design that: 
1) is robust (i.e., it performs “well enough” across a broad range of plausible futures, but may 
not perform optimally in any single future; it also has little regret),  
2) avoids most situations in which the design would fail to meet its goals, and  
3) makes clear the remaining vulnerabilities (i.e., conditions under which the design would fail 
to meet its goals). 
 
According to Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel (2013), RDM includes the following five 
steps: 
1) Scoping ‒ determine the scope of the analysis by identifying exogenous uncertainties, 
modeling options, key relationships, and performance metrics; construct a simulation 
model that relates actions to consequences. 
2) Simulation ‒ identify a candidate model to evaluate and run it against an ensemble of 
scenarios. 
3) Scenario discovery ‒ identify vulnerabilities of the candidate model (i.e., what 
combinations of exogenous uncertainties, and in which ranges, cause the design to fail to 
meet the goals?). 
4) Adaptation ‒ identify hedging actions (modifying existing models or defining new ones) 
to address these vulnerabilities. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for additional candidate models. 
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5) Display ‒ plot expected outcomes of all models over probabilities of vulnerable 
scenarios, and choose the most robust option for implementation. 
 
Over the years, RDM has been employed to provide support in strategic planning 
problems in a variety of fields, including climate change (Lempert, Schlesinger, & Bankes, 
1996), complex systems (Lempert, 2002), economic policy (Seong, Popper, & Zheng, 2005), 
and flood and water risk management (Lempert, Sriver, & Keller, 2012; Herman et al., 2014). 
7.5. Discussion of uncertainty quantification in LCE  
 
Given the importance of decision support in LCE, it is essential to explore approaches 
for dealing with deep uncertainty. Some of the non-probabilistic methods introduced by Aven 
et al. (2014) try to resolve the problem within the “predict and act” paradigm in risk and 
uncertainty management, by introducing methods that are less reliant on probabilistic data. This 
set of methods corresponds more to the improvement of LCA by allowing better, more accurate 
estimates. In addition, these methods allow the experts to provide information in data formats 
that they feel comfortable with (points, intervals, and ratios as well as their combination), 
depending on the confidence level. Some studies further enhance the usage of non-probabilistic 
methods through comparative analyses with probabilistic approaches (André & Lopes, 2012).  
The approaches discussed in this chapter, on the other hand, drop the “predict and act” 
thinking altogether and introduce a “monitor and adapt” paradigm to replace it. These 
approaches change modeling more fundamentally and have produced reliable results in fields 
such as water management (Herman et al., 2014), climate change (Walker, Hassnoot, & 
Kwakkel, 2013), and policy-related research (Hamarat, Kwakkel, & Pruyt, 2013). Once crucial 
decisions under deep uncertainty have been made and additional information and knowledge 
have been collected, traditional approaches can be employed to continue the uncertainty 
management in LCE.   
Arguably, the challenges that practitioners face in other fields are in many ways close 
to the ones that are often seen in LCE. For instance, such situations are characterized by a large 
number of stakeholders, weak available information, significant impact on the further process 
and a notable societal impact. I focus on the uncertainty quantification and how these methods 
work and the kinds of insights they produce in the context of LCE through the lens of RDM. 
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Traditionally in engineering, when dealing with a lack of hard data, uncertainty analysis 
is based on expert judgment. Experts are asked to provide precise estimates on different 
activities and these estimates are the input for probabilistic analyses (described in more detail 
in Chapter 6). The models used in these analyses need to have all the activities and correlations 
predetermined upfront. For a number of reasons these correlations are not always obvious or 
visible to the modelers. 
With the latest developments in the manufacturing industry it is often not feasible to 
find solid ground for estimating probabilities. Moreover, subjectivity in expert judgment 
remains a challenge (Ellsberg, 1961; Cooke, 1991). Furthermore, the results do not reflect the 
availability and quality of background information, or a number of assumptions behind the 
calculations. 
The current trend towards achieving desirable life cycle properties (i.e., “-ilities”) 
further challenges the applicability of deterministic models (de Weck, Ross, & Rhodes, 2010). 
As stated by Ricci et al. (2014), a survivable, flexible, or evolvable system should be able to 
sustain value delivery over time by responding to exogenous changes in the operational 
environment. To achieve this, we need to allow adaptivity and imprecision throughout the life 
cycle, and explicitly design for this.   
One way to do this is to employ RDM in LCE: a large number of futures are generated 
based on performance criteria. First, RDM is used to sample a wider range of futures, which 
are subsequently assessed to see whether they are dire, benign, or opportunistic. Second, it 
offers a holistic assessment of the performance of generated options over the wider range of 
futures. The idea is that a design solution should work satisfactorily over a broad range of these 
possible futures. RDM also identifies what combinations of uncertain future stresses lead to 
system vulnerabilities through “scenario discovery” (Matrosov, Woods, & Harou, 2013; 
Thissen, Kwakkel, Mens, 2017). The five-step RDM process (see above) is then repeated 
iteratively until a suitably robust solution is found. RDM aims to assist in the development of 
a solution whose performance is good enough over a wide range of futures (i.e., it is robust) 
rather than an optimal solution for a single specific future. 
An example is presented by Matrosov, Woods, and Harou (2013), in which the authors 
applied RDM for a water management problem when statistical distributions of future events 
were poorly known, and they followed the five described steps. In terms of LCE, RDM differs 
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from traditional approaches, for instance Scenario Planning, by sampling a larger number of 
possible scenarios that are further evaluated. In the mentioned example, they generated 311080 
possible simulations/scenarios, whereas Scenario Planning typically involves the evaluation of 
only a few identified scenarios. This provides more thorough analyses (e.g., minimizing life 
cycle regret) that improve the quality of decision making in LCE, which impacts the quality of 
products and systems produced.  
It is worth noting that such analyses are now feasible given the advances in 
computational methods. Moreover, RDM is complementary to other approaches (Matrosov, 
Woods, & Harou, 2013) that provide additional  information to the decision makers when 
managing deep uncertainty. 
This kind of modeling does not require unjustified assumptions and provides a 
structured framework for the iterative refinement of future plans.  
A brief discussion with practitioners on RDM in the LCE context  
 
The case company is a large Danish company with extensive experience in designing 
and managing large engineering projects, including assessing cost and operational life cycle 
properties of complex, long life cycle infrastructure systems. I interviewed the head of the risk 
management department on his experience with RDM. The interview was conducted after the 
interviews presented in Section 8.4.2.1. Details regarding their risk management team and 
process can be found there.  
In their practice they recognized the need to look for alternative approaches that can 
reliably manage deep uncertainty. They analyzed different options and decided to use RDM on 
one of their projects.  
Several limitations were raised regarding RDM: first, in their experience, it is still open 
to debate which design is the best choice when simulating the system’s life cycle properties. 
RDM does not provide a “simple” answer and the analysis results must be further interpreted 
in the decision making process. Second, RDM-based assessments of, for instance, 100-year life 
cycle system properties are based on current data, even if they are analyzed and interpreted 
differently. Third, there are projects where the use of RDM is not justified, that is, projects 
involving only the first three levels of uncertainty, where similar engineering solutions exist, 
where uncertainties of mostly stochastic nature are present, and where the lifetime is fairly 
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short. Clearer guidance is needed about when RDM effectively adds value to LCE decisions, 
and when it does not. 
The case company agrees that there are LCE tasks in projects where higher levels of 
uncertainty are present and that the traditional approaches currently employed only offer 
modeling capabilities corresponding to the first three levels of uncertainty. These cases are 
where the life cycle performances of a one-of-a-kind bridge with a 100-year lifetime have to 
be assessed, and they are dealing with first-of-a-kind solutions for engineering problems, novel 
technologies, new locations, more stakeholders and significantly longer lifetimes. Often, as in 
the water management example, traditional modeling approaches require them to make 
“precise” predictions based on the limited information available. The approaches introduced in 
this chapter can significantly support uncertainty management through their provision of more 
thorough analyses of possible alternative futures.  
 
Reflections  
The theoretical sampling was also appropriate in this case. The chosen company is 
highly specialized in risk management and runs projects that often involve deep uncertainties. 
More interviews would need to be conducted to entirely comprehend their modeling capacities 
with RDM, but informal discussions confirmed their remarkable computational skills. In this 
way, the work presented here constitutes a solid contribution and opens topics up for future 
research (see Section 10.4). 
Despite all these positive aspects, some limitations did emerge. During the PhD project, 
no opportunity arose to check the company’s actual modeling. For instance, the possibility of 
developing a synthetic case with them, on which more detailed discussions provided key 
insights, would have been very relevant and would have allowed findings to emerge that could 
have opened up better possibilities for triangulation.  
7.6. Conclusions 
 
There are a number of methods on hand to deal with uncertainty, so it is important to 
select the method best suited to the particular uncertainty in question. It would be desirable to 
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have a single method capable of quantifying all types of uncertainty. Traditionally, one 
candidate for this task is probability theory. 
As previously mentioned, engineering systems design risk and uncertainty management 
practice have so far relied heavily on probability-based methods when treating uncertainty. I 
acknowledge the great merit of probability-based methods, but I also point out limitations that 
lead to the need for frameworks beyond probability. This has triggered the development of 
alternative approaches in other fields. The methods introduced in this chapter rely on the idea 
that imprecision and adaptivity correspond better to the weak information available in LCE, as 
one approach to ensuring the desirable life cycle properties (i.e., “-ilities”) of engineering 
systems. 
The contribution of this chapter is in the “monitor and adapt” paradigm, which is 
suggested for application in LCE to improve risk and uncertainty management practices. I raise 
the importance of distinguishing deep uncertainty from uncertainty due to variance, and point 
out the complexities that it brings to decision making. Given the evident need to go beyond 
probabilities when dealing with deep uncertainty, I provide insights into the contributions 
offered by novel approaches and where they have been used. These approaches need further 
adaptation to the conditions of LCE.  
I further introduce RDM as a specific method for coping with deep uncertainty in LCE. 
Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the full benefit of RDM for LCE, real case studies are 
needed, as well as illustrative examples/synthetic cases. Future research in that direction would 
not only allow better treatment of deep uncertainty, but it would also broaden our understanding 
of decision making support in such situations. In my view, it is essential for the field to consider 
these relatively recently developed methods. Of particular significance is their application 
potential when looking for more appropriate solutions to analyzing and quantifying uncertainty 
in LCE and, correspondingly, overall engineering systems design. 
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8. Tailoring risk management: Risk and uncertainty 
quantification as part of the overall risk management 
process  
 
“It’s always the small pieces that make the big picture” 
 -Unknown- 
 
Acknowledgement: The content of this chapter is based on the previously published 
article (Tegeltija et al., 2018b). The chapter quotes the article with only minor edits to 
harmonize the language with the remainder of the thesis. As the first author, I have initiated 
the research question, collaboration with a scholar from another University, collaboration 
with industry and conceptual development of the proposed approach. I have carried out the 
empirical work and drafted the first version of the manuscript. Lastly, I have consolidated the 
comments from other authors and polished the final version of the manuscript. 
While risk quantification research has grown over the last few decades, a limited 
number of studies have addressed the overall process integration of these approaches in 
engineering systems design risk management, that is, tailoring risk management methods to 
the specific requirements and conditions of a design project. This chapter argues that the choice 
of risk quantification method has strong implications for several aspects of the risk 
management process, as well as the integration of risk management results into decision 
making processes. I investigate current risk management maturity models and suggest an 
expansion to accommodate the requirements originating from the choice of quantification 
method, as well as informing the choice of quantification method based on other process 
parameters. This is validated through three case companies. Additionally, three more 
companies were approached to provide their feedback on the developed approach.  
In the context of this thesis, this step is important. Up to this point, the thesis has 
investigated advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods (introduced under the non-
probabilistic framework). This chapter concerns itself with the broader question of when and 
how to integrate these methods into an overall risk management process (answering research 
question 4). 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.1 provides a short introduction to the 
motivation and need for tailoring risk management in engineering systems design through 
theoretical and empirical considerations related to the current practice. Section 8.2 further 
describes the specifics of risk management in the field and reviews risk management maturity 
models. Section 8.3 describes the conceptual development of the risk management tailoring 
approach, depending on the risk management maturity. In Section 8.4 the approach is 
illustrated through case companies from different sectors and the empirical work is described. 
In Section 8.5 I discuss different risk management tailoring approaches, and lastly, in Section 
8.6, I provide concluding remarks about the presented research and highlight the importance 
of the proper integration of risk quantification in engineering systems design to enhance its full 
potential. 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The positive impact of risk management activities on design and product development 
outcomes has been confirmed multiple times by different scholars (Wieland & Wallenburg, 
2012), but the need for risk management differs between different organizations (Oehmen et 
al., 2014). While some organizations have identified the requirement for rigorous and very 
strict organization-wide risk management processes in all aspects of their businesses, others 
simply require some basic understanding of risk management practice. Different project types 
and the associated risks have to be managed according to the context − one size does not fit all 
− and the enduring need to tailor the wide range of activities and approaches in the field is 
confirmed, for example by recent reviews  (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012; Škec et al., 2014; Herrmann 
et al., 2018).  
One part of the overall risk management process that requires good integration is risk 
and uncertainty quantification – such as the methods developed and discussed in the previous 
chapters of this thesis. Organizations wishing to implement a formal quantification approach, 
or to improve their practices, need a benchmark against which to review their processes. In this 
regard, although a number of risk management maturity frameworks are available in the 
literature, they lack a focus on quantification methods and their impact on and implications for 
the overall design risk management process. This chapter seeks to address this gap through a 
proposed tailoring approach, based on maturity grids, that allows a two-fold tailoring: firstly, 
tailoring the design risk management process to a chosen risk and uncertainty quantification 
approach, and secondly, tailoring risk and uncertainty quantification options to the capabilities 
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of the overall design risk management process. This chapter will introduce the reader to the 
importance of maturity grids in benchmarking and as a strategy for improvement, suggesting 
five categories that will help practitioners choose their risk quantification method: 1) 
understanding of the needs, 2) method sophistication for risk quantification, 3) quality of data, 
4) awareness regarding risk in organizational culture, and 5) impact of risk assessments in 
decision making. Within these categories, improvements are made to the overall risk 
management processes, which will ultimately assist companies in systematically planning their 
desired advancement in practice.  
8.2. Risk and uncertainty in design 
8.2.1. Risk management in design  
 
Engineering systems design is vulnerable to various risks, which can emerge during the 
design process. Some even argue that the design process can be perceived as a process of 
uncertainty and risk management (Gericke, 2011), and suggest that a key attribute of a designer 
is the ability to manage uncertainty (Cross, 2011). Standardized and structured design 
processes, accompanied by the use of appropriate methods and tools (such as lean, six sigma 
and total quality management) may reduce uncertainty and risk in general, but nevertheless a 
considerable amount of residual uncertainty remains, which needs to be addressed and treated 
in design processes. Management of risk in these processes has received attention from 
researchers in engineering design (Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2009), and related studies have 
been carried out in project management (Raz & Michael, 2001), and safety-related risk 
management (Paté-Cornell, 1996). 
Despite the wide study of risk management in engineering systems design, only a few 
authors have tackled the issue of systematization and classification of risk management 
methods, and especially the need for formulation of recommendations with respect to method 
application and the associated tailoring of the overall risk management process. The application 
of risk management requires familiarity with methods, appropriately trained employees and an 
understanding of context, and if any of the above-mentioned aspects is not implemented 
correctly, the value that risk management brings to design can decrease significantly. For these 
reasons, maturity models have been introduced as one approach to guiding organizations in 
their risk management implementation and benchmarking themselves against best practice 
(Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012).  
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8.2.2. Risk management maturity models 
 
Maturity-based assessments, for example, in the form of maturity grids or models, are 
a structured approach to exploring how well the behaviors and practices of an organization are 
adapted to delivering required outcomes, usually expressed as a series of structured levels 
presented in matrix form. For a review of existing models see, for example, Maier, Moultrie, 
and Clarkson (2012). The underlying idea behind maturity-based assessments is that they 
provide a framework that seeks to capture “good practice” in order to guide and structure both 
assessment and improvement in capability. The authors of these models begin with the 
underlying assumption that there is a link between the higher levels of maturity and improved 
performance in the (relevant) organizational capabilities. Organizations advance through a 
series of stages or levels of maturity, with levels often represented as ranging from initial, to 
repeatable, defined, managed, and optimized. While the underlying rationale for the levels may 
differ (Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2012), the levels often describe an evolutionary path 
ranging, for example, from ad hoc, chaotic processes or capabilities to mature, disciplined 
processes and, in this case, defining the degree to which a process is institutionalized and 
effective. Stepping through the levels can be seen as representing progress towards an optimum 
capability. A prominent example of such a maturity model is the Software Engineering 
Institute’s Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) (Humphrey, 1988). The approach 
has been tailored, modified and further developed for various applications in different domains, 
including the organizational project management maturity model (OPM3) program of the 
Project Management Institute (Pennypacker & Grant, 2003), knowledge management (Paulzen 
et al., 2002) and innovation (Chiesa, Coughlan, & Web, 1996). But while maturity models may 
share a common structure, their content differs, and for this reason maturity models are very 
often developed anew. A review of existing models and guidance for the development of new 
models is given by Maier, Moultrie, and Clarkson (2012). 
In terms of risk management, a maturity model was first introduced by Hillson (1997). 
This was followed by the PMI’s RISKSIG extension of the model with new criteria and a 
further model, with a slight variation, was developed for complex product systems projects 
(Ren & Yeo, 2004). Table 10 shows the PMI RISKSIG’s maturity levels. 
Although a good basis for evaluation, current risk management maturity models have 
some limitations. The underlying assumption of many maturity models is “the higher the 
better.” However, different organizations have different risk management needs, and achieving 
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higher levels of risk management maturity does not necessarily imply a better “fit” of risk 
management to the organization’s requirements. In this thesis, the extension of the model based 
on the proposed tailoring approach allows companies to engage in a discussion around the 
maturity model to find and agree on the most adequate risk quantification approach in their 
case. Furthermore, previous risk management maturity models do not have a strong method 
focus. Finally, a range of models is available, but all of them neglect the impact of a chosen 
method on the overall process; we need to be more explicit about the selection and application 
of the methods. 
Table 10 PMI RISKSIG risk management maturity levels (2002) 
Attribute Level 1  
(Ad hoc) 
Level 2  
(Initial) 
Level 3 
(Repeatable) 
Level 4 
(Managed) 
Definition Unaware of the 
need for 
management of 
uncertainties 
Experimenting 
with RM through a 
small number of 
individuals  
Management of 
uncertainty built 
into all 
organizational 
processes 
Risk-aware 
culture with 
proactive 
approach to risk 
management 
Culture No risk 
awareness 
RM used only on 
selected projects 
Accepted policy 
for RM 
Top-down 
commitment to 
RM, leadership 
by example 
Process No formal 
process 
No generic formal 
process 
Generic 
processes applied 
to most projects 
Risk-based 
organizational 
processes 
Experience No 
understanding 
of risk 
principles of 
practice 
Limited to 
individuals with 
little or no formal 
training 
In-house core of 
expertise 
All staff risk 
aware and able 
to use basic risk 
skills 
Application No structured 
application 
Inconsistent 
application of 
resources 
Routine and 
consistent 
application to all 
projects 
Risk ideas 
applied to all 
activities 
 
8.3. Conceptual development of the risk management tailoring approach 
depending on the risk management maturity level  
 
The wide diversity in engineering systems designs and the uncertainty that arises during 
a design process has led to the development of a number of risk management approaches. To 
support key phases of risk assessment, including risk identification, analysis and evaluation, 
different methods and tools have emerged. Some are qualitative, as they mostly serve for risk 
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identification and for when the information is not very easily quantifiable, such as 
brainstorming, checklists or the Delphi method. Other approaches are semi-quantitative, such 
as interviewing, risk mapping or the NUSAP tool (Brocéliande team, 2015), and provide 
quantitative results accompanied by qualitative, descriptive information. Monte Carlo 
simulations, sensitivity analysis, Bayesian networks and other probability-based approaches 
provide quantitative uncertainty modeling (Cagliano, Grimaldi, & Rafele, 2014).  
I refer to all of the above approaches as “quantification approaches” since organizations 
with lower levels of risk management maturity only need to identify risks and prioritize them 
as the first steps towards reaching higher levels. When feasible, companies with higher levels 
of risk management maturity aim to employ purely quantitative approaches that can vary in 
their level of sophistication − in terms of mathematical complexity and data requirements (Paté-
Cornell, 1996).  
The literature is rich in methods, tools and conceptual frameworks for risk 
quantification. However, scholars have reported limitations and pitfalls in terms of both their 
methodological foundation and their application. For instance, the probability-based 
approaches to risk and uncertainty analysis, as those most commonly applied, can be 
challenged under the frequently found conditions of limited or poor knowledge, in which case 
the information available does not provide a strong basis for a specific probability assignment 
(Walley, 1991; Flage et al., 2014). In such cases, precision in probabilistic results may lead to 
a false degree of certainty (Beer, Ferson, & Kreinovich, 2013). Furthermore, some of the 
limitations of the methods relate to the fact that correlations among risks are often not modeled 
and may lead to serious consequences, if not taken into account (Kujawski & Angelis, 2009). 
Subjectivity in risk assessments is also an issue (Hubbard, 2009). The quality of data used in 
the analyses has strong implications for the reliability of the results, and this is not reflected in 
the current approaches. Risk analyses often involve a number of assumptions that, if not 
presented to decision makers, may lead to false directions (Aven et al., 2014).   
As evidence of the low application of quantitative risk methods, Crossland, Williams 
and McMahon (2003) documented the fact that relatively few engineering systems design 
companies make use of such models in their risk management practices. They demonstrate the 
wide applicability of such approaches to engineering systems design, describing three different 
quantitative modeling approaches and illustrating both the simplicity of the approaches and the 
benefits of their usage.  
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The limitations of the current approaches and the gap between practice and research 
has led recent research to be focused on two research themes. The first is research into novel 
(more advanced) approaches that will bridge the existing limitations (Walker, Hassnoot, & 
Kwakkel, 2013;  Flage et al., 2014). For instance, some propose uncertainty modeling (i.e., 
imprecise probabilities) that can be used to explicitly express the precision with which 
something is known (Aughenbaugh & Paredis, 2005). 
The second theme is overviews of existing models, and clarification of both the 
advantages and disadvantages of their usage is increasingly attracting attention. Classifications 
of risk management techniques are available in Cagliano, Grimaldi, and Rafele (2014); Raz 
and Hillson (2005); Dikmen, Birgonul, and Arikan (2004); and Marle and Gidel (2012). To 
support advancements in practice, it is important to clarify and be transparent about these 
limitations and disadvantages, and propose to the practitioners ways to overcome these 
challenges, both when choosing a method and when looking for ways to improve it. 
To overcome some of these limitations and enable companies to knowledgably and 
systematically choose and plan their risk quantification, I propose to extend current risk 
management maturity models with quantification criteria, building on the work of Crossland, 
Williams and McMahon (2003); Grubisic, Gidel and Ogliari (2011); and Škec et al. (2014). I 
derived the five categories from the literature review and our empirical work, and iteratively 
developed this tailoring framework with three engineering companies. The purpose is to 
benchmark risk management quantification processes in the companies and adapt them to their 
needs. The framework itself also serves to codify boundary objects for organizational learning 
about risk management, thereby allowing organizations to understand where specifically to 
improve. 
In particular, I propose a risk management tailoring approach that includes the five 
categories shown in Figure 17 and described below. The five categories were developed to 
support all the steps of the entire risk management process. Starting with the method 
sophistication and quality of data arising from the above-mentioned literature (see also Aven 
& Zio, 2011), I included three more categories (understanding of the needs, awareness 
regarding risk in organizational culture, impact of risk assessments in decision making) to 
incorporate the case companies’ registered necessities and challenges in practice and 
experience. 
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Category 1: Understanding of the needs  
To professionally approach risk and uncertainty in engineering systems design, an organization 
should be able to understand its needs, and those of its stakeholders, and the necessary approach 
to this will depend on the organizational structure, the applicable processes and the types and 
sizes of projects. The understanding of the concepts of risk and uncertainty is important for the 
ability to manage risk. The nature and type of uncertainty determine in part what kinds of 
methods are applicable, and thus a heightened level of understanding of uncertainty enables 
more mature risk management. 
Category 2: Method sophistication for risk quantification 
Higher accuracy of estimates enables better decision making support. Given their design 
challenges, some organizations may only need approaches that allow the identification of risks. 
Others may face challenges that require in-depth analysis. The level of sophistication of 
analysis will depend substantially on the method chosen for the analysis. Any limitations of 
the approach should be reported and communicated to decision makers. To improve their 
quantification, besides choosing a more sophisticated method, practitioners also need to 
synchronize advancements with other categories to ensure the greatest benefits of their risk 
management.   
Category 3: Quality of data 
The quality and availability of data will impact the results, as well as the number of assumptions 
supporting the analysis. In some cases, it is feasible to spend resources on acquiring high-
quality data. In others, we need to proceed with the engineering systems design (often due to 
time pressures) and be aware of the arbitrariness in the quality of data we use and the number 
of assumptions we make prior to the analysis of choice. In the absence of that kind of 
transparency (achieved, for example, through visualization tools), central pitfalls may be 
overlooked. The quality of data should correspond to the method, as using a more sophisticated 
method on a low quality of data arguably does not add desired value.  
Category 4: Awareness regarding risk in organizational culture 
It is of great importance to build awareness of risk management processes, activities, value 
creation and impact for all employees across the different levels of an organization’s hierarchy. 
To properly support decision making, decision makers need to be aware of its value and other 
employees need to be informed about why it is important that they provide certain information, 
attend associated meetings, and why the whole process deserves attention. Communication and 
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(professional) language can vary, even within organizations. While some employees may have 
an educational background that corresponds to risk management needs, the way they inform 
and interact with others in the company needs to be adapted to correspond to their knowledge 
base. 
Category 5: Impact of risk assessments in decision making 
Employees may not appreciate the analysis and may have too little trust in the results to base 
decisions on them. Some of the complex mathematical calculations may be challenging for 
managers to comprehend properly, which may lead to them being neglected. Furthermore, the 
way the responses are planned and handled needs to be synchronized with the overall 
engineering systems design. 
These categories, the associated maturity levels and a mapping of the categories to the 
ISO 31000 process, are shown in Figure 17. The proposed approach consists of the iteration of 
the following steps, inspired by the process outlined in Figure 17: 1) identifying and articulating 
the needs, 2) analyzing the current state of the risk management in the organization and 
identifying existing levels of maturity, 3) re-evaluating the needs to match the desired levels of 
maturity, and finally, 4) developing individual recommendations in order to achieve the desired 
practice according to specific cases. 
 
Figure 17 Relationship of maturity categories and the ISO 31000 risk management process (based on 
Tegeltija et al., 2018b). 
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8.4. Case companies: Validation of proposed tailoring framework for risk 
management in design 
8.4.1. Research method 
 
In order to examine the applicability of the proposed approach for tailoring risk 
management in engineering systems design based on the extension of the risk management 
maturity model, I approached six companies to obtain feedback. As the proposed approach 
aims to provide support for a broader range of different practices, I selected companies with 
completely different application domains (areas of design work) with different risk 
management procedures. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with employees (as described in detail in the 
following sub-chapters) in order to understand the organizations’ contexts. This also allowed 
me to modify, extend and enrich the initial set of questions and, when needed, to organize 
follow-up interviews. By doing so, I deepened our understanding of the risk management 
practices that were encountered. The guide to interview questions and related grouping of codes 
is available in Appendix 2. 
The first set of interviews included discussions with the interviewees on: 1) their area of 
work and the design challenges they face, in order to understand their specific engineering 
systems design risk and uncertainty profile; 2) their risk management process, how it relates to 
their overall organizational structure, how it is designed and compares with risk management 
standards and maturity models, and 3) the different quantification techniques they use and their 
relationship to the five categories introduced previously. I then analyzed and coded the 
collected data in ATLAS.ti, according to the proposed customization approach, as pilot 
applications, and developed recommendations for process adaptations. This included follow-
up phone calls where clarification was necessary. The results of these pilot applications of the 
proposed customization approach were presented in a second set of interviews, and the 
interviewees were invited to comment on their possible application, usability and contribution, 
as well as any limitations and challenges they might foresee. I used Support Evaluation 
(Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009) as part of the continuous testing of the design support.  
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Figure 18 Overview of case companies' levels of maturity (1-6) (extended from Tegeltija et al.,    
                2018b). 
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8.4.2. Companies involved and their risk management context 
 
A summary of the risk management maturity of the case companies is shown in Figure 
18. Given the information collected from the practitioners, and based on coding with respect 
to each of the five categories, I evaluated companies on the introduced Level 1 - Level 4 
maturity scale. There is one company with a very ad hoc profile (Company 3) and one that has 
established some initial risk management practice (Company 4). Another company has an 
almost completely managed profile (highly structured approach in Company 1). As a public 
entity, Company 5 has a completely different profile than all the other cases. Finally, Company 
2 and Company 6 have profiles that explicitly illustrate the need for the tailoring being 
addressed by this thesis, as their current quantifications need improvements in terms of the 
other four categories.  
8.4.2.1. Company 1: Design of large-scale engineering systems 
Area of work and design challenges: The first case relates to a large Danish company 
with extensive experience in designing and managing large-scale engineering projects, such as 
long life cycle infrastructure systems. They have projects of different sizes (from megaprojects 
to small design solutions), for instance, they are designing for first-of-a-kind engineering 
projects in which they face severe uncertainties, but they also help small practices achieve their 
goals. Their risk management approach needs to provide support for their whole spectrum of 
design activities and ensure proper and timely responses and monitoring.  
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: The company 
is a large, highly structured organization comprising many departments. I interviewed the head 
of the risk management department twice. The department was established to oversee risk 
management for the company’s projects as well as to provide consultancy services to other 
companies. The department consists of highly specialized risk (and safety) experts, working on 
different aspects of the risk management process during the design and construction project 
phases. They all have an appropriate educational background, are familiar with the applicable 
standards (ISO, 2009) and practitioners’ guidelines (PMI, 2008) as well as following the 
relevant advances and courses in the field. Furthermore, their project, program and portfolio 
managers are familiar with and rely on the department’s results, and other employees are aware 
that such practice exists in the organization. 
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Given the broad scope of design activities and the number of projects carried out, there 
was a need to engage all sorts of methods (from qualitative, through semi-quantitative to 
quantitative), but also sometimes to employ some of the most sophisticated quantification 
approaches. For each of the projects they would need to select the most appropriate method, 
and after the analyses had been carried out, present and communicate the results to the 
managers. When necessary, special interest and focus would be placed on gathering data. 
Depending on the specific design and associated uncertainties, they use risk registers and 
historical data, and they organize workshops and/or hire experts/consultants for particular 
issues (for instance, when estimating the number of railway passengers in the next 50 years). 
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: Even though the company has 
already reached a high level of risk management maturity, they still seek frameworks for further 
improvement and carry out constant re-evaluation. They show a high level of understanding of 
the impact and the importance of the choice of risk method and its proper usage, which is why 
my recommendation was to examine the proposed approach in terms of the consultancy 
services they provide. The feedback to the proposed recommendation was that, from their 
perspective, the tailoring approach allows them to systematically, and in a structured way, 
explain and argue why they propose specific risk actions (and even more specifically why they 
use a certain risk method). The risk management maturity of their clients varies a lot and they 
would face challenges in adjusting the recommendations and communication to the clients’ 
level. The selected maturity model and proposed extension are seen as a clear, easily 
understandable and manageable approach for different clients. While until now the clients have 
relied on the manager’s experience to understand their needs and also to convince them of his 
choices, the presented approach, in contrast, would support and clarify the manager’s 
recommendations in those situations. Documenting their practice in such a structured way 
(through discussions and associated decisions for all five categories) would also help to ensure 
a learning and knowledge sharing environment. In this way, other managers, as well as new 
employees, would get a chance to develop their expertise more rapidly.  
8.4.2.2. Company 2: Oil and gas exploration, designing new systems 
Area of work and design challenges: Exploration and commercial production of oil 
and gas are the main business of the second case company. A significant risk in the design and 
early execution of a new production project is the placement of exploration drill wells. Their 
objective is to find new oil or gas fields, based on a sound analysis of the prospect’s risks and 
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of the potential hydrocarbon volumes: what is the chance that a drilling (well) will locate 
hydrocarbons, and what quantity could there be? The design challenges are to understand what 
the best process and infrastructure design are to discover and explore these fields. They explore 
different locations and prospects, and their performance depends directly on the success rate of 
drilling, determined in the early design phase of the project. Test drillings are very expensive 
and represent a significant investment. To increase the success rate with regard to identifying 
prospective oil deposits, the opinions of multiple experts are solicited as part of the early 
engineering systems design risk management. Given that the subsequent detailed design of the 
whole production system is based on these analyses, attaining higher accuracy in their estimates 
is of great engineering and financial importance.   
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: I interviewed 
the head of enterprise risk management twice as part of this case. The interviewee is in charge 
of facilitating risk quantification workshops. The company reaches high levels of maturity in 
terms of quantification and also has employees with outstanding risk quantification training. 
Furthermore, the overall managerial skills of these employees, in terms of running the whole 
risk management process, are at a high level. Yet there is some space left for improvement, 
mostly regarding the awareness of their work in the organization and communication to 
decision makers on the quality of data aspects. Moreover, the impact of the method choice has 
drawn their attention in recent years, due to the need for greater accuracy in the estimates. As 
they sometimes face severe uncertainties, they have not, until now, had a framework that would 
better support their argument for the additional research needs. 
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: Their challenge is to ensure that 
all parties (not just highly trained people) follow the rationale for any change introduced during 
and through the risk quantification, and that they are able to illustrate its impact on the different 
levels of the project and organization. The recommendation in this case was to use the tailoring 
approach to facilitate the conversation with less risk-aware managers, but also with those 
managers without an extensive mathematical background. Since they run very complex 
calculations, it is essential that the managers understand the critical issues in terms of data 
quality. This can be achieved through the discussion of the five tailoring categories. The 
feedback I got mostly relates to the fact that the proposed approach would allow a structured 
conversation among different departments and at different hierarchical levels. Yet the desired 
changes in their risk management routine (introducing new quantification and visualization 
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methods with a greater focus on data quality) would also impact other processes, such as 
financial analyses, which can be challenging to achieve, as the organization relies on the current 
estimates at portfolio and strategic levels.  
8.4.2.3. Company three: SME, design in construction 
Area of work and design challenges: The third example organization is an 
engineering and consulting SME that provides design services for construction projects. They 
experienced several risks in the design phase and have heavy delays on their currently most 
challenging project. 
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: Since there 
is no established culture regarding risk in their practice, there is no awareness of the need for 
it, of ways to incorporate it, or any appreciation of its role in value creation. To understand 
their practice and established ways of working, I talked to key stakeholders of the project. I 
conducted separate interviews with a risk management employee, a fire and safety engineer, 
the project manager, a structural engineer, the HVAC design manager, an electrical engineer-
designer, an architect and design manager, and the project owner. The employees have no 
educational background in risk management, are not aware of any bodies of knowledge, or any 
sort of risk management procedures. However, one of the engineers was actively exploring 
professional risk management online training material and professional conferences. 
Only after one of their larger projects (the design of a hotel complex) faced heavy 
delays, did the organization consider investigating methods to help them manage uncertainties. 
The understanding of such a need comes from managers, whereas some of the engineers see 
absolutely no reason even to jointly discuss possible risks. In their view, they are the experts 
for a particular design matter and they take full responsibility for that aspect, expecting the 
others to do the same in their own domains, without appreciating the potential challenges that 
are present at the intersections of the domains.  
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: The challenge they are facing 
is to establish initial risk management practice. The recommendation in this case was to use 
the proposed tailoring approach to facilitate the conversation about their needs and the 
importance of establishing risk management practice, from the beginning informing them that 
the method (tool, technique) they choose should be based on an informed and knowledgeable 
choice, not just something copied from another company. Furthermore, I highlighted the 
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requirement to ensure a discussion took place about what kind of data they need to support the 
chosen analysis and how they can ensure its proper quality. The feedback was that the 
communication through the proposed approach was clear enough for the employees to 
understand and follow the concept, and some initial understanding and awareness of risk 
management was achieved. 
8.4.2.4. Company 4: Consultancy for the Design phase  
Area of work and design challenges: This international, multidisciplinary engineering 
consultancy company is an example of an organization that provides design services for 
construction projects. They provide consultancy services for projects such as the design of 
airports, transportation systems, hospitals and similar projects. They also have some of their 
own projects in construction. 
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: To 
understand their practice and established ways of working, I talked to their business and risk 
management consultant, who works for many different clients in construction. The risk 
consultant had previously worked across different sectors: the pharmaceutical sector, the utility 
sector, the beer and beverage sector, and others. They have two types of projects: those where 
he works as a risk manager as a specialist and those where his work is incorporated into other 
services provided to the client as part of a bigger service for larger projects, or megaprojects. 
As part of working on the first type of project, they are helping clients to increase their maturity 
in terms of risk management. At the moment, he is the one who has the lead on risk 
management and in terms of resources he collaborates with other departments working on the 
same projects (for example, the financial team, or a planner). They are aware of the ISO 31000 
standard and other practitioners’ guidelines.   
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: There was recognition of the 
great need to develop this type of tailoring approach. Furthermore, the practitioners from this 
company had been looking into available risk management maturity models before we 
established the collaboration. They appreciated having an overview of the maturity models 
described in Section 8.2.2, as it summarizes the basic information they need.  
However, the proposed approach is not seen as straightforwardly implementable. The 
approach is understandable for a risk manager, risk analyst or those very informed on risk 
management, but in order to present it to the others on the team it would need further 
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adjustments. However, the approach is seen as a valuable supplement to established practice. 
For instance, it could be used to support risk managers in their work and the communication of 
the need to improve the quantification. The interviewee also highlighted the fact that this and 
similar approaches should not be too academic, so as to be more easily applicable in practice.  
8.4.2.5. Company 5: Public Organization  
Area of work and design challenges: An international organization providing design 
services for a number of different projects and systems. They provide services to other NGOs, 
governments and lastly the private sector and private foundations. They are mainly focused on 
procurement services, project management, and infrastructure, plus they offer some financial 
management services (such as managing grants) and human resource services (some 
organizations outsource their recruitment processes). What is very interesting is that they are 
currently designing their risk and quality framework. The biggest challenge is to design a 
framework for the whole spectrum of their practice (applicable and manageable for everyone, 
from those working in the field in war zones to those working in senior positions in offices). 
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: I conducted 
the interview with their risk and quality group. Previously, risk management was a part of 
project management. However, the decision was made to establish a separate team and dedicate 
more attention to the risk management process. Their risk management is part of the wider 
governance risk and compliance framework. 
They are aware of the standards and the practitioners’ guidelines, and have also got in 
touch with some of the practitioners with other companies that already have established risk 
management. Every project they start has to go through a qualitative risk assessment with 27 
questions divided into four risk categories with predefined answers (the level of criticality from 
0 to 4 that is tailored to each of the 27 questions). This assessment is followed up quarterly and 
updated. Operational risk management is daily risk management. They want to find a common 
basis for everyone to be able to complete their risk management task/report. For more 
systematic and quantitative information, they could use additional forms/questionnaires. 
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: The proposed approach, in their 
view, requires expertise, and that could be the main challenge for the implementation of the 
approach in their organization. As a public entity, they have quite a wide range of projects. 
Some of the projects involve employees who are aware of risk and project management, but 
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some employees need to be introduced to even the basics. They find the discussion on to what 
extent they need to go into analyses very interesting and very relevant. Finding the right balance 
is seen as the key to effective risk management.  
8.4.2.6. Company 6: Large-scale high-tech infrastructure design in energy 
sector 
Area of work and design challenges: The sixth case company is involved in designing 
and deploying large-scale high-tech infrastructure in the energy sector. Designing and 
operationalizing both onshore and offshore systems is part of their expertise.  
Risk management process and link to other organizational processes: Their risk 
management is recognized as one of the best practices, due to their advanced way of dealing 
with risk and uncertainties throughout the process, tools and decision making they have 
adopted and further developed. We previously conducted nine interviews with their senior 
project risk manager on their risk management and challenges in practice, as well as analyzing 
the implementation of a complex, quantitative engineering design and deployment project risk 
model in Primavera. Additionally, we conducted a follow-up interview on the proposed 
approach. 
Proposed design risk customization and evaluation: The company has already 
reached a high level of risk management maturity and, like Company 1, they constantly seek 
frameworks for further improvement and carry out re-evaluation. More concretely, they look 
into ways to improve their processes through advanced risk quantification techniques. 
Undoubtedly, they show a high level of understanding of the impact and the importance of the 
choice of risk method and its proper usage. However, the importance, resources (in terms of 
cost, time, and employees) needed, and the quality of data are some of their main concerns. 
The feedback on the possibilities of using and implementing this approach is therefore mostly 
related to the opportunities it provides in terms of better communication to the managers on 
these two core aspects: why they need better quality of data and why they need to improve their 
quantification. The downside of the approach is seen in the sense that, in order to properly use 
it (go in detail through all the criteria), a lot of time would be required. Often, the managers 
they report to allocate insufficient attention to the long process of reporting (presenting and 
questioning). 
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8.5. Discussion  
 
The case companies’ interviews supported the view that I had identified in the literature 
about the diversity of engineering systems designs and, consequently, also of risk management 
practice. The first company showed a high level of understanding of the impact and the 
importance of the choice of risk method and its proper usage, and the maturity framework that 
this thesis proposed would help them to identify detailed improvements, especially in their 
consulting activities.  
For the second company, the proposed customizations would support their 
communication to less risk-aware managers, as well as to those without an extensive 
mathematical background. It would also help them identify where they have a greater need for 
better accuracy in their estimates, the approaches they might take to achieve these, and the 
necessary argumentation for additional research. The proposed approach could contribute to 
the sustainability and effectiveness of their risk management process.  
For the third organization, I consider that the proposed approach would be useful to 
help establish a practice to facilitate a conversation about their needs, from the beginning 
informing them that the method (tool, technique) they choose should be based on an informed 
and knowledgeable choice, not just “copied and pasted” from another company.  
The practitioners from the fourth company highly appreciated this research direction. 
While the proposed approach is seen as overly “academic” to be directly used in their practice, 
it is also seen as a valuable way to help risk managers to communicate to others in the company 
the need to improve the quantification.  
The fifth case company has a rather specific risk management profile, due to the nature 
of their organization. The concrete contribution that the approach introduced in this chapter 
could bring to their practice was hard to determine, as they are going through the restructuring 
of risk management process. However, the approach could support their workshops as well as 
enable support from the academic point of view in the argument for the need to approach the 
whole risk management process more structurally.  
And finally, the sixth company showed a high level of understanding of the impact of 
the choice of risk method and especially of its proper usage. The proposed approach would 
help them to start the conversation with their managers about the need to actively improve the 
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quality of data on which they base their assessments, as this represents one of the main concerns 
in their current practice. 
The interviews also supported the view, which I had identified from the research 
literature, of the need for any engineering systems design risk management process to be 
adapted to the particular circumstances of the project and of the organization undertaking it. 
As Loch (2000) demonstrates, based on 90 product development projects, there is no “best 
practice” product development process; rather, a tailoring approach is needed to help 
companies achieve their strategic innovation needs. They propose a strategy deployment 
procedure for product development, which can help an organization to manage its innovation 
efforts proactively. This and our research are aligned with other related work. For example, 
Mulqueen, Maples, and Fabisinski (2012) describe tailoring of systems engineering processes 
with a specific focus on the conceptual design environment. Cabannes et al. (2014) propose an 
approach for taking into account the maturity of information in risk assessments and providing 
meta-information on the risk estimations, given that there is uncertainty related to information 
during the design process (particularly in the early design stages). Fontoura and Price (2008) 
propose a systematic approach to managing risks in software development projects through 
process tailoring, with the aim of elaborating a defined process to a project suitable to the 
project’s context, taking advantage of agile methods, planned or hybrid, while preventing 
identified risks for the project. All these approaches are aligned with the approach we propose. 
However, tailoring is not an easy task; it requires experience and knowledge in related 
processes, and concrete recommendations that go beyond the statement that “you should tailor 
your risk management process” are scarce. Furthermore, changes in large organizations can 
take time and are difficult to implement. Starting from the number of approvals on different 
hierarchical levels needed for proceeding with a change, to training employees for the new 
process, and ensuring proper integration with other processes, implementing change represents 
a challenging task. Therefore, organizations need to treat the implementation itself as a strategic 
change project. This requires articulating clear objectives as well as success criteria, proper 
planning and resources, and effective monitoring and control. 
The approach taken in this chapter, based on existing risk management process maturity 
frameworks, with the addition of specific components that enable a concrete tailoring of risk 
management processes (e.g. decision making) to specific quantification approaches, makes 
contributions in both these respects. 
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The proposed tailoring can also be seen from a fit-for-purpose point of view. We believe 
this also makes the contribution of ensuring that risk management is fit-for-purpose as the 
dimensions we discuss (understanding of the risk management needs; method sophistication 
for risk quantification; quality of data; awareness regarding risk in organizational culture and 
impact of risk assessments in decision making) have a significant impact on it. This promises 
potential to develop the proposed customization framework into a tool incorporating significant 
detail on the process level, thus also enabling organizations with less design risk management 
context knowledge to significantly improve their overall process quality. However, the 
proposed tailoring approach requires further detailing and application in industry. This would 
allow reporting of the potential impact of the approach in an organization and its learning and 
knowledge sharing capacities. 
In summary, the key insights obtained through the case companies’ validation were: 
• Success in using the same tailoring framework at three different companies facing three 
very different risk profiles and design tasks; the three companies approached to provide 
their feedback on the developed approach raise the importance of the approach and suggest 
further improvements; 
• the framework yielded practical suggestions to adapt the design risk management process 
model that were seen both as fitting and relevant by the interview partners; 
• while the current application of the framework still requires significant risk management 
context knowledge (one of the challenges of the current state), the prototypical adaptation 
has already enabled us to collect concrete examples of alternative modes of executing risk 
management when using different quantification techniques.  
8.6. Conclusions 
 
During engineering systems design, companies deal with uncertainty. The types and 
degrees of uncertainty vary significantly as the design process progresses, and the choice of 
methods to deal with risk and uncertainty play a crucial role in achieving the desired results. 
Therefore, in this chapter I present the research on developing a framework to tailor risk 
management to the specific company’s needs. I accomplished this objective by linking risk 
management maturity concepts to previous research on product development, project 
management, and risk management methods, deriving five categories to guide practitioners in 
the choice of the appropriate method. The proposed framework advances the state of the art by 
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taking into account the quality of the available data, the corporate culture and awareness of 
risk, and the way responses are planned. I preliminarily tested the validity of our approach in 
six different companies, showing its value in tailoring risk management to the specific needs 
and challenges of each of the companies. 
Risk management awareness usually occurs after companies have already digested 
other management practices. These companies have usually already adopted strategic 
management cultures and methods such as, for instance, product/project portfolio management. 
The proposed approach enables further improvements of management practices by informing 
different hierarchical levels on the need for a more adequate process/method, accompanied 
awareness and its value.  
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, to fully take advantage of the potential that 
advanced risk and uncertainty quantification approaches offer, a company (or the 
analysts/managers responsible) must understand and articulate their overall risk management 
needs and resources available. In order to improve the accuracy of quantities produced, it is not 
enough to simply apply a more advanced method. Often, more resources need to be used, such 
as: hiring trained people or sending already employed experts to training courses, buying new 
software, getting adequate IT (more powerful computers, data storage, etc.), investing in data 
collection when needed and enabling data storage for learning purposes.  
For that reason, in my view, the greatest potential of these methods is by far in large-
scale engineering systems and large-scale projects. It makes sense to invest a bit more in the 
quality of the analyses on which the important decisions are made, given the impact they later 
have, as the difference in terms of the outcome can be significant.  
However, projects and design solutions that are not necessarily large-scale, but that deal 
with deep uncertainties, can also benefit significantly from applying advanced approaches. For 
instance, an IT solution can be designed for a particular online banking service or a tax system, 
or a transportation system that improves the experience for the end user. It impacts a large 
number of users, it becomes part of an extremely large system and better understanding is 
needed of its effect on the overall system. Yet, since it is a first-of-a-kind solution, it cannot be 
tested elsewhere and therefore it should be recognized that there is a need to cope better with 
deep uncertainties.    
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9.  Discussion: The non-probabilistic framework and its 
connection to the current state-of-the-art  
 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful” 
- George E.P. Box –  
To allow a more thorough reflection on the contributions of this PhD thesis and the 
general limitations potentially impacting the results, this chapter intends to wrap up the findings 
of this thesis and elaborate on the replicability and reproducibility of the research.  
In the context of this thesis, this is the final step: up to this point, the thesis has 
investigated advanced risk and uncertainty quantification methods (introduced under the non-
probabilistic framework) and the methods’ integration into the overall risk management 
process. This chapter concerns itself with the broader question of the integration of the non-
probabilistic framework into the existing state of the art in engineering systems design risk 
management, potential recommendations for its usage and specific method selection. This is 
followed by a discussion on methodological reflections and limitations. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.1 provides a rationale for considering 
the non-probabilistic framework as an additional step ‒ an extension of the current probabilistic 
(view on) risk management. Section 9.2 further describes this extension through the integration 
of risk assessment tools and techniques, and the comparison of probabilistic and non-
probabilistic methods. Additionally, recommendations depending on types of situations in 
engineering systems design are provided. Section 9.3 specifically addresses the limitations.  
9.1. The extension of the probabilistic view on quantification in risk 
management  
 
The methods investigated in this thesis are presented as a complement to probabilistic 
methods to quantify epistemic uncertainty. The basic rationale behind this is that the non-
probabilistic methods introduced in this thesis should complement the probabilistic processes 
in specific situations and scenarios that are dominated by epistemic uncertainty. They are not 
intended to substitute already established (entire) processes and analyses, but rather to support 
them in situations in which it has been demonstrated that conventional approaches face 
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challenges (examples are provided in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Specific situations are documented, 
and their integration and recommendations are described in Section 9.2. 
Moreover, the literature on uncertainty quantification explains that probabilistic 
methods are basically a special case of the non-probabilistic ones. The main points for making 
such claims are following: 
1. The first group of methods: Mathematically imprecise probabilities are seen as a natural 
extension of probabilities, because different studies show that, with sufficient evidence 
(information), the intervals converge to precise estimates (Walley, 1999; 
Weichselberger, 2000). 
An exception to this line of thinking is Dempster-Shafer theory, which is created on 
completely different pillars: degree of belief and no condition to sum probability 
intervals to unity (Beynon, Curry, & Morgan, 2000). 
2. The second group of methods: Semi quantitative methods are technically a combination 
of probabilistic approaches and qualitative descriptions and/or visualizations that 
support the evidence behind the conducted analyses (Aven, 2008; Boone et al., 2010). 
3. The third group of methods: Exploratory modeling enables the sampling of a large 
number of scenarios for different plausible futures, on a large number of different 
inputs, for which conventional scenario analysis becomes only a subset of the new 
scope (Bankes, Walker, & Kwakkel, 2013). 
These methods are aimed at enabling modeling for system resilience and providing 
business continuity support.  
 
As an example, consider cyber security risks. Over the last five to ten years this type of 
risk has risen significantly in terms of size, number of attacks, their mutation capacities and 
effect. Major organizations can almost certainly expect to be the potential subject of an attack 
speaking in 3-5 year horizon. While they cannot be sure of the exact probability of this 
happening, they can prepare recovery systems, that are as good as and as fast as possible, to 
minimize the potential harm to their systems. In this context, the non-probabilistic methods 
assessment supports such aims.   
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9.2. Overview of the existing approaches and the comparison with non-
probabilistic methods 
To allow a discussion on the integration of the non-probabilistic methods into the 
broader, widely available and used set of methods (a broadly accepted collection), both the 
academic and practitioners’ communities need to consider various angles in which such 
integration contributes to the field. In that view, this thesis adds to the current state of the art 
by: 1) uplifting the importance of specifically addressing epistemic uncertainty, 2) providing 
the means to do so, 3) integrating developed methods into the broadly accepted collection of 
methods and 4) articulating recommendations to both research and practice. 
 In the previous chapters, this thesis has explained the first two aspects. After 
introducing, describing and analyzing different concepts, the explanations for their integration 
into the overall risk management process are discussed through the proposed tailoring 
approach. There is a need to more thoroughly discuss the concrete choice of a specific method. 
The third aspect aims to address this gap. As explained at the beginning of this thesis, the 
methods used in analyzing risks can be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative. The 
degree of detail required will depend upon the particular application, the availability of reliable 
data and the decision-making needs of the organization. Some methods and the degree of detail 
of the analysis may be prescribed by legislation in a field. Other types of design 
solutions/projects may have certain domain tendencies (“common practice”), some can be 
contractual requirements, or there may be no usual approach at all. 
The work presented here builds on the existing literature and what is considered to be 
the best practice. More concretely, the foundation is found in the ISO 31000 risk management 
process description and ISO 31010 list of approaches (Institute, 2011). In light of this, the 
extension of Applicability of Tools used for Risk Assessment in ISO 31010 is presented in 
Appendix 3. Such an extended list allows the creation of awareness about the existence and 
availability of these approaches, and their applicability possibilities.  
Furthermore, a more detailed integration is developed and presented in Appendix 4, 
where methods are briefly described and further characterized. The significant extension here 
lies in two groups of methods: 1) software assessments and 2) non-probabilistic methods.  
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Over the last decade, software (computationally-based and web-based) solutions have 
emerged. As they provide a valuable contribution to the current practices, this thesis suggests 
expanding the current most-widely accepted list of Tools and Techniques with this group of 
methods. Namely, these solutions allow the usage of multiple tools and techniques from the 
same list in a structured, transparent and traceable way. This proposed extension is provided in 
Appendix 4 under “Software Assessment.”  
The included examples are: Oracle’s Primavera Risk Analysis, RamRisk, RAMAS, 
Resilinc, and Risk Calc (for references, please see Appendix 4). These types of methods 
brought a number of benefits, from which some were documented through the empirical work 
presented in Section 3.4. For instance, they allow the integration of both predeveloped risk 
registers and newly developed risk registers, they can identify common scheduling pitfalls, 
they can report confidence levels with regard to finishing dates, costs, internal rates of return, 
and net present values. Important features include more employees having the access to the 
same data and/or analysis at the same time, the possibility of allocating tasks and 
responsibilities, round-the-clock access from multiple devices, confidentiality (possibilities for 
restrictions), customized reporting, mail notifications, data storage, benchmarking against 
peers, etc.  
Therefore, these cloud-based platforms provide a powerful array of tools for risk 
management, model development, benchmarking and business continuity. These methods are 
user friendly, and project members can contribute directly and collaborate efficiently when 
performing analyses. They allow integration of multiple analyses, maturity assessments, and 
the use of various visualization options to customize solutions, access and reporting. For these 
reasons, they represent a valuable contribution to the field.  
The methods introduced in this thesis represent the second important extension of the 
overall collection (see Appendix 4). Non-probabilistic methods are in this way included in the 
list, and their merits have previously been discussed.  
Other than integrating developed methods to the broadly accepted collection of 
methods, this thesis also provides a comparison of the methods with some of the most widely 
used ones (Table 11). As illustrated, it is important to understand what the required inputs are 
for each of the analyses and what the expected outcomes are. The first three methods require 
more specific input, with predefined system variables. The three non-probabilistic methods 
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instead open up various possibilities for situations when such predefined information is not 
available: by elicitation of different formats, by providing qualitative explanations regarding 
the assumptions and by sampling a large number of scenarios.  
The comparison of the outputs reveals that, in the case of the first three methods, we 
can expect a precise outcome and a clear recommendation. In contrast, the non-probabilistic 
methods provide a broader description of a wider range of different outcomes according to the 
initial input. Strengths and weaknesses discussed in this thesis are summarized and presented 
in Table 11.  
Table 11 Comparison of the probabilistic and non-probabilistic methods 
Method Input Output Strengths Weaknesses 
Monte Carlo 
Analysis 
*Largely taken 
from the ISO 
31010 standard  
- Good model 
of the system 
and 
information on 
the types of 
inputs, the 
sources of 
uncertainty 
that are to be 
represented 
and the 
required output 
- Uniform, 
triangular, 
normal and log 
normal 
distributions 
are often used 
for this 
purpose 
- The output 
could be a single 
value 
- It could be a 
result expressed 
as the probability 
or frequency 
distribution 
- It could be the 
identification of 
the main 
Standards’ 
functions within 
the model that 
has the greatest 
impact on the 
output 
- In general, a 
Monte Carlo 
simulation will be 
used to assess 
either the entire 
distribution of 
outcomes or key 
measures from 
the distributions 
- Models are 
relatively simple to 
develop and can be 
extended as the 
need arises 
- Sensitivity 
analysis can be 
applied to identify 
strong and weak 
influences 
- Software is 
readily available 
and relatively 
inexpensive 
 
- The accuracy of 
the solutions 
depends upon the 
number of 
simulations which 
can be performed 
(this limitation is 
becoming less 
important with 
increased computer 
speeds) 
- It relies on being 
able to represent 
uncertainties in 
parameters by a 
valid 
distribution 
- Large and 
complex models 
may be challenging 
to the modeler and 
make it difficult 
for stakeholders to 
engage with the 
process 
- The technique 
may not adequately 
weigh high 
consequence/low 
probability events 
and therefore not 
allow an 
organization’s risk 
appetite to be 
reflected in the 
analysis 
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Consequence 
Probability 
Matrix 
*Largely taken 
from the ISO 
31010 standard 
- Customized 
scales for 
consequence 
and probability 
- A matrix 
which 
combines the 
two 
- The output is a 
rating for each 
risk or a ranked 
list of risk with 
significance 
levels defined 
 
 
 
  
- Relatively easy to 
use 
- Provides a rapid 
ranking of risks 
into different 
significance levels 
- It is difficult to 
define the scales 
unambiguously 
- Use is very 
subjective and there 
tends to be 
significant variation 
between raters 
- Risks cannot be 
aggregated (i.e. one 
cannot define that a 
particular number of 
low risks or a low 
risk identified a 
particular number of 
times is equivalent 
to a medium 
risk) 
- It is difficult to 
combine or compare 
the level of risk for 
different categories 
of consequences 
Bayesian 
analysis 
*Largely taken 
from the ISO 
31010 standard 
- Define 
system 
variables 
- Define causal 
links between 
variables 
- Specify 
conditional and 
prior 
probabilities 
- Add evidence 
to net 
- Perform 
belief updating 
- Extract 
posterior 
beliefs 
- The graphical 
output provides 
an easily 
understood model 
and the data can 
be readily 
modified to 
consider 
correlations and 
sensitivity of 
parameters 
- All that is needed 
is knowledge of the 
priors 
- Inferential 
statements are easy 
to understand 
- Bayes’ rule is all 
that is required 
- It provides a 
mechanism for 
computing 
subjective beliefs 
in a problem 
- Defining all 
interactions in 
Bayes nets for 
complex systems is 
problematic 
- Bayesian approach 
needs the 
knowledge of a 
multitude of 
conditional 
probabilities, 
which are generally 
provided by experts 
- Software tools can 
only provide 
answers based on 
these assumptions 
Imprecise 
Probabilities 
(Coherent upper 
and lower 
probabilities, 
(Walley, 1991)) 
- Expert 
judgments 
elicitation in 
different 
formats 
- Depending on 
the data format, 
the corresponding 
aggregation – 
single point, 
distribution, 
envelope, c-box 
- Various options 
for aggregating 
expert opinions 
- Imprecision 
explicitly manifests 
the degree of 
knowledge or 
ignorance  
- The greater the 
interval the greater 
our ignorance is 
 
- Harder to 
communicate the 
results 
- Harder to compute 
- Immaturity of the 
field  
- Can be a large 
imprecision that 
makes conclusions 
impractical 
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Semi-
quantitative 
methods 
(The NUSAP 
tool, (Funtowicz 
& Ravetz, 1990)) 
- Quantitative 
assessment 
followed by 
qualitative 
information on 
all the steps, 
assumptions 
and potential 
limitations  
- Precise 
quantitative 
output 
supplemented by  
descriptions of 
quality of data 
and 
visualizations 
representing 
uncertainty 
surrounding the 
results 
- Important 
information about 
the assumptions 
included in the 
analysis are 
provided to 
decision makers 
- Facilitate 
conversation about 
uncertainties, 
convenient for 
discussions with 
lay public 
- Not widely used, 
lack of awareness of 
its 
abilities/capacities 
- Can be time 
consuming to 
present all the 
details 
Exploratory 
modeling 
(RDM, (Walker, 
Haasnoot, & 
Kwakkel, 2013)) 
- Development 
of agents 
- Sampling of a 
large number 
of scenarios 
- Use trusted 
simulation 
models to 
consider a 
wide spectrum 
of plausible 
futures, each 
with different 
input 
parameters  
- A robust 
solution for a 
system/design 
that works 
satisfactorily over 
a broad range of 
possible tested 
futures 
- Advanced and 
thorough approach 
- Highly relevant 
for complex 
systems  
- Computational 
complexity 
- Seeks robustness 
rather than optimal 
solution 
- Demands a strong 
set of skills for its 
usage 
 
Regarding the fourth aspect in which this thesis adds to the current state of the art, it 
develops recommendations for the specific situations, previously identified as critical. This 
recommendation is framed as a combination of findings from the comparison of the methods, 
from literature and from the empirical studies (Table 12).  
It is important to clarify the *Resource dependency in the first recommendation. As the 
methods introduced in this thesis can be demanding in terms of resources, a number of other 
factors need to be considered when deciding on the method (apart from risk and uncertainty 
quantification considerations). The scope, size, budget, lifetime, and current level of risk 
management of projects play an important role. For instance, the greatest potential of these 
methods is in large-scale systems, also because of the fact that their budget allows such results 
to bring value to the organization. In the case of smaller systems, it can simply be too costly to 
be appreciated, even though it may lead to better results. Employing these methods involves 
having adequately educated employees, specialized in the topic, which is more reasonably to 
be expected in larger organizations. In the case of time pressures, there is a tendency to neglect 
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all the benefits from a more thorough investigation of system components and use tools that 
allow a rough estimate. 
Table 12 Recommendations for method selection for the key situations 
Situation Probabilistic Non-probabilistic 
“Low likelihood, high 
impact” 
Resource dependent* 
Advantage: Well-known and 
well established in practice. 
Disadvantage: 
Have been challenged in the 
accuracy and reliability of their 
results, making them arbitrary to 
use. 
Do not really cope with black 
swans.  
Advantage: Bring more 
relevant information to 
decision makers. 
Disadvantage: 
Do not provide a single, 
simple, straight forward 
answer, which is harder for 
decision makers to 
comprehend. 
New methods, representing a  
challenge for practice to 
integrate with other 
processes.  
“No information”, or 
hardly any knowledge 
or prior experience 
available. Typically, a 
first-of-a-kind situation 
Advantage: Relying on 
managers’ experience. 
Disadvantage: 
Arbitrary results. 
Possibilities for 
misrepresentation.  
 
Advantage: Recommended, 
by providing the means to do 
so. 
Disadvantage: 
Computational requirements 
and an adequate educational 
level of employees that is 
needed. 
“50-50 %” 
Possibility of 
distinguishing between 
the actual 0.5 outcome 
and default assigned 
probability  
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Assigning 0.5 by default making 
it hard to further explain to 
managers.  
Advantage: Clear. 
Disadvantage: 
A new method that the whole 
team needs to switch to. It 
also needs to be integrated 
into other processes.  
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“Historical data sets 
available”, several 
experienced experts 
involved, experience in 
providing similar 
solutions-systems 
Advantage: Clear. 
Disadvantage: 
Computational complexity and 
costs of conducting the full 
analysis can be high. Time-
consuming when there is a 
pressure to make fast decisions. 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Add additional complexity 
and costs (in terms of time, 
money and other resources) 
that can be hard to justify.  
 
It is possible to anticipate that in the future, with an advance in methods and 
computational developments, and a wider availability of risk management educational 
programs (MSc studies and PhD projects), that this dependency may no longer be as high. 
However, at the moment, it represents one possibility for future research that would make 
methods more hands-on and their results easier for communication.   
9. 3. Methodological reflections and limitations of the study 
 
This PhD study has been carried out to investigate practical challenges taking place in 
the real world, which is not always controllable. As such, this research differs from studies 
taking place in controlled labs, where replicability can be achieved and demonstrated in an 
easier manner. Thus, the choice of this type of research may have consequences for validity, 
generalizability and repeatability.  
Validity 
Validity refers to the extent to which the findings of a research study accurately reflect 
the studied phenomenon (Collis & Hussey, 2009). There is an ongoing discussion around the 
criticism of case studies in different scientific communities. The most vociferous opponents 
indicate that such studies tend to be subjective and are often biased in the researchers’ 
interpretations. However, others, for example, Flyvbjerg (2006a), argue that case studies are 
neither more subjective nor more biased than other methods of inquiry, if additional wits are 
considered. 
To do so, and by following  Lincoln and Guba (1986), triangulation, peer debriefing 
and member check were applied. I employed method triangulation (Guba, 1981) by combining 
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case studies work with interviewing technique. On the other hand, a noteworthy limitation of 
this study lies in the inability to employ data triangulation. Due to the confidentiality issues, it 
was not feasible to arrange access to actual companies’ documentation and records or to 
perform observations. Such insights could have significantly enriched and strengthened the 
findings.   
Peer debriefing was organized in both the scientific and practitioners’ communities 
(Guba, 1981). As part of the scientific peer debriefing, I shared my research challenges with 
the research group of which I was part, and received critical feedback and challenging questions 
that enabled me to consider various angles and alternatives to my interpretations. During my 
first external research stay at Delft University of Technology, researchers from the Multi-Actor 
Systems Department challenged the extensiveness of the non-probabilistic framework. This 
resulted in the expansion of the framework with a whole new group of methods (the third 
group). During my second external research stay at Applied Biomathematics, USA, the 
researchers working at the Institute challenged the development of the case studies and the 
generalizability of the data. This resulted in me refining my argumentation and improving the 
data collection and coding. Furthermore, I presented subanalyses and received feedback from 
the broader researcher communities (design, project management and risk analysis). 
Peer debriefing in the practitioners’ communities was carried out through participation 
and presentation at professional conferences, seminars and forums, where I received feedback 
from risk managers, project managers, portfolio managers and policy makers, as well as 
business modelers and analysts. Their experiences have put this research into a very practical 
application perspective, encouraging me to develop solutions that seek to be applicable in and 
relevant for practice.  
The third step in improving the validity and reliability of this study was member check, 
which was based on the presentation of initial constructs and results to the interviewees and 
participants of the case studies. This enabled me to validate interpretations and helped me 
clarify that the data generating code was conducting representative samples.  
Generalizability and transferability 
 In research, generalizability refers to the extent to which the results of one study can be 
extended to a wider sample (Collis & Hussey, 2009). More specifically, in his work, Yin (2013) 
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points out the limitations of (single) case study generalizability that applies to this study as 
well. However, by introducing the term “transferability,” Flyvbjerg (2006a) argues that 
achieving learning from examples is a valuable outcome of a case study. Transferability refers 
to the fact that principles from one or more case studies can be transferred to similar contexts. 
While case studies cannot generalize beyond their sample (Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1989) and 
create/provide conclusions that will be applicable in all situations, they can result in knowledge 
relevant for similar contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1986) propose two ways to enable 
transferability—purposive sampling and descriptive data. 
As purposive sampling is not intended to be representative of a wider 
sample/population (Guba, 1981), it should allow comparison between cases based on specific 
criteria. The case companies (where interviews were conducted, presented in Chapter 8) were 
selected on the maximum variation criterion, which is a criterion for purposive sampling 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006a). Identification of commonalities across cases that vary to the maximum 
degree are considered highly transferable. However, the focus of sampling was on companies 
within engineering systems design. As such, this sector has characteristics that differ from other 
sectors. To have substantiated arguments for claiming transferability within risk analysis, but 
in other domains (such as ecology, or the pharmaceutical or financial industries), would require 
certain adaption or additional research. However, fields such as project, portfolio and 
megaproject management have significant overlap with design, making the results potentially 
transferable to that domain. 
Descriptive data, on the other hand, provide extensive information about a specific case 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1986). As transferability depends on matching characteristics between 
contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1986), this thesis includes thorough case descriptions and case 
company descriptions. By providing those data, this thesis enables readers to compare the cases 
with other possible contexts and future applications.  
Repeatability  
As mentioned above, due to the high context dependency, the reliability of case studies 
has been questioned in research communities. This emerges due to the fact that the replication 
of a case study within a different yet related context will not necessarily result in consistent 
findings (Thomas, 2015). Reliability refers to the absence of differences in results if the 
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research is repeated (Collis & Hussey, 2009). However, others suggest that the reliability of 
case studies can be increased through audits (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). 
Audits involve allowing other researchers or companies to check the conducted analysis 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1986). This study involves audit initiatives, both from researchers and 
practitioners. Furthermore, for both case studies, the setup was discussed in another large 
company to ensure its repeatability, consistency and accuracy.  
For all these reasons, I argue that the main principles of the findings and the non-
probabilistic framework followed by the tailoring approach can (with adaptions) be transferred 
to risk management in other sectors. In this way, the findings, the non-probabilistic framework 
and the tailoring approach have potential in the broader context of risk management.   
   171 
 
10. Conclusions: Learnings from applying advanced risk    
quantification methods to engineering systems design 
 
“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.” 
- Aristotle- 
Risk assessment methods have become widespread in supporting decision making 
processes. These methods have to create the necessary level of confidence in their results to 
satisfy the decision makers. To create this confidence in risk management, the key is to have a 
transparent and systematic analysis and representation of uncertainty.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, engineering systems design risk management practice has so 
far widely relied on probability-based methods when treating uncertainty. However, both 
theoretical and practical challenges have emerged, within engineering systems design as well 
as in risk management in other domains. On the other hand, the non-probabilistic methods 
emerged in other fields as alternatives to the challenging, and still not fully understood, 
epistemic uncertainty quantification. Only a few studies have investigated these non-
probabilistic methods, and little or no attention has been devoted to their application and 
integration into engineering systems design. Yet these methods are essential when exploring 
different means to represent uncertainty as part of risk management in engineering systems 
design. Therefore, it is crucial ‒ in terms of both research and practice ‒ to extend our 
knowledge base on risk management (quantification) in engineering systems design. 
As part of a comprehensive investigation and rethinking of uncertainty quantification 
in engineering systems, industry involvement was initiated through conducting case studies 
and interviews with practitioners to extract their professional knowledge (Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7 
and 8). These practical insights provided a unique opportunity to investigate the non-
probabilistic methods in the engineering systems design context and extend our knowledge 
base. The study was guided by four research questions (see Chapter 2) that supported the 
development of the non-probabilistic framework to support: 1) researchers in analyzing and 
representing (epistemic) uncertainty and 2) practitioners in planning, facilitating and 
performing their risk management.  
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The following conclusions summarize the core findings, and relate them to the existing 
research and practice.  
10.1. Core contributions of this thesis 
 
This thesis makes the following contributions: 
1) The thesis clarifies different concepts in uncertainty quantification and their 
limitations, and synthesizes challenges with the currently most widely used methods 
In Chapter 3, this thesis confronts research question 1. The literature review and 
conducted empirical studies provide the following finding: current risk management practice 
has challenges in terms of uncertainty quantification. The specific challenges in terms of 
modeling, quality of background knowledge and use and integration of results are documented 
and discussed. Furthermore, an overview of the main concepts in uncertainty quantification is 
provided, followed by the literature findings on their limitations, misuse or misrepresentation. 
The subsequent finding is that there is a need to investigate alternative approaches to adequately 
represent epistemic uncertainty.  
2) The thesis develops the non-probabilistic framework 
In Chapter 4, this thesis addresses research question 2. The main findings are literature-
based: other fields have dealt with similar issues, with the result that those fields have 
developed advanced methods for coping with uncertainty. The conceptual development here 
argues for the introduction of the methods to the engineering systems design field and exploring 
their application potential in the field. The contribution to our knowledge base in engineering 
systems design is collecting a broad range of methods, providing their systematization and 
categorization, and conceptually discussing their application in the engineering systems design 
context. Furthermore, the literature-based findings about the limitations of the non-
probabilistic methods are acknowledged ‒ their complexity has been recognized as the main 
reason for their not being widely used in terms of the analyses and resources needed. 
3) The thesis creates a usable, practical toolkit for practitioners  
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, this thesis addresses research question 3. It transfers more 
general non-probabilistic methods into usable tools: a method for eliciting expert judgment in 
different data formats, a method for aggregating different data formats in expert judgment, a 
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qualitative Pedigree scoring for quality of data, a visualization method for uncertainty around 
data, and a bias correction method. This is done through examples of case study applications 
in the oil and gas industry (Chapters 5 and 6), followed by their comparison with several 
traditional probability approaches in representative situations (Chapter 9). The main findings 
here are based on empirical research work: for the engineering design situations and scenarios 
tested in this thesis, the non-probabilistic methods provided a more reliable representation of 
uncertainty. 
4) The thesis develops a tailoring approach to tie the quantification needs to the overall 
risk management process capabilities 
In Chapter 8, this thesis addresses research question 4. After introducing, describing 
and analyzing different concepts, the explanations for their integration into the overall risk 
management process are discussed through the proposed tailoring approach. The main finding 
highlights the fact that the success of choosing a specific quantification method from the 
available options is context dependent, and a broader risk management process view needs to 
be carefully considered when tailoring risk management to specific design situations, rather 
than the simple picking of a specific advanced quantification method. 
In the end, there is a need to discuss more thoroughly the actual choice of a specific 
method. Appendices 3 and 4 provide insights into the rich set of available methods (including 
the non-probabilistic extension) to fit and address different problems. This thesis proposes that 
the choice of the methods is dependent on context, resources and capabilities (the discussion is 
opened in Chapter 9). This means that once practitioners have understood their needs (through 
the proposed tailoring approach), a conscious choice needs to be made in terms of the allocation 
of resources, the adequate usage of a method, and the acknowledgement of each method’s 
limitations (instead of hiding such obstacles). Furthermore, the importance of an adequate level 
of employees’ education (in terms of risk management and risk quantification) is raised, as 
methods involving higher mathematical sophistication require certain skills in both conducting 
analyses and presenting, communicating and explaining the results to various stakeholders 
involved in decision making.  
10.2. Implications for research in engineering systems design  
 
This thesis has the following implications for research: 
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• The thesis offers a clarification of different concepts of risk and uncertainty quantification, 
documenting the challenges and limitations of the current practice of uncertainty 
quantification. Researchers can use this information to guide the development of 
approaches to overcome these limitations. Furthermore, the clarification provided in this 
thesis could be a good starting point for young researchers seeking to explore their research 
directions.  
 
• The field of engineering systems design is enriched by a collection of advanced risk and 
uncertainty representation approaches, introduced through the non-probabilistic 
framework. The non-probabilistic methods extend the umbrella of available approaches, 
which can also be researched in other case applications.  
 
• The field of risk management is enhanced by concrete examples and case studies for the 
particular needs of one insufficiently researched domain: engineering systems design. This 
contributes to the overall verification of risk management methods and tools and their 
applicability, usability and generality. 
 
• It is critical to clarify the fact that we should not expect unrealistic answers from science. 
The intention of quantification methods is not to eliminate uncertainty, but rather to provide 
its effective management. It is necessary to raise awareness about this central distinction 
among other researchers in the community, as well as the lay public.  
 
10.3. Implications for practice in risk management 
 
This thesis has the following implications for practice: 
• Managerial implications include support for decision making under uncertainty in 
engineering systems design. This can help practitioners to be aware of the pitfalls of current 
practices and reflect on the opportunities for improving their risk management process. 
 
• Throughout the project, one of the main goals and contributions to the practice has been 
ensuring a higher level of understanding of uncertainty, its nature and types, and the need 
to cope with it knowledgably in the field by presenting and participating in various events. 
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Another goal was ensuring practitioners’ greater awareness of the need to more thoroughly 
revise the way they decide on a risk quantification method and, in particular, how they deal 
with epistemic uncertainty, through active industry engagement, different industry 
involvement and presentation across various levels of managerial hierarchy. 
 
• A tailoring risk management approach is developed, based on a risk management maturity 
model, which can be seen as an extension of or additional feature of the ISO 31000 Standard 
and the risk management process. The extended process view provided through this 
tailoring approach enables a better understanding of the need for and applicability of the 
approaches introduced in this thesis. 
 
• The contributions are highlighted through the lens of the current trends in design, such as 
industrial product-service systems and the integration of various systems (particularly those 
that face epistemic uncertainty due to their innovative nature and first-of-a-kind solutions). 
Globalization and rapid technological changes demand proactive monitoring and timely 
reactions and decisions, while keeping options open for future possibilities. Risk 
management should therefore keep pace with the evolving and dynamic nature of 
engineering systems.  
10.4. Directions for future research  
 
 The paragraphs that follow contain suggestions for relevant future research in relation 
to the four core findings and the non-probabilistic framework. Future studies can continue the 
development of “beyond probabilistic” thinking in risk and uncertainty quantification in design 
as this thesis provides the basis for 1) collecting/adding/developing more (and new) methods, 
2) addressing particular challenges through the application of selected approaches in specific 
design situations, and 3) further fostering the impact of such applications on decision making 
processes and the overall quality of design solutions.  
 Core contribution 1 and related findings open up the need for future research of other 
types of risk management challenges in engineering systems design. For instance, purely 
behavioral aspects are discussed only to a certain degree in this thesis. Different perceptions of 
different stakeholders when communicating non-probabilistic results are still to be 
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investigated. Additionally, methods that specifically address or integrate the treatment of 
ambiguity are an interesting direction. 
 Core contribution 2 and related findings suggest further investigation of other 
alternative approaches and their integration into the non-probabilistic framework. For instance, 
specific literature searches in fields such as mechanical engineering or IT have been outside of 
the scope of this thesis, but could potentially provide more resources.  
Core contribution 3 and related findings reveal opportunities for various types of 
research. First, additional cases from different industries and different contexts would help in 
identifying and documenting both opportunities for, and the limitations of, the application of 
the approaches introduced in this thesis. As the generalizability of the conducted studies is 
limited, these additional studies would allow a clearer understanding of specific boundaries. 
Second, applications in real case studies, or even past projects (but on actual data) would 
provide new insights. Such applications would enable further adjustments of the methods for 
particular cases and design challenges. Those adjustments would provide practitioners with 
more hands-on tools, and provide researchers with the ability to streamline some of the more 
mathematically complex approaches and to seek other application domains.  
Third, analyzing actual data is of great importance as it could demonstrate the ability 
of the introduced approaches to cope with “the noise.” Often, due to time pressures, mistakes 
or intentional approximations of some form accompany the documentation recorded in 
organizations. Many of the approaches can first be tested on the historical data (which is the 
biggest strength for the companies that store this information). Such valuable material can 
allow the comparison of the approaches and their results, and inform on the level of 
professionals’ ability to read and comprehend the results on different levels.  
Finally, the diversity of design projects and their solution space have a broad range. 
Core finding 4 and related findings allow a proper understanding of the particular needs in 
terms of risk management, highlighting specific situations in which advanced methods are 
essential. The positive feedback on the tailoring approach opened the door for additional 
discussions, implementation examples and the commercialization potential of the approach. In 
this way, it could be the basis for the systematic improvement of risk management and its 
integration into the broader managerial processes. Future studies could apply the approach in 
different companies, making the findings more generalizable and opening up the possibility of 
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a bigger scientific contribution. The proposed methods, and the related tailoring approach and 
gained knowledge, can also be introduced and used in other domains, such as project and 
program management and supply change management, where many of the challenges are based 
on design issues or are emerging in design.  
An acceptable and largely affordable way for companies to further explore non-
probabilistic methods could be through encouraging and supporting its employees to study 
further and engage in MSc projects and other research activities. In this way, a company could 
potentially benefit from the results of the application of the methods, educating its employees 
and possibly identifying areas for improvement in its risk management process.  
My recommendation for future studies is, if feasible, to design a study over a longer 
period of time. This would enable the capturing of a more nuanced research process and allow 
sufficient time to provide a significant amount of detail in each of the analyses conducted. I 
would seek to develop case studies in various companies involved in engineering systems 
design, evaluating their processes and methods applications. It is essential to establish a fruitful 
industrial collaboration built on mutual trust and respect, and to be open to understanding 
practitioners’ needs (both short- and long-term ones). This is a key element in adjusting risk 
and uncertainty quantification methods for their direct, practical usage, and in opening 
supplementary research questions.  
This thesis concludes with the following insight: there is no single best method for 
quantifying every type of uncertainty. Context, resources and application skills play a major 
role, as well as a proper understanding of different schools of thought when applying methods. 
The thesis looks into and identifies situations when the non-probabilistic methods are more 
adequate to use, describes these situations and provides the means (tools) to apply them in the 
identified contexts. Nevertheless, this high potential of the non-probabilistic methods in 
engineering systems design is dependent on their integration into the overall risk management 
and associated processes. These must be carefully and knowledgably planned and carried out 
in order to harness this potential and to achieve an actual design impact in practice. 
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Appendix 1: Coding preview 
 
Interviews’ coding preview 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guides  
 
Interview guide for documenting challenges in risk management practice  
Introduction  I introduce myself and my background.  
I briefly present the PhD project.  
This includes an explanation of the expectations of the interview and 
plans for its use. 
Background of 
the interviewee 
Can you give me a short introduction to your current position 
(including exact title, hierarchical level, etc.)? 
Also about your professional background, including examples of 
previous projects, tasks, duties? 
What are your current roles and responsibilities in the organization? 
Previous 
experience with 
risk management 
Are you aware of risk management standards and procedures? 
Have you had any prior experience with risk management? What was 
it? 
Educational level—ask for details if relevant. 
Have you had any training on the topic? 
Design (solution) 
in question 
What kind of design work does your organization do? 
Who are the users of your solutions? (Affecting whom?) 
What is the scope/budget and lifetime of your projects? (Portfolio of 
design activities.) 
Do you cover an entire system’s life-cycle or only the design? 
The project you are currently working on is in which design phase? 
Risk management 
in the 
organization  
Can you briefly present how risk management is performed in your 
practice? 
Do you rely on the current best-practice recommendations (ISO 
31000, PMBok guide, etc.)? 
How applicable are those recommendations to your practice? 
How would you describe the position of risk management (risk 
managers) in your organization? (The 1st, 2nd or 3rd line of defense?) 
Who is in the team? 
Who do they report to? On what? How often? 
In which form (written reports, presentations, oral-dialog)? 
Risk 
quantification 
(Risk and 
uncertainty 
modelling) 
In your practice do you rely on any quantification methods? 
If yes, which ones? If not, what do you use instead? 
What are the tools you currently use? Do you use one or more 
methods? How many of you work on it? 
Can you share more about your experiences with employing the 
method? 
Do you focus on representing epistemic uncertainty? 
Data collection Data availability: 
What kind of data do you use in your assessments? 
How are they collected? 
Who has the access to it? How sensitive is it? 
Data quality: 
Do you consider how reliable your data are? 
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How do you challenge the accuracy of the experts’ estimates 
(surveys, measurements or other ways in which you collect your 
data)? 
Lack of data: 
In case of missing data, what do you do? 
Do you sometimes experience time pressures? If so, how does that 
affect your modeling process and/or data quality? 
Do you have means (tools, protocols, visualizations) to report and 
separately discuss the quality of data on which you performed the 
analyses (within the risk management team and with decision 
makers)? 
Limitations of the 
chosen approach 
What are the challenges with the method you are using? Please 
elaborate.  
What additional features of the method would you like/need to have? 
How much time do you need to perform your assessment?  
What resources you need in order to do so? 
Do you have managerial support for collecting all the information 
you need? 
Communication 
of the results 
How do you prepare for the communication of the results? 
What is your main concern when doing so, what do you try to 
highlight?  
What is the main message you send? Only the top risks or the overall 
findings? Or more? 
Is a discussion on data included? Is the reliability of results 
considered? 
What is your biggest challenge when communicating the result? 
Risk-informed 
decision making  
How are the results of your assessment taken into account? 
What challenges do you experience? 
Do you experience any follow-ups, meaning requests for additional 
research/assessment/analyses? 
What other aspects can impact decision making? 
Other 
(Some of the often 
recognized, 
additional, 
questions) 
Do you store your data and knowledge as some form of historical 
data? 
Is there a possibility for knowledge sharing from project to project? 
What additional challenges have you noticed in today’s risk 
management? 
If you had the opportunity to choose, would you change the tool you 
are using?  
What happens if you are dealing with a first-of-a-kind solution, for 
which you do not have prior experience? Please describe how you 
approach modeling (assessment) in such a case.  
Did you try using other methods, for instance Monte Carlo 
simulation? What are your experiences? 
Do you consider having insurance to cover some of the risks 
materializing? Who decides on when and which ones? Did you try 
using other methods, for instance Monte Carlo simulation? What are 
your experiences? 
Do you consider having insurance to cover some of the risks 
materializing? Which ones, who and when decides on that? 
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Interview guide for the risk management tailoring approach  
Introduction  
(shortened if the 
interviewee was 
previously 
contacted) 
I introduce myself and my background.  
I briefly present the PhD project.  
This includes an explanation of the expectations of the interview and 
plans for its use. 
Background of the 
interviewee 
(shortened if the 
interviewee was 
previously 
contacted) 
Can you give me a short introduction to your current position 
(including exact title, hierarchical level, etc.)? 
Also about your professional background, including examples of 
previous projects, tasks, duties? 
What are your current roles and responsibilities in the organization? 
Previous 
experience with 
risk management 
(shortened if the 
interviewee was 
previously 
contacted) 
Are you aware of risk management standards and procedures? 
Have you had prior experience with risk management? What was it? 
Educational level ‒ ask for details if relevant. 
Have you had any training on the topic? 
Area of work and 
design (solution) 
in question 
What kind of design work does your organization do? 
Who are the users of your solutions? (Affecting whom?) 
What is the scope/budget and lifetime of your projects? (Portfolio of 
design activities). 
Do you cover an entire system’s life-cycle or only the design? 
The project you are currently working on is in which design phase? 
Challenges with 
the type of design  
What are the challenges with the solutions you are developing (in 
your organization)? 
How much novelty or new technology do they include? 
Do you have first-of-a-kind solutions? 
How dynamic is the market? How competitive is the field? 
What is the time horizon of the solutions that you are developing? 
How do you integrate and prioritize your activities? 
How early in the process do you take risk and uncertainty into 
account? 
What are the milestones? 
Risk management 
in the 
organization  
Can you briefly present how risk management is performed in your 
practice? 
Do you rely on the current best-practice recommendations (ISO 
31000, PMBok guide, etc.)? 
How applicable are those recommendations to your practice? 
How would you describe the position of risk management (risk 
managers) in your organization? (The 1st, 2nd or 3rd line of defense?) 
Who is in the team? 
Who do they report to? On what? How often? 
In which form (written reports, presentations, oral-dialog)? 
Do you benchmark your practice to others? Do you use maturity 
models? How? 
How is risk management integrated into the overall organizational 
structure? 
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Details regarding 
the approach 
An explanation from my side.  
Figure 17 Relationship of maturity categories and the ISO 31000 risk 
management process, from this thesis. 
Understanding of 
the needs 
Do you consider the broader impact and integration of risk 
management in your organization? 
How are resources distributed and how much is allocated for this 
type of analysis (in terms of employees, software, access to different 
information, etc.)? 
Do you discuss project types and sizes? Do they differ in terms of 
risk management needs? 
Do you distinguish between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty?  
Do you focus on representing epistemic uncertainty? 
What are your needs in terms of quantification? 
Method 
sophistication for 
risk quantification 
(Risk and 
uncertainty 
modelling) 
In your practice do you rely on any quantification methods? 
If yes, which ones? If not, what do you use instead? 
What are the current tools you use? Do you use one or more 
methods? How many of you work on it? 
Can you share more about your experiences with employing the 
method? 
How did you choose that approach?  
What did you use before? Did you try any other methods? 
How much time do you need to perform your assessment?  
How computationally demanding (mathematically sophisticated) is 
it?  
Quality of data  
 
What kind of data do you use in your assessments? 
How are they collected? 
Who has the access to it? How sensitive is it? 
What kinds of measurements (and data collection methods) do you 
use? 
How do you challenge the accuracy of the experts’ estimates 
(surveys, measurements or other ways in which you collect your 
data)? 
In case of missing data, what do you do? 
Do you sometimes experience time pressures? If so, how does that 
affect your modeling process and/or data quality? 
Do you have means (tools, protocols, visualizations) to report and 
separately discuss the quality of data on which you performed the 
analyses (within the risk management team and with decision 
makers)? 
How do you get the budget for additional research—data collection 
(in terms of time, costs and trained employees)? 
Do you have managerial support for collecting all the information 
you need? 
Awareness 
regarding risk in 
organizational 
culture  
How do you prepare for the communication of the results? 
What is your main concern when doing so, what do you try to 
highlight?  
What is the main massage you send? Only top risks or the overall 
findings? Or more? 
What is your biggest challenge when communicating results? 
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That is when communicating to your colleagues from the team or 
your superiors. But what about other employees? 
How do others perceive your work (risk management related tasks)? 
How would you describe the risk management culture in your 
organization? Do they understand the value it creates? 
Do you and how do you adjust your communication and vocabulary 
depending on the position of the employee you are interacting with 
(some may have had no experience with risk management and 
therefore need some basic explanations)? 
Do you get the opportunity to attend professional conferences or 
other types of training? 
Is there an opportunity for knowledge sharing from project to 
project? 
Impact of risk 
assessments in 
decision making  
How are the results of your assessment taken into account? 
Generally, do you perceive there is trust in the results? Please 
elaborate.  
Is there a discussion on data included? Is the reliability of results 
considered? Does it comply with the development of the responses? 
What challenges do you experience? 
Do you experience any follow-ups, meaning requests for additional 
research/assessment/analyses? 
What other aspects can impact decision making? 
Feedback In your opinion, which criteria from the tailoring approach need to be 
specifically addressed within your organization? 
What are the challenges with the proposed approach? 
Where do you see it having the highest potential? How would it 
support your current practice? 
Other 
(Some of the often 
recognized, 
additional, 
questions) 
What additional challenges have you noticed in today’s risk 
management? 
If you had the opportunity to choose, would you change the tool you 
are using?  
What happens if you are dealing with first-of-a-kind solutions, of 
which you do not have prior experience? Please describe how you 
approach modeling (assessment) in such a case.  
If you consider the approach too “academic,” can you please 
elaborate why you think so? Which parts are too demanding? 
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Appendix 3: Tools and Techniques  
 
*Table adapted and extended from the ISO31010 Standard. 
Table A.3 Applicability of tools used for Risk Assessment 
Tools and 
Techniques 
Risk Assessment Process 
Risk 
Identification 
Risk Analysis Risk 
Evaluation Consequence Probability Level of 
risk 
Brainstorming SA1 NA2 NA NA NA 
Structured or 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
 SA NA NA NA NA 
Delphi SA NA NA NA NA 
Checklists SA NA NA NA NA 
Primary Hazard 
Analysis 
SA NA NA NA NA 
Hazard and 
Operability 
Studies 
(HAZOP) 
SA SA A3 A A 
 Hazard Analysis 
and Critical 
Control Points 
(HACCP) 
SA SA NA NA SA 
Environmental 
Risk 
Assessment 
SA NA NA NA NA 
Structure 
<<What if?>> 
(SWIFT) 
SA NA NA NA NA 
Scenario 
Analysis 
SA SA A A A 
Business Impact 
Analysis 
A SA A A A 
Root Cause 
Analysis 
NA SA SA SA SA 
Failure Mode 
Effect Analysis 
SA SA SA SA SA 
Fault Tree 
Analysis 
A NA SA A A 
Event Tree 
Analysis 
A  SA A A NA 
Cause and 
Consequence 
Analysis 
A SA SA A A 
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Cause-and-
Effect Analysis 
SA SA NA NA NA 
Layer 
Protection 
Analysis 
(LOPA) 
A SA A A NA 
Decision Tree NA SA SA A A 
Human 
Reliability 
Analysis 
SA SA SA SA A 
Bow Tie 
Analysis 
NA A SA SA A 
Reliability 
Centered 
Maintenance 
SA SA SA SA SA 
Sneak Circuit 
Analysis 
A NA NA NA NA 
Markov 
Analysis 
A SA NA NA NA 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
NA NA NA NA SA 
Bayesian 
Statistics and 
Bayes Nets 
NA SA NA NA SA 
FN Curves A SA SA A SA 
Risk Indices A SA SA A SA 
Consequence/Pr
obability Matrix 
SA SA SA SA A 
Cost/Benefit 
Analysis 
A  SA A A A 
Multi-Criteria 
Decision 
Analysis 
(MCDA) 
A  SA A SA A 
Expert 
judgement 
elicitation 
process with 
IPs 
SA SA SA SA SA 
The NUSAP 
tool 
A A A SA SA 
Robust 
Decision 
Making 
SA SA SA SA A 
1 Strongly Applicable. 
2 Not Applicable. 
3 Applicable. 
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Appendix 4: Types of Risk Assessment Tools  
 
*Table adapted and extended from the ISO31010 Standard. 
Table A.4 Attributes of a Selection of Risk Assessment Tool 
Type of Risk 
Assessment 
Technique 
Description Relevance of Influencing 
Factors 
Can 
Provide 
Quantitative 
Output 
Resources 
and 
Capability 
Nature and 
degree of 
Uncertainty 
Complexity 
LOOK-UP METHODS 
Checklists A simple form of risk identification. 
A technique which provides a listing 
of typical uncertainties which need 
to be considered. Users refer to a 
previously developed list, codes or 
standards. 
Low Low Low No 
Primary 
Hazard 
Analysis 
A simple inductive method of 
analysis whose objective is to 
identify the hazards and 
hazardous situations and events 
that can cause harm for a given 
activity, facility or system. 
Low High Medium No 
SUPPORTING METHODS 
Structured 
Interview and 
Brainstorming 
A means of collecting a broad 
set of ideas and evaluation, 
ranking them by a team. 
Brainstorming may be stimulated 
by prompts or by one-on-one 
and one-on-many interview 
techniques. 
Low Low Low No 
Delphi 
Technique 
A means of combining expert 
opinions that may support the 
source and influence 
identification, probability and 
consequence estimation and risk 
evaluation. It is a collaborative 
technique for building consensus 
among experts. Involving 
independent analysis and voting 
by experts. 
Medium Medium Medium No 
SWIFT 
Structured 
<<What-If>> 
A system for prompting a team 
to identify risks. Normally used 
within a facilitated workshop. 
Normally linked to a risk analysis 
and evaluation technique. 
Medium Medium Any No 
Human 
Reliability 
Analysis 
(HRA) 
Human reliability assessment 
(HRA) deals with the impact of 
humans on system performance 
and can be used to evaluate 
human error influences on the 
system. 
Medium Medium Medium Yes 
SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
Root Cause 
Analysis 
(Single 
Loss Analysis) 
A single loss that has occurred 
is analyzed in order to 
understand contributory causes 
and how the system or process 
can be improved to avoid such 
future losses. The analysis shall 
consider what controls were in 
place at the time the loss 
occurred and how controls might 
be improved. 
Medium Low Medium No 
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Scenario 
Analysis 
Possible future scenarios are 
identified through imagination or 
extrapolation from the present 
and different risks considered 
assuming each of these 
scenarios might occur. This can 
be done formally or informally 
qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Medium High Medium No 
Toxicological 
Risk 
Assessment  
Hazards are identified and 
analyzed and possible pathways 
by which a specified target might 
be exposed to the hazard are 
identified. Information on the 
level of exposure and the nature 
of harm caused by a given level 
of exposure are combined to 
give a measure of the probability 
that the specified harm will 
occur. 
High High Medium Yes 
Business 
Impact 
Analysis 
Provides an analysis of how key 
disruption risks could affect an 
organization’s operations and 
identifies and quantifies the 
capabilities that would be 
required to manage it. 
Medium Medium Medium No 
Fault Tree 
Analysis 
A technique which starts with the 
undesired event (top event) and 
determines all the ways in which 
it could occur. These are 
displayed graphically in a logical 
tree diagram. Once the fault tree 
has been developed, 
consideration should be given to 
ways of reducing or eliminating 
potential causes/sources. 
High High Medium Yes 
Event Tree 
Analysis 
Using inductive reasoning to 
translate probabilities of different 
initiating events into possible 
outcomes. 
Medium Medium Medium Yes 
Cause/ 
Consequence 
Analysis 
A combination of fault and event 
tree analysis that allows 
inclusion of time delays. Both 
causes and consequences of an 
initiating event are considered. 
High Medium High Yes 
Cause-and-
Effect 
Analysis 
An effect can have a number of 
contributory factors which may 
be grouped into different 
categories. Contributory factors 
are identified often through 
brainstorming and displayed in a 
tree structure or fishbone 
diagram. 
Low Low Medium No 
FUNCTION ANALYSIS 
FMEA and 
FMECA 
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis) is a technique which 
identifies failure modes and 
mechanisms, and their effects. 
There are several types of 
FMEA: Design (or product) 
FMEA which is used for 
components and products. 
System FMEA which is used for 
systems. Process FMEA which 
is used for manufacturing and 
assembly processes. Service 
FMEA and Software FMEA. 
FMEA may be followed by a 
criticality analysis which defines 
the significance of each failure 
mode, qualitatively, semi-
qualitatively, or quantitatively 
(FMECA). The criticality analysis 
may be based on the probability 
that the failure mode will result in 
Medium Medium Medium Yes 
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system failure, or the level of risk 
associated with the failure mode, 
or a risk priority number. 
Reliability-
Centered 
Maintenance 
A method to identify the policies 
that should be implemented to 
manage failures so as to 
efficiently and effectively achieve 
the required safety, availability 
and economy of operation for all 
types of equipment. 
Medium Medium Medium Yes 
Sneak 
Analysis 
(Sneak 
Circuit 
Analysis) 
A methodology for identifying 
design errors. A sneak condition 
is a latent hardware, software, or 
integrated condition that may 
cause an unwanted event to 
occur or may inhibit a desired 
event and is not caused by 
component failure. These 
conditions are characterized by 
their random nature and ability 
to escape detection during the 
most rigorous of standardized 
system tests. Sneak conditions 
can cause improper operation, 
loss of system availability, 
program delays, or even death 
or injury to personnel. 
Medium Medium Medium No 
HAZOP  
Hazard and 
Operability 
Studies 
A general process of risk 
identification to define possible 
deviations from the expected or 
intended performance. It uses a 
guideword based system. 
The criticalities of the deviations 
are assessed. 
Medium High High No 
HACCP 
Hazard 
Analysis and 
Critical 
Control 
Points 
A systematic, proactive, and 
preventive system for assuring 
product quality, reliability and 
safety of processes by 
measuring and monitoring 
specific characteristics which are 
required to be within defined 
limits. 
Medium Medium Medium No 
    CONTROLS ASSESSMENT 
LOPA 
(Layers of 
Protection 
Analysis) 
(May also be called barrier 
analysis). It allows controls and 
their effectiveness to be 
evaluated. 
Medium Medium Medium Yes 
Bow Tie 
Analysis 
A simple diagrammatic way of 
describing and analyzing the 
pathways of a risk from hazards 
to outcomes and reviewing 
controls. It can be considered to 
be a combination of the logic of 
a fault tree analyzing the cause 
of an event (represented by the 
knot of a bow tie) and an event 
tree analyzing the 
consequences. 
Medium High Medium Yes 
STATISTICAL METHODS 
Markov 
Analysis 
Markov analysis, sometimes 
called State-space analysis, is 
commonly used in the analysis 
of repairable complex systems 
that can exist in multiple states, 
including various degraded 
states. 
High Low High Yes 
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Monte 
Carlo 
Analysis 
Monte Carlo simulation is used 
to establish the aggregate 
variation in a system resulting 
from variations in the system, for 
a number of inputs, where each 
input has a defined distribution 
and the inputs are related to the 
output via defined relationships. 
The analysis can be used for a 
specific model where the 
interactions of the various inputs 
can be mathematically defined. 
The inputs can be based upon a 
variety of distribution types 
according to the nature of the 
uncertainty they are intended to 
represent. For risk assessment, 
triangular distributions or beta 
distributions are commonly 
used. 
High Low High Yes 
Bayesian 
Analysis 
A statistical procedure which 
utilizes prior distribution data to 
assess the probability of the 
result. Bayesian analysis 
depends upon the accuracy of 
the prior distribution to deduce 
an accurate result. Bayesian 
belief networks model cause-
and-effect in a variety of 
domains by capturing 
probabilistic relationships of 
variable inputs to derive a result. 
High Low High Yes 
SOWFTWARE ASSESSMENT (Examples) 
Oracle’s 
Primavera 
Risk 
Analysis 
Primavera Risk Analysis 
integrates directly with project 
schedules and cost estimates to 
provide quick and easy 
techniques to model risks and 
analyze the cost and schedule 
impacts of mitigating them. 
Use distribution to determine 
confidence levels for project 
pans and schedule and cost 
contingencies.* Available at:  
https://www.oracle.com/applicati
ons/primavera/products/risk-
analysis.html 
High Medium High Yes 
RamRisk RamRisk is a web-based risk 
register specifically developed to 
support the optimal handling of 
risks and opportunities. 
RamRisk complies fully with ISO 
31000, 'Risk management – 
Principles and guidelines'. User-
friendly and flexible user 
interface that makes it easy to 
setup new projects with 
templates and make personal 
user defined views* Available at: 
https://ramrisk.com/ 
High Medium High Yes 
RAMAS RAMAS Risk Calc 4.0 computes 
with scalars, intervals, fuzzy 
numbers, probability 
distributions, and interval 
bounds on probability 
distributions. * Available at: 
http://www.ramas.com/ 
High High High Yes 
Resilinc The Resilinc is the standard for 
measuring, benchmarking, and 
tracking companies’ supply 
chain risk and resiliency. It is a 
comprehensive assessment of a 
company’s supply chain 
resiliency. The metric is based 
High Medium High No 
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on extensive data collected by 
Resilinc working with tens of 
thousands of organizations as 
part of our global supply chain 
visibility initiative. It builds on key 
metrics: Transparency, Network 
Resiliency, Continuity 
Robustness, Performance and 
Supply Chain Risk Program 
Maturity.* Available at: 
https://www.resilinc.com/ 
RiskCalc The cloud-based platform 
provides a powerful array of 
tools for risk management, 
model development, 
benchmarking, impairment 
analysis, capital allocation and 
strategic business decision 
making.* Available at: 
https://rafa.moodysanalytics.com
/riskcalc 
High Medium High Yes 
 
 
NON-PROBABILISTIC METHODS 
Imprecise 
Probabilities 
Expand the possibilities of 
established probabilistic risk 
quantification to reason more 
reliably with limited information 
on actual probability 
distributions. The approach 
allows decision makers to review 
and discuss coherent and 
plausible ranges of probabilities. 
High High High Yes 
The NUSAP 
Tool 
The NUSAP Tool adds 
qualitative information to the 
uncertainty and risk analysis in a 
structured manner, informing the 
modelling, analysis and decision 
making process by making 
issues such as data origin, 
quality and key assumptions 
transparent. 
High Medium High Yes 
Robust 
Decision 
Making  
The main principles of Robust 
Decision Making are: to explore 
a wide variety of relevant 
uncertainties, connect short-term 
targets to long-term goals, 
commit to short-term actions 
while keeping options open and 
continuously monitor the 
environment and take actions if 
necessary. 
High High High Yes 
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Appendix 5: Code in R 
 
Code in R 
# 10 experts (replicates of each other; could be 20) 
# 6 models (c-boxes, beta distributions, point values, intervals, weighted intervals, Burgman 
elicitations) 
# 4 aggregation methods (average, mixture, enveloping, pooling) 
##################################################################################
# 
# number of experts 
some = 10             # but note that only a max of 9 are plotted 
##################################################################################
# 
# MODELS 
# natural frequencies 
n = floor(rexp(some,1/15))    # randomly constructed 
k = floor(runif(some,0,n))    # randomly constructed 
 
# confidence boxes 
CBox <- function(k,n) return(env(beta(k, n-k+1), beta(k+1, n-k))) 
c = rep(CBox(0,0),some) 
for (i in 1:some) c[[i]] = CBox(k[[i]],n[[i]]) 
 
# beta distributions 
b = rep(beta(1,1),some) 
for (i in 1:some) b[[i]] = beta(0.5+k[[i]],0.5+n[[i]]-k[[i]]) 
 
# point values 
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x = rep(0,some) 
for (i in 1:some) x[[i]] = midpoint(mean(c[[i]])) 
 
# intervals 
ci <- function(b,level=0.95,p1=(1-level)/2,p2=1-(1-level)/2) interval(left(cut(b,p1)), right(cut(b,p2))) 
v=w=NULL; for (i in 1:some) { CI = ci(c[[i]]); v = c(v,left(CI)); w = c(w,right(CI)) } 
 
# weighted intervals 
l = runif(some, 0.5, 1) 
y=z=NULL; for (i in 1:some) { CI = ci(c[[i]], level=l[[i]]); y = c(y,left(CI)); z = c(z,right(CI)) } 
yzl = list(y=y,z=z,l=l) 
 
# Burgman elicitations 
yzlx = list(y=y,z=z,l=l,x=x) 
 
 
##################################################################################
# 
# Plot the controversy for each model 
 
par(mfrow=c(2,3)) 
 
blank <- function() plot(NULL,xlim=c(0,1), ylim=c(0,1), xlab ='', ylab = '') 
blank(); title(main = 'C-Box', xlab ='Estimates', ylab = 'Cumulative probability'); for (i in 1:some) 
lines(c[[i]], col = i) 
blank(); title(main = 'Beta', xlab ='Estimates', ylab = 'Cumulative probability' ); for (i in 1:some) 
lines(b[[i]], col = i) 
plot(density(x), xlim = c(0, 1), main = 'Estimates Density', xlab ='Estimates') 
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plot(NULL, xlim = c(0,1), ylim = c(1,10), main = 'Intervals', xlab ='Estimates', ylab = 'Expert ID'); for (i 
in 1:some){ lines(c(v[[i]],w[[i]]),rep(i,2), col = i, lwd = 2); points(x[i],i, col = i, pch = 19);} 
plot(NULL, xlim = c(0,1), ylim = c(1,10), main = 'Weighted Intervals', xlab ='Estimates', ylab = 'Expert 
ID'); for (i in 1:some){ lines(c(y[[i]],z[[i]]),rep(i,2), col = i, lwd = 2); points(x[i],i, col = i, pch = 19);} 
 
##################################################################################
# 
# Plot each expert with all models 
 
par(mfrow=c(3,3)) 
par(mar=c(2.1,4.1,2.1,1.1)) 
for (i in 1:min(some,9)) {  
  plot(c[[i]],col='blue', main = paste('Expert ', i, sep = ''));  
  lines(b[[i]],col='red', lwd = 1);  
  lines(c(v[[i]],w[[i]]),c(0.3,0.3), lwd = 2) 
  lines(c(y[[i]],z[[i]]),c(0.5,0.5), lwd = 2, col = 'green') 
  points(x[[i]],0.5, pch = 19, cex=1.5) 
  } 
 
par(mfrow=c(1,1)) 
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##################################################################################
# 
 
# AGGREGATIONS 
##################################################################################
# 
# average 
 
Ac = c[[1]]; for (i in 2:some) Ac = Ac %|+|% c[[i]]; Ac = Ac / some   # convolutive average 
Ab = b[[1]]; for (i in 2:some) Ab = Ab %|+|% b[[i]]; Ab = Ab / some   # convolutive average 
Ax = mean(x) 
Avw = c(mean(v), mean(w)) 
Ayzl = c(sum(y*l) / sum(l), sum(z*l) / sum(l)) 
Ayzlx = c(Ayzl, Ax) 
otherAyzl = Ayzl                    
Y = (y - x) * (0.95 / l) + x 
Z = (z - x) * (0.95 / l) + x 
Y = pmax(0,Y)                      # cannot exceed zero or one 
Z = pmin(1,Z)                      # cannot exceed zero or one 
Ayzl = c(mean(Y), mean(Z)) 
 
Ayzlx = c(Ayzl, Ax) 
 
# debug 
# plot(Z, ylim=c(0,1)) 
# for (i in 1:some) lines(c(i,i), c(y[[i]],z[[i]]), col='blue') 
# points(x, col='red') 
# lines(l) 
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# points(Y) 
# points(Z) 
 
 
######################################################################### 
# mixture 
 
Mc = mixture.pbox(c) 
Mb = mixture.pbox(b) 
Mx = histogram(x, mn=0, mx=1,conf=0) 
I = rep(pbox(0,0),some) 
for (i in 1:some) I[[i]] = pbox(interval(v[[i]],w[[i]])) 
Mvw = mixture.pbox(I) 
for (i in 1:some) I[[i]] = pbox(interval(y[[i]],z[[i]])) 
Myzl = mixture.pbox(I,w=l) 
for (i in 1:some) I[[i]] = pbox(interval(Y[[i]],Z[[i]])) # use extrapolations Y and Z 
Myzlx = mixture.pbox(I) 
 
 
####################################################################### 
# enveloping  
 
Ec = env(c) 
Eb = env(b) 
Ex = range(x) 
Evw = range(c(v,w))     # i.e., c(min(v), max(w)) 
Eyzl = range(c(y,z))     # i.e., c(min(y), max(z))   # ignores levels l 
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Eyzlx = list(range = Eyzl, mean = Ex) 
 
 
####################################################################### 
# pooling 
 
Pc = CBox(sum(k),sum(n)) 
Pb = beta(0.5+sum(k),0.5+sum(n)-sum(k))  
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“Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; 
everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted.” 
 
- Albert Einstein - 
 
 
 
